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 ABSTRACT 





Energy has recently become a very important item on the political agenda of 
most Western countries; it is bound to be even more so in the future, due to the increas-
ing scarcity of natural gas and oil. With Russia using the energy weapons to advance its 
economic and political goals, energy security has become a central topic in European 
politics. Important political bargaining models like game theory can offer valuable in-
sights and contribute to the explanation of the outcome of important political confronta-
tions like the ones between Russia and its former satellites. Game theory, however, fails 
to adequately account for an evolving context which can affect the preferences of the 
disputing actors, an issue which is likely to systematically produce inaccurate explana-
tions and predictions. The relevance of the preferences of external actors will be demon-
strated in this work by finding empirical evidence that the start of the dispute has dam-
aged GDP and stock market performances of external players; in fact, this would give 
them a reason to become a relevant part of the game by exerting pressure on the two 
players so as to reach an agreement in the shortest time possible. The growing impor-
tance of external actors, I argue, needs to be modeled by game theory because, as it was 
especially the case for the Russia-Ukraine dispute in 2006, their role can be pivotal to in 
determining the duration and the outcome of the political bargaining. I select a Pooled 
Panel Nonlinear Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (PP-NARCH) model 
and Box-Tiao intervention models to support the validity of what I define a Fully-Fuzzy 
game. I rely more on the general message conveyed by the statistical models consi-
dered, thus freeing my analysis from the specificity of the model chosen for its better fit. 
My work, however, would be incomplete if simply finding empirical evidence of a neg-
ative effect of the gas disputes on the real growth of GDP and main stock markets of 
European countries. I summarize the most relevant statements, agreements, and partner-
ships which are likely to have exerted pressure on Russia and the other negotiating 
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(…) it doesn’t matter whether the forecast of the future is true or not. If a mathemati-
cian should predict a long and happy reign for me, a time of peace and prosperity for 
the Empire -- Eh, would that not be well? (Asimov, 1988) 
 
 
Energy has recently become a very important item on the political agenda of 
most Western countries and it is bound to be even more so in the future due to the in-
creasing scarcity of natural gas and oil. Energy resources and their allocation have been 
the central element of conflict between producer countries and the countries in the dis-
tribution systems in recent years. The intensity of these conflicts, however, has reached 
over the past 6 years a level that was unseen since the seventies. More specifically, po-
litical scientists have noted that the conflicts between Russia and some of its former sa-
tellites beginning in 2004, can be justified not only in economic terms, but also, and 
more importantly in political terms.  
In the literature, political scientists attribute this new Russian approach towards 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova not only to the Russian desire to collect as many finan-
cial resources as possible from these countries, but also to use the financial leverage 
gained by increasingly expensive gas exports to gain economic and political control 
over these countries. In fact, Putin himself recognized the importance of gaining access 
to the old Soviet pipeline system in order to restore, at least in part, Soviet prestige. It is 
probably a secondary goal to secure a steady flow of gas and oil through its former sa-
tellites, when one compares it to that of establishing a tighter economic and political re-
lationship with those areas that play an important to role in the Russian economy. 
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The relevance of this topic, however, is not in the expansion of Russian political 
influence per se, as it was the case during the Cold War. The concern of the highest Eu-
ropean spheres stems from the growing suspicion that Russia may also use the energy 
weapon to advance its political agenda in Eastern and Western Europe.  
Political bargaining models can offer valuable insights and contribute to the ex-
planation of the outcome of important political confrontations like the ones between 
Russia and its former satellites. However, the understanding of the evolution of these 
confrontations can depend on the quality of the formal models that one uses to disen-
tangle all the threads that one identifies as relevant. If one of the important threads is not 
accounted for in the model, then our understanding will be inherently flawed and the 
adoption of the model, however accurate and refined, will systematically produce inac-
curate explanations and predictions. 
The main goal and contribution of the present work is that of showing that one 
of the most respected political bargaining models, game theory, has thus far been li-
mited by its inability to deal with a changing environment. Several modifications to 
classical game structures have been proposed since its conception in the 1920s: evolu-
tionary games (Danielson 1998; Binmore and Samuelson 1992; Nachbar 1992), infini-
tively repeated games (Myerson 1994; Shubik 1991), multi-agent games (Snyder and 
Diesing 1977; Dixit and Nalebuff 1991), two-level games (Putnam 1988), nested games 
(Tsebelis 1990; Scholz 1991), fuzzy games (Aristidou and Sarangi 2006; Kandel and 
Zhang 1998), neutrosophic games (Bhattacharya, Smarandache, Khoshnevisan 2006) 
supergames, and metagames (Snyder and Diesing 1977). Despite of their complexity, 
none of these enhancements is designed to account for an evolving environment where 
additional actors‟ preferences are gradually included in the political bargaining process. 
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The relevance of the preferences of these actors will be demonstrated in this 
work by finding empirical evidence that the start of the dispute has damaged other ex-
ternal economies; in fact, this would give them a reason to be a relevant part of the 
game by exerting pressure on the two players so as to reach an agreement in the shortest 
time possible. The growing importance of external actors, I argue, needs to be modeled 
by game theory because, especially the case for the Russia-Ukraine dispute in 2006, 
their role can be central in determining the duration and the outcome of the political 
bargaining. 
I use a statistical model to find empirical evidence that politics and economics 
interact with each other so intensely that politically-induced gas crises (especially those 
from 2004 to 2009) are capable of influencing GDP and stock market indices. This sup-
ports my hypothesis that game theory should take into consideration the preferences of 
the actors within the proximate environment and sets the stage for my representation of 
dispute through what I term a Fully-Fuzzy game. It is important to note, however, that 
these preferences although relevant to explain the outcome of the bargaining process, 
may have nothing to do with the original causes that led to the start of a dispute. I be-
lieve that when studying these kind of crises, one needs to realize that are at least two 
phases that need to be modeled: one in which the preferences of the players that were 
behind the start of dispute are relevant, and one in which the preferences of all actors in-
terested in the resolution matter. If one wants to understand why a specific outcome is 
the result of the bargaining process, I argue that one needs to broaden the reference con-
text to comprise all the other actors that may have influenced through diplomatic acts or 
statements the preferences of the disputing actors. 
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Thus, I hypothesize that the start of a dispute leads to a negative trend in the real 
GDP and in the stock markets of several important European oil importing countries 
that belong to the same environment of the two disputing countries. I use quarterly GDP 
data since I believe these are a good measure of the medium-to-long term effects of the 
disputes on external economies, without having to deal with the intricacies of daily 
stock market data, which reflects not only traders‟ expectations, but also speculations 
and stochastic behaviors that may be erroneously attributed to the variables. The kind of 
argument advanced in this work, however, requires also studying the statistical effects 
of these crises on a daily basis. For this reason, I provide a statistical analysis also of the 
main stock market index for each of 9 countries considered in this work. 
Given that the data used is affected by heteroskedasticity, which is evident in 
correspondence of the negative downturn in the economies of the countries studied in 
this work, I select a Pooled Panel Nonlinear Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroskedas-
ticity (PP-NARCH) model, which provides a better general fit of the data and more con-
sistent estimation of several control variables added in the model. Nonetheless, I rely 
more on the general message conveyed by the several models considered, thus freeing 
my analysis from the specificity of the model chosen for its better fit. For the stock 
market model, however, I select a Pooled Cross Sectional Time Series model with con-
stant variance (for simplicity identified as PCSTS to distinguish it from the GARCH 
model), given the higher speed with which it can process the data and the lack of a sig-
nificant advantage of using a more complicated GARCH model. 
My work, however, would be incomplete without an analysis of the political 
maneuvers that may have affected the bargaining process between Russia and the transit 
countries. In fact, just by finding empirical evidence of a negative effects of the gas dis-
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putes on the real growth of GDP and the main stock market of the European countries 
would not suffice to prove that their preferences should be gradually incorporated in the 
game theoretic model: it may (implausibly) be that all EU countries may prefer to re-
main neutral, without expressing any concern regarding the potential effects of pro-
longed gas supplies disruptions both in Europe in general and in the countries directly 
involved in the dispute. The analysis of the most relevant facts reveals not only that 
countries did react to the disputes, but that they also exerted pressure on Russia and the 
other negotiating country. This pressure took the form of public statements about the re-
liability of Russia as a gas supplier, the concern about the negative effects of gas disrup-
tions on the EU, the establishment of new institutions designed to predict and anticipate 
possible disruptions that may damage the economies of the EU members, and, most im-
portantly a renewed interest for alternative energy resources and the construction on 
new infrastructure designed to bypass Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and to reduce Eu-
ropean dependence on Russian energy. Some of the reactions selected as the most im-
portant are found to have a significant and positive effect on the stock markets of sever-
al EU countries. 
This work starts with a chapter on the relevance of energy security in today‟s 
political agendas. This chapter quickly narrows down the energy security issue to the 
specific case of Europe and its dependence especially on Russian gas. As I specify in 
this chapter, oil, very important for Europe as well, is not much of concern for European 
leaders, given the large array of producers available. Gas, however, is a much more crit-
ical issue, given the centrality of Russia in terms of exports, and the use that Russia 
made of it to gain access to the distribution networks in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. 
The chapter continues with a review of the explanations of some important political 
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scientists regarding the motivation behind the Russian use of the energy weapon and a 
description of the main disputes that occurred starting in 2004. I then introduce political 
bargaining theory, with its strengths and weaknesses. Here I also discuss the preemi-
nence of game theory among the political bargaining theories, describing in what way 
the literature praises it and what are the most common critiques made to this theory. At 
this point I only briefly hint that game theory lacks the ability of accounting for an 
evolving context. 
In Chapter 3, I provide a review of some articles published in important journals 
that offer a statistical analysis which shares, at least in part, some of the methodological 
choices adopted in this work. I continue with a description of the methodology chosen 
to support my argument, starting from Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average 
(ARIMA) models, incorporated in the final specification identified, moving on with a 
description of intervention models and a review of Generalized Auto Regressive Condi-
tional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models and some of the most important generaliza-
tions. I discuss variables, model selection and model evaluation techniques adopted. 
Mainly due to my use of quarterly data, Principal Component Analysis is used in order 
to retain as much variance as possible from all control variables selected, while at the 
same time drastically reducing the collinearity which would inevitably affect the tests of 
significance.  
The results of model chosen as the “most fit” are then analyzed in Chapter 4, not 
just from a methodological point of view, but also in the larger context of the nature of 
the cases studies examined in this work and the true meaning of the significance of the 
independent variables.  
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Given the results, I offer my own critique, pointing out that game theory appears 
to be limited by its inability to work with a changing environment, where new actors 
emerge as relevant players. I test my argument against the most important modifications 
of the classic game, noting also that my critique goes in the same direction as that of 
Gintis,  recently published in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, but it 
differs from that for being more general. It is at this point that I informally introduce the 
Fully-Fuzzy game. Thus, I make comparisons across the cases bridging the narratives 
describing the case studies with the quantitative results. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the purpose of this work, its main contributions and what 
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2 Gas Disputes and Soviet Foreign Policy 
 
2.1 European dependence on Russian Gas 
 
Energy is a growing issue in today‟s world arena. Energy has been an element of 
the national security agenda and foreign policy of many states for more than a century, 
bringing not only wealth, technology, and sociological progress, but also aggressive 
foreign policies. Here national security is viewed as in Nye (1990), who maintains that 
national security has evolved over the past few years from a predominantly military is-
sue to a more economic and ecological issue. Interdependence, which has made modern 
countries reliant on the political and economical performance of other countries, has 
changed the global situation from a set of highly self-sufficient areas to a set of highly 
interconnected individual states, whose survival is largely determined by the interna-
tional situation. The destruction of the adversary is nowadays no longer a feasible solu-
tion, Nye says, in that it is assumed to lead to catastrophic consequences also for the ag-
gressor, since all states are mutually dependent. The realist concept of „national interest‟ 
is now ill-suited to represent the underlying force driving modern global affairs, since it 
now incorporates the stability and the prosperity of other mutually-dependent states as 
well (Keohane and Nye 2001). 
Russia‟s control over European energy has been consolidating over the years, 
and it is now the supplier of over twenty-seven percent of natural gas consumed in the 
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EU
1
 (Howorth 2007, 247, Lebedev 2010), not to mention its investments in sixteen dif-
ferent European countries, including Italy, Britain, Germany and Holland (Lucas 2008, 
165). The lack of a unified EU energy foreign policy and the growing European depen-
dence especially on Russia‟s natural gas (given the fact that it cannot be transported in 
ways other than pipelines, unlike oil)
2
 has the potential of being capable of undermining 
the political independence of the European countries. According to Lucas (2008, 163) 
and Nichol, Woehrel and Bernard (2006), Russia has clearly stated its intentions of us-
ing its energy reserves for political purposes. This can be found in the Russian energy 
strategy approved by the Government of the Russian Federation in 2003, where one can 
read that: 
The new factor for the period up to 2020 will be the participation of Russia, as a large supplier of 
energy resources, in securing of the world energy safety. Forming of the common energy and energy and 
transport infrastructure in the regions of Europe and Asia, development of the international energy and 
transport systems, providing of the undiscriminatory transit of energy answer the strategic interests of 
Russia. In order to reach these aims, the state will foster the participation of Russian joint-stock compa-
nies in development and realization of the great international projects of transport of gas, oil and energy 
both in western and eastern lines (Ministry Of Energy of The Russian Federation 2003). 
 
A similar intent has been claimed to be evident also in Putin‟s personal belief on 
the matter expressed in his dissertation
3
, in which he clearly declares that the manage-
ment of the energy sector is so important that it has to be taken over by the Russian 
government (Lucas 2008, 163). A similar statement is found also in Yasmann‟s (2006) 
article, in which Putin is reported to envision Russia‟s future as that of an “energy su-
                                               
1 Data refers to 2008 figures. It is also important to note that, as I will show below, Russia also depends 
on Europe, being the latter the major client of Russian energy; however, Russia has demonstrated over the 
past 4 years that it is willing to use the energy weapon to achieve it economic and political goals. 
2 The Liquefied Natural gas market (LNG) is still expanding and still represents a more expensive source 
of gas than traditionally-delivered gas. 
3 Lucas (2008) claims that it is possible that not even Putin was the true author of the dissertation. See 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2006-78-3a.cfm for more information (as reported by Lucas 2008: see 
footnote). 
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perpower” and of a leader in the energy market. Therefore, to Putin, energy is to be seen 
as the most powerful force in today‟s world and in the immediate future.  
Over the past few years, Russia has shown that if the condition is favorable, that 
is if the opponent is particularly weaker, it has no hesitation in resorting to coercion to 
achieve its purposes (Youngs 2008). When Russia abruptly doubled the price of the 
natural gas supply to Ukraine in 2009, and the latter refused to pay, at which point Rus-
sia halted the supply, Russia was clearly demonstrating to the world that the alignment 
between the Russian government and Gazprom
4
 had reached critical levels
5
 and that Eu-
rope had a new priority, if it wanted to assure that its citizens and its economy were not 
subject to the will of Russia (Lucas 2008, 168). 
Some have argued that Russia does not actually have much power in terms of 
energy coercion, since Russia needs Europe as its main energy market (Lucas). In some 
respects, such a statement is correct, but the knowledge and awareness that Russia can 
halt supplies and endure the loss of natural gas revenues for several months gives credi-
bility to the leverage that Russia has in terms of using energy coercion to advance other 
political ends. In other words, even though Russia will indeed be disadvantaged by the 
interruption of gas supplies to the Western countries, this will cause an immediate and 
                                               
4 Gazprom is the largest energy company in Russia. Its business is field exploration, and production, 
transportation, storage of energy sources like natural gas, oil, heat and electricity. Gazprom supplies the 
domestic market and is a key player in the supply of energy to several European countries. The strong 
connection between Gazprom and the Russian government is often emphasized by the fact that important 
political figures like Putin and Medvedev had previously played (or still do) a key role in Gazprom. The 
Russian government also owns a controlling share in Gazprom (Howorth 2007).  
5 Shaffer (2009, 121) maintains that the Russian government and its energy sector are so deeply linked to 
each other that the election of Dmitry Medvedev to the position of President of Russia should not sur-
prise, given his past as the Gazprom chairman. See also Youngs (2009, 90-93). 
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substantial disruption within the countries that depend on Russian gas, enabling Russia 
to possess bargaining leverage over the other contestant (Youngs 2008).  
In Europe, there exist several countries that heavily depend on Russian gas, 
some of them even totaling up to 100% of their gas demand and with an average of over 
fifty percent dependence on foreign gas (Energy Information Administration 2008, Ho-
worth 2007, Lucas 2008) and over twenty-seven percent on Russian gas (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 
Energy dependence on Russian gas of European countries. 
 
Up to one year may pass before Russia would start accruing the loss of revenues 
which stem from the sales of the gas (Howorth 2007). 
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Figure 2.1 
European dependence on Russian gas. 
 
Source: IEA Data, Gazprom Data, EPRINC calculations. Estimate for 2009 (Energy Policy 
Research Foundation. 2009) 
 
As said above, a sudden interruption of gas supplies would strike the economies 
of those countries that heavily depend on Russian gas, while their supplier would start 
feeling the blow some time later, depending on how well Russia is able to divert the gas 
to other consumers
6
. Up to one year may pass before Russia would start feeling the loss 
of revenues coming from the sales of the gas (Howorth 2007). This is a very large time 
in which Russia can exploit its leverage on its energy resources to extend its political in-
fluence
7
 (without actually territorial expansions)
8
 and increase the energy dependence of 
target countries. Even though energy weapons do not immediately produce the destruc-
tion and the likely loss of lives as much as a conventional attack would, energy disrup-
tions in the middle of the cold season might cause as much death and economic disaster 
                                               
6 Should Russia not be able to supply its excess gas to other countries, the sudden reduction in sale reve-
nues is likely to strike the Russian economy and political sphere harder than otherwise. 
7 Influence is here meant as the ability to defend one‟s interest without waging war and is conceptually 
similar to Nye‟s (1990) concept of soft power.  
8 See Oliker et al. (2009, 135-136). 
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as a military conflict, achieving the same results, that is the creation of instability, rais-
ing the likelihood of military conflict and paving the way for terroristic activities (Unit-
ed States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2008)
9. 
Moreover, Russia is in control of the old Soviet infrastructure
10
 that channels oil 
and gas from its surrounding regions to the West and is also the major buyer of the 
energy resources produced in the ex-Soviet republics, which it then resells to Europe at 
a higher price (Lucas 2008). 
 
                                               
9 USCSCFR (2008) from now on. 
10 This control can be direct, with stakes in the companies managing and/or owning them, or indirect, by 
having a tight economic and political control over the government and/or the companies operating with 
them (see picture below). 
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Figure 2.2 
Russian oil and gas pipeline system. 
 
Source: IEA11, CIA. 
A portion of the profit coming from those sales has been invested in Airbus, 
which lately it has become known that it may have extended those shares in the compa-
ny, which happens to be an important provider of services and goods that are used to 
improve Europe‟s security (USCSCFR 2008). 
The best option for Europe and the US is thus that of diversifying the supply of 
oil and gas, by dismantling the monopoly that Russia has, especially on some Eastern 
                                               
11 See http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/images/PrimaryOGPipestoEur06.gif. 
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European countries. Better efficiency and new pipelines that introduce competition in 
the supply of energy products is currently seen by European leaders as the best tool to 
weaken Russia‟s energy dominance over Europe. 
Nonetheless, both the construction of new pipelines and an increased efficiency 
involve mutual understanding and a more consistent and unified strategy on the part of 
the European countries, which is lacking as of now. So far, many European countries 
have demonstrated little interest in finding a common energy security
12
 policy, to the 
point where they have closed private deals with Moscow or joined non-European part-
ners in constructing new energy infrastructures, even though they are aware that the 
economy of those countries is heavily dependent on the continued flow of energy (Lu-
cas 2008, Shaffer 2009, 133-134). 
This has not been the case so far, in that Russia has close dealings with several 
countries like Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary for a direct supply of energy (Lucas 2008, 
Young 2009, 8687). An agreement was also concluded with Germany to construct the 
so-called “Nord Stream pipeline”, and similarly, with Italy to construct the “South 
                                               
12 Pascual and Elkind (2009, 2) note that „energy security‟ is a term that does not only refer to energy in-
dependence, but it involves also considerations about the relationships between energy suppliers and 
energy consumers, about the necessary transition to low-carbon energy economies, and about the man-
agement of the side effects of our using carbon fossil fuels. Energy security is based on three components: 
reliability, affordability and environmental friendliness (Shaffer 2009, 92). Reliability refers to conti-
nuous, uninterrupted supplies over time, affordability refers to the price levels that promote economic 
growth and environmental friendliness refers to policies that do not impact the current environmental sit-
uation. Sounders (2008) notes that “energy security” takes on a different meaning for Europeans and 
Americans. For Americans, energy security mainly refers to oil and its large availability on the global 
market, possibly at a very low price. For Europeans, energy security is an issue that does not really have 
much to do with oil; it is more about natural gas, and achieving an abundant and steady flow of natural 
gas from Russia. To the author, this conceptual difference is what characterizes the different diplomatic 
approach that Europe and the US have in dealing with Russia. In this work, I will mainly discuss reliabili-
ty issues (Europe in general) and affordability (Ukraine and Belarus) issues. 
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Stream pipeline”13 (Lucas 2008). The result of this is a lower interest on the part of 
these countries to unite their political and economic needs with the other European 
states, thus weakening every effort to improve Europe‟s energy dependence on Russian 
energy resources (Lebedev 2010). 
Starting from 2006, Russia has demonstrated its resolve in using its dominance 
in the energy market to project influence not only in Europe, but also in Asia and along 
the Southern Russian territories (Douglas 2008, 317). Gazprom‟s decisions cannot be 
interpreted just from a business point of view. Given the fact that Gazprom is a state 
owned company
14
, and that both Putin and Medvedev served as the Chairman of Gaz-
prom‟s Board of Directors, it is a priority for Russia to make sure that the company 
stays in good shape (Lucas 2008, 163-164). That is not only because that will grant a 
consistent flow of financial resources into the country, but it will also allow Russia to 
use those energy resources to accomplish what has been put forth by the Russian for-
eign policy agenda (Douglas 2008, 320-321). According to the United States Congress 
(2008) Gazprom has even preferred in some cases some financial losses in order to 
achieve political victories, reducing at least partly the flow of gas to six different coun-
tries. 
It is argued that the increased dependence on Russian energy resources is the re-
sult of the lack of consistency and unity among European countries (Lucas 2008). As 
mentioned above, private agreements between some countries and Russia itself have 
weakened the European will to challenge dependence on Gazprom services. The Na-
                                               
13 The South Stream pipeline replaced the Blue Stream II project which would have connected existing 
Russian infrastructure with Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Croatia. 
14 Fifty-one percent of the stakes of Gazprom are in fact owned by the Russian government (Lucas 2008). 
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bucco pipeline
15
 is to be seen as a relevant energy source that is able to weaken Russia‟s 
dominant position in the European energy market. Such a new pipeline will be in direct 
competition with Russian gas and infrastructure, diversifying Europe‟s energy imports, 
allowing it to be in contact with Central Asian gas and reducing Russia‟s coercive pow-
er over Europe. As of now, in fact, Russia is the only one that has access to Turkmenis-
tan‟s and Kazakhstan‟s gas which Russia is using to support its own economy and by 
exporting the gas it produces at a much higher price than that imported from these re-
gions (Stern 2005, 71-72; Youngs 2008). 
The European energy security issue is also characterized on the one hand by Eu-
ropean states and their lack of a unified strategy, and on the other hand by a Russian 
government and its majority stakes in Gazprom. Government and energy companies 
have already become one entity under Putin, whose intentions are clearly those of ex-
panding Russian economic and political influence. It is spread in terms of unity of inten-
tions which has given the Russians the advantage that has resulted in European depen-
dence on foreign gas. The Nabucco pipeline is a direct threat to Russian dominance, in 
that should Russia really lose the privileged access to the gas it is currently selling 
(Turkmenistan, for example), it would have to support its economy with its own gas, 
thus losing the revenues that it could have benefitted from by selling it. 
                                               
15 Nabucco is part of the EU‟s Southern Gas Corridor project and is a natural gas pipeline supported by 
several European countries to erode the Russian dominance in the natural gas market. Nabucco starts 
from Turkey and reaches Austria, crossing several countries like Romania, Hungary, Bulgary. This 
project was proposed by the EU as an alternative to the Russian exports of natural gas, seen as unreliable 
especially after the Ukraine-Russia dispute in 2006 and it aims at granting EU access to Middle Eastern 
and Caspian natural gas resources. Nabucco may be further expanded in the future by connecting Turkey 
to Greece and Italy or connecting Greece to Italy through Albanian territories (Trans Adriatic pipeline). 
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According to the United States Congress (2008, 2009) in order to help Europe 
achieve its energy security goals, it is also important that the democratic transition of 
the new republics be aided in reaching maturity and stability. Russia has also demon-
strated unwillingness to allow this pipeline to be constructed by offering the creation of 
the South Stream pipeline, which would nullify the construction of Nabucco from an 
economic point of view, since the markets that it would serve would be saturated or 
nearly saturated by the gas transported via the new Russian pipelines. Allowing the 
completion of the Nabucco pipeline would seriously impair Russia‟s monopoly over the 
gas market. Russia had primarily offered to become a partner in the works, but this was 
refused by the state members since it would have made their efforts meaningless. The 
main goal of constructing the Nabucco pipeline system is that of reducing Russian con-
trol of the energy market (Lucas 2008). 
Clearly seeing that that is the goal of Nabucco pipeline, Russia has first offered 
to build a pipeline that will transport gas to Turkey therefore excluding the Central 
Asian gas supplies that would have been provided by the Nabucco pipeline (Lucas 
2008;). After Turkey refused to allow this pipeline to be constructed, Russia has pro-
posed the construction of another pipeline that will transport gas to Bulgaria and contin-
ue to Greece, thus ending up supplying the same markets Nabucco was designed for. 
Russia‟s statements that there is just not enough gas to justify the construction of the 
Nabucco pipeline is another attempt to weaken the investors‟ will to support the project  
(Lucas). The same strategy was adopted in the case of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipe-
line, where it was also added that the project was nothing more than just an American 
political idea. As it can be clearly seen, time is the key variable in this game. In fact, the 
party that is able to construct its own pipeline will also probably win such a game, pro-
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vided that the newly constructed supply channel will likely rule out the economic feasi-
bility of a similar construction by a delayed party. Once again, however, a disparity in 
resolution will determine the results of this economic dispute. Nabucco, in fact, will be 
the result of the confidence of its main investors that it leads to high profit. In addition, 
there is a Russia-backed plan, with the government and Gazprom aligned to reach their 
goals, in which they are willing to support economic losses if that entails the achieve-
ment of long term economic and political influence. 
For Russia, the construction of the proposed pipelines would entail a further 
strengthening of its dominant position, reducing the economic appeal of the Nabucco 
project (probably leading to its abandonment), and the European countries would be left 
to compete against each other in order to extract privileged access to Russian energy. 
This is a precarious situation in that it would place Russia in the position to use its eco-
nomic leverage to extract political favors and extend its influence in the whole of Eu-
rope. Russia‟s interests in the Caspian Sea would be highly threatened after a two cen-
tury long monopoly over it, which has been estimated to contain energy reserves whose 
value exceeds the $4 trillion threshold (Belopolsky 2009). Moreover, as South Stream is 
constructed, this would provide Russia with another advantage, namely the possibility 
to expand its gas supply to other European countries, de facto gaining supreme domin-






                                               
16 The White Stream pipeline would go from Turkmenistan through Azerbaijan to the Georgian port of 
Supsa and then through the Black Sea and through Crimea to the EU. 
17 Please note that Nord Stream, the underwater pipeline system under costruction to bypass transit coun-
tries is not included in this table, since it is a project that is supported by Russia and the EU, in that even 
though it increases Russia‟s role as energy supplier, it bypasses Ukraine and Belarus, thus increasing the 
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Table 2.2 
EU energy policy options 
Option Primary goal Supporters Opponents 
Nabucco EU direct access to Central Asian gas EU Russia 
South Stream Undermine economic viability of Nabucco Russia EU 




Russian influence will keep growing unless the main European leaders come to-
gether and devise a common plan on how to resolve the problem (Lucas 2008). The ef-
fort that is being put forth by the Committee is not even comparable with the unity of 
intents and resources that Russia has been contributing to expanding its economic do-
minance. The same Committee recommends that the US inform the European leaders of 
the strategic relevance of gas independence not only in the short term (avoiding shocks 
like the one caused by the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute), but also in the long term, justi-
fying this statement in terms of guaranteeing the freedom of the European leaders from 
their economic and political dependence upon Russian influence. 
Making sure that European countries benefit from steady and diversified sources 
for the energy they require is very important for a stable and thriving economy (Nefte 
Compass 2010). The volatility that the markets have recently experienced due to the in-
stability of the major suppliers (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Algeria and Iran) is damaging per 
se, because it reduces the profit expectations of opening and/or expanding businesses 
                                                                                                                                          
security of Russian gas supplies. On the other hand, Ukraine has designed the White Stream pipeline to 
become less reliant on Russian supplies. 
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(making expansions or the opening of new businesses economically not feasible). Such-
volatility generally reduces investors‟ confidence (a consequent drop in investments) 
and lowers consumers‟ expectations of the future that lies ahead (lower consumption) 
(Howorth 2007, 248). Russia itself is in a troubled situation with a plunging and an 
overly oil-centric economy vulnerable to oil and gas price fluctuations, debilitating so-
cial and demographic problems, not to mention a diffused corruption at all levels. The 
last four months of 2008 were characterized by a record price for oil ($150 per barrel), 
followed by just a few months later in January 2009 by a quick and substantial fall in 
the oil price, down to just $40 per barrel. Such volatility, even though it gives specula-
tors some interesting opportunities, is very damaging to the global economy for the rea-
sons reported above and that it brings about a general reduction in the confidence of in-
vestors and consumers.  
The problem of European dependence on Russian oil is further aggravated by the 
expectation that global demand will grow, referring especially to China and India, 
whose oil demand has been estimated to more than double by 2030
18
. 
Europe will soon find itself competing with more and more other states for energy re-
sources that are becoming scarcer, and their demand will keep growing at faster paces 
than Europe‟s19. For this reason, diversification of energy sources, efficiency, capacity, 
transparency and emergency stocks have become priorities in dealing with European 
energy security (Howorth 2007; Nefte Compass 2010). A higher demand for energy will 
increase its price; however, the most distressing shock for the world economy with high 
oil prices is not just that oil price spikes cause inflation, since businesses at least partly 
                                               
18 See also Lucas 2008, page 16. 
19 Shaffer (2009, 46) maintains that if Russia built a new pipeline system to China, that would improve its 
bargaining position with respect to both China and Europe as well. 
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transfer the increased energy expenses on consumers, but they are also followed by a 
general recession or a slowdown of the economy. In fact, according to Bemanke, Gertler 
and Watson (1997; 2004) a 10% oil price spike corresponds to a peak output decline of 
0.7%. However, if the influence of oil price spikes is combined with monetary policy 
(restrictive to lower inflation), then it becomes much more difficult to understand 
whether it is actually the increased oil price that caused a slowdown of the economy, or 
whether it was the restrictive monetary policy that it is mainly responsible for the de-
cline. According to Carlstrom & Fuerst (2005), this is exactly the case, for their Dynam-
ic New Keynesian Models of monetary policy shows that it is the monetary policy that 
is associated with the decline of economic output, while the oil price spike is associated 
with an increase in the output. Such a statement is directly contrary to what has been 
found by Bemanke, Gertler and Watson (1997, 2004). 
Moreover, according to the United States Congress (2009), economic instability 
or recession is associated with lower levels of security. The resource curse literature
20
 
shows that economies mainly based on exports of energy are also vulnerable to the vo-
latility of markets, given their dependence on the revenues from oil and gas, and the 
lack of diversification of the economic sectors. For the Committee cited above, the key 
to solving the issue of Russia‟s dominance is diversity of gas sources, gas consumers, 
and transportation routes, in other words, competition. For this reason the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee has continually emphasized governmental help to advance 
the Nabucco project. To note, a milestone in its development is the July 2009 signing of 
the Inter-governmental Agreement, which was closed in August 2009 between the 
                                               
20 According to this literature, countries rich in energy resources like oil and gas are less likely to develop 
than countries which do not possess similar resources, due to greater exposition of energy price volatility 
and lack of economic differentiation. 
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country members of the project and is necessary to create a legal framework for the 
transportation of gas between the European partners of the project and Turkey. Diversi-
ty could be achieved also with the creation of the pipeline connecting Turkey-Greece-
Italy (Lucas 2008, 177
21
). The construction of these pipelines is one of many steps that 
Europe is to take to ensure its economic and political independence from Russia. Other 
initiatives, like separating ownership between gas transporters and gas producers, im-
proving the gas network among European countries that allows them to more flexibly 
distribute the gas among them, and increase in the storage capabilities of gas are all 
strategies that the United Stated favors in order to help develop European energy inde-
pendence. Also important is the establishment of diplomatic relations with European 
countries so as to create a commonly shared sense and perception of the necessity to 




2.2 Modern Russian approach to foreign policy 
 
The dependence of Europe on imported gas has been growing over the past dec-
ades, and it is likely to do so in the near future. This is so because European production 
has been constantly declining, while at the same time its demand has been increasing 
(Youngs 2008). With an economy that is increasingly improving after the financial and 
economic crisis that started in 2008, the perspectives of European dependency on for-
eign energy resources are likely to worsen (World Gas Intelligence 2009). In 2006 over 
40% of OECD Europe‟s gas consumption was of foreign origin and over 75% of this 
                                               
21 See United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2009) and Lucas 2008. 
22 See United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2008, 2009). 
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gas was produced either in Russia or Algeria; projections claim that in 2030 well over 
50% of the total gas demand will be satisfied with foreign gas (World Gas Intelligence). 
Moreover, energy security in Europe has been a growing concern given the cooperation 
agreements that several gas producers have reached, especially after the supply disrup-
tions that occurred starting in 2006 (World Gas Intelligence 2009). 
Russia seems to not be preoccupied with the consequences of its disputes with 
the transit countries, mainly Ukraine and Belarus. In fact, Bindi (2010) notes that cur-
rent diplomatic relations with Europe are certainly not the most favorable and that there-
fore it is not expected that Russia would avoid using force, in whatever form it may be – 
even the use of the gas weapon, for the continuation of its policy. The author notes that 
according to some European countries, the major source of Russian discontent is the 
American presence in countries that were once under Soviet influence, which spreads 
American influence throughout the European continent, while at the same time reducing 
the defense capability of the Russian government.  
The last statement refers especially to the Russian disapproval of the missile 
shield, which, according to Bindi (World Gas Intelligence), would significantly reduce 
Russian capability to protect itself. According to some East-European countries, how-
ever, the intent of the Russian political sphere can be better approximated by its eager-
ness to exert political and economic influence over its neighboring countries
23
. Russia 
seems to have a positive opinion of Europe in general, while Americans are the true 
problem (Bindi; Shaffer). If Russia did not strongly oppose the enlargement of the Eu-
                                               
23 See Bindi (2010, 216). Shaffer (2009, 116) simply summarizes Russia‟s behavior as that of a country 
that it is maximizing its own energy security. 
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ropean Union, it is because Russia viewed it as an alternative to the expansion of 
NATO.  
However, with the integration of several countries that used to be under the So-
viet influence, two new paradigms emerged that dominated the discussion of Russian 
foreign policy. According to the first paradigm, which views the joining of ex-Soviet 
republics as a positive event, the lower transaction costs, given the lower distance be-
tween European countries and Russia, and a unification of trading procedures and 
norms all would benefit from the economic and therefore political situation within the 
European countries. The second paradigm views the entrance in the European Union of 
ex-Soviet republics as a direct threat to the Russian existence, in that following the ex-
pansion of the EU to Eastern Europe would put Russia at the border of the main trading 
routes and outside the political center of world policy making. More specifically, the en-
largement would prevent Russia from having privileged access to the East-European 




Even though some collaboration between Russia and the EU seemed likely in 
the early 1990s, when the EU and the Russian federation signed the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (a document that recognized the need to work together to pro-
mote security, peace, democracy and economic cooperation), the relationship started de-
teriorating and the two paradigms developed, therefore substantially reflecting the dee-
per economic relationship between the two entities, and the greater ideological distance 
that mounted throughout the 1990s (Bindi; Shaffer
 
). 
                                               
24 The assumption here is that the European Union is dominated by anti-Russian individuals (Bindi; Shaf-
fer, 123). 
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A cold war approach has prevailed since then, characterized by frustration 
stemming from seeing the expansion of the European Union and NATO
25
 in Eastern 
Europe. Additional motivations are the strong demands from the EU to support its own 
expansion (Olker et al. 2009, 105-106)
26
 and the European insistence on promoting val-
ues like democracy and human rights well beyond its territories (Oliker et al. 2009, 
107). Since then, Russia has been ignoring the Baltic States, preferring a direct diplo-
matic relationship with each European country, rather than dealing with the European 
supra-national institutions, as if not recognizing the power of the European Union as a 
community
27
. Following this paradigm is the diffusion of a more negative perception of 
the European countries. Even though the US still ranks first among the „less-liked coun-
tries‟, the European countries have now been gaining so many positions in the afore –
mentioned ranking, that some have reached the second slot following the US (Bindi 
2010, 124). “Fear and disagreement” (Bindi) have characterized the Russian opinion of 
the West in general, but are now assumed to be working towards the destruction of Rus-
sian power (Bindi). There have been times at which the European Union and Russia 
seemed to be striving to reach some more cooperative agreements towards more coop-
                                               
25 See Oliker et al (2009, 110) and Douglas 2008 (221). 
26 Nonetheless, Oliker et al (2009, 105-106) maintain that several figures of the Russian elites and many 
Russians as well, see themselves and their country as European. They specify that especially Western Eu-
rope has been perceived by Russia from three different points of view. First of all, it used to represent an 
„enlightened‟ region where values like democracy, religious and race tolerance are widely spread. Such a 
conceptualization of Europe seems not apply anymore after Putin came to power, which coincided with 
Russia perceiving Europe as simply following the US policies (often viewed as damaging for Russia‟s 
security). Europe has also been perceived as a modernized and prosperous society, which seems to 
represent the end goal of Russian transformation. Finally, Europe it is seen as an opportunity for Russia to 
show its great-power status by interacting with European institutions and nations. Its identity, partly Eu-
ropean, as recognized by some, is reinforced with its interaction with the EU.  
27 Bindi (2010). 
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eration. An example of this is when the two parties met in Khanty-Mansiysk in 2008 
and started discussing again strategic issues that were abandoned without a renewal of 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which had expired at the end of 2007
28
. 
The situation quickly worsened due to Russian concern over European support of dis-
putes against Russia and the construction of missile defense equipment on the Russian 
border at the expense of its own security (Bindi 2010, 126). Diplomatic relationships 
took an even worse turn with the breakout of war in Georgia in 2008 when the Euro-
pean countries found themselves disapproving of Russian conduct in the war which 
consisted of militarily and diplomatically supporting the secession of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. Meanwhile, others blamed Georgia for the start of the crisis (Bindi)
29
. 
Such a difficult relationship with Europe does not benefit efforts by Russia to 
settle issues with countries via diplomatic means. This is especially true if those Euro-
pean countries are the reason for the Russian “great resentment of joining „the West‟”30 
and where Russian “soft power”, not just “hard power”, does not exert the same polit i-
cal pressure as in the Soviet era (Lucas 2008, 131). It is more likely that, as the war in 
Georgia showed, force may be preferred as a means to advance the Russian political 
agenda. 
That being said, I would expect to see Russia using its energy weapons as often 
and as intensively as needed. Although some of the crises merely lasted few days, oth-
ers in fact lasted some months before a satisfactory agreement was found, thus suggest-
ing that in those cases, the accomplishment of the goals of one (or more) parties was not 
heavily affected by other pressures to quickly end the dispute.  
                                               
28 Trading issues, however, were still predominant in the talks (Bindi 2010, 124). 
29 See also Youngs (2009, 89). 
30 See page 123. 
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With the 1998 financial and economic crisis, diplomatic relations between Rus-
sia and Ukraine deteriorated, requiring that Gazprom compensate with energy revenues 
for the recession. The crisis reached a climax in November 1999, when oil and electrici-
ty exports to Ukraine were stopped; however, knowing that that would have not 
achieved much, given the Russian lack of control over the Ukrainian pipeline system, 
Russia decided that it was in its interest to bypass Ukraine and find an alternative way 
to supply gas to Europe
31
. It was at this time that the idea of building a pipeline to be 
used to bypass Ukraine became a serious enterprise. Ukraine perceived that the new 
pipeline, which was supposed to bypass up to 50% of the pipe system in the Ukrainian 
territory, was a serious threat to its centrality and gas delivery to Europe
32
. For this rea-
son, a wave of agreements followed, and the situation, at least temporarily, stabilized. 
In 2006, when Gazprom requested a higher price for the gas imported, Ukraine 
refused to comply with Gazprom‟s requests and with the January 1 gas disruption, 
Ukraine reacted by diverting some gas that was meant for the European market. The re-
duction of gas towards Europe triggered an immediate reaction of the European custom-
ers and the following day the two countries restored the gas flow and on January 4, 
2006 an agreement was reached. Once again, the external environment changed, putting 
pressure on the disputing actors and ending the crisis sooner. 
This was also evident on January 1, 2009, when the situation between Russia 
and Ukraine degenerated again, with a partial gas reduction first and a total stop just six 
days later, causing vast damages in a large number of European countries. Only nine-
                                               
31 Stern (2005, 89) maintains that the new pipeline would have paid off itself very soon, given the large 
losses due to acts of siphoning of gas. 
32 Its centrality represented its main bargaining advantage in the negotiations with Russia. 
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teen days later, Russia and Ukraine finally found common ground and resumed gas ex-
ports to Europe soon after (World Gas Intelligence 2009).  
Of apparently different nature are the crises between Russia and Belarus, proba-
bly due to the minor centrality of the Belarusian network to Russian gas exports. Dip-
lomatic relations between the two countries started degenerating after 1998, when Bela-
rusian gas debts started reaching very high levels and the two parties failed to agree on 
the price of the gas deliveries (World Gas Intelligence 2009). In 2002, a temporary 
agreement was reached, but, due to disagreements over unpaid energy, in 2003 Gaz-
prom stopped its supplies to Belarus as soon as the contract binding them to do so ex-
pired. Belarus and Russia did not reach any agreement in January of that year and on 
February 18, 2004 Gazprom cut off all gas supplies for 30 hours, including those that 
were meant to be delivered to the European market. The consequences of the cut were 
significant especially for the Kaliningrad region and Poland, the former being forced to 
switch to oil fuel and to hot water, the latter suffering a 35% gas diminution on Febru-
ary 18, and 50% by February 19, while Latvia was able to compensate using its own gas 
reserves, which were even sufficient to help neighboring Lithuania as well (World Gas 
Intelligence, 100). The particularity of this crisis revolves around the Belarusian confi-
dence that it still holds bargaining leverage in terms of being an important route to the 
European market. Until other pipelines were constructed which bypassed Belarus, it 
would have been still in a position to avoid entering the Russian influence sphere (Kup-
chinsky 2006). Should the gas be cut off, Belarus could shift the burden of such a move 
back to Russia, by redirecting, as Ukraine did, the gas that was supposed to be reaching 
the European markets, at the expense, evidently, of increased European concern of 
energy security. It is probably for these reasons that an agreement was signed by the 
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two countries not earlier than December 31, 2006 (Yafimava and Stern 2007). Despite 
the likely mitigating effects of direct or indirect pressures, Belarusian confidence in its 
relevance as a transit country and in its ability to shift the burden back to Russia pro-
longed the duration of the conflict. 
No significant damage to the larger community resulted with the 2007 crisis 
since Belarus refused to pay a higher price and failed to repay its accumulated debt up 
to that point, Gazprom threatened to reduce gas supplies by 45% on August 1, 2007, 
even after it had to give up 50% of the shares in Beltranshaz for 2.5 billion dollars 
(Maksymiuk 2007); In this instance, Belarus reluctantly paid its debt back to Russia just 
1 week later, quickly ending the dispute and complying with Russian requests (Ria No-
vosti 2007). 
The Moldovan situation, although in smaller scale if compared to Ukraine‟s and 
Belarus‟, shows a similar pattern, in which Russia fully exploited its strategic use of the 
gas weapon to achieve its goals thanks to a relatively stable diplomatic environment. 
Similarly to Ukraine and Belarus, energy-related debts accrued since 1991 to the point 
where Gazprom renewed its threats of cutting gas supplies, which, however, failed to be 
implemented in 2004 due to the recognized Moldovan role as a transit country and its 
ability to shift the burden of the „cold war‟ approach back onto Russia (Stern 2005, 
102). However, on January 1, 2006 Moldova was left with no gas supplies due to its re-
fusal to accept a 100+% increase in price, up from the $80 per mcm paid just the year 
before. Sixteen days after the gas disruption, Russia resumed the gas supply, having set-
tled with Moldova to pay a higher price (BBC News 2006). See Figure 2.3 for a sum-
mary of the main events of these crises just described and used in this work as case stu-
dies. 
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Figure 2.3 
Time line of the case studies adopted 
 
 
These cases suggest that the negative externalities of these disputes seem to have 
an effect on the length of the gas disputes. The more external countries are affected by 
them, the shorter the duration of these crises, due to the acknowledged relevance of ex-
ternal actors‟ preferences in reaching an agreement.  
Pirani, Stern, Yafimava (2009, 33) speculate as to why Russia gambled (and still 
does) over imposing higher prices at the expense of destroying its reputation as a relia-
ble gas supplier. In the case of the Ukrainian crisis in 2009, Russia also knew that the 
financial and economical significance of an escalation of the dispute resulted in a loss of 
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over a hundred million dollars per day 
33
. Moreover, Russia was aware that a disruption 
of the gas supply, on which Ukraine is highly dependent, had the potential to destroy the 
Ukrainian economy. It was already very weak at the time and could not afford to pay 
the $400-450 per mcm that Gazprom asked during the apex of tension between the two 
countries. In fact, Ukraine (and also Belarus and Moldova) had already had difficulty in 
paying back the debt that had accumulated starting from the 1990s, when the Soviet Un-
ion collapsed and Russia started charging higher prices to support its economy. Pirani, 
Stern and Yafimava (2009) seem to be surprised that Russia, obviously not ignoring the 
aforementioned issues, neglected them and preferred escalating the dispute the way it 
did, rather than accepting a lower price for the gas consumed by Ukraine, who already 
had a large debt given the price levels.  
The authors continue by noting that the conclusion that can be drawn from the 
event is that for Russia, and more specifically for Prime Minister Putin, it was more im-
portant to consolidate the Russian bargaining position by demonstrating its resolve ra-
ther than being guided by purely economical and financial considerations. Such „pu-
nishing‟ actions took priority over guaranteeing that Europe was constantly and consis-
tently being supplied. Given the importance of the European market for Gazprom and 
the important economical and financial role of Gazprom for the Russian economy it is 
surprising that political motivations overrode purely economic motivations. The authors 
conclude by speculating that these political motivations may have reflected a Russian 
intention to destabilize the Ukrainian economic and political system, given the recent 
                                               
33 In this sum are included also claims for damages and the liabilities for not having been able to fulfill 
contractual obligations, which, however could have been cashed most likely only years later, in case of 
successful filing of a litigation in the Stockholm court (Pirani, Stern, Yafimava 2009). 
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Ukrainian shift to more pro-Western and pro-Georgian policies demonstrated in recent 
years, especially in 2008
34
. 
However, Pirani, Stern and Yamifava (2009) also warn that defining the priority 
of imposing higher prices to be an expression of the Russian will to extend its political 
goals would be rather simplistic and it would not accurately represent the true motiva-
tions behind the escalation. In fact, they suggest that for Russia, achieving a general rise 
in the price was first an economic goal, and then a political one, given the losses that 
domestic gas sales had represented for Gazprom at least until 2003 (Stern 2005, 43; 
Shaffer 2009, 42-43). In fact, Gazprom is subject to Russian law that requires it to sell 
at predetermined prices
35
 (Stern 2005, 144). Moreover, even though control over the 
pipelines transporting gas to its main customer, Europe, should rather be seen as an 
economic goal itself
36
, by establishing control over down-stream activities, thus reach-
ing its customers and assuring that interruptions would no longer occur as in the past.  
Following this logic, risking damage to its reputation as a reliable gas supplier 
appears to be a reasonable consideration in order to gain control of the gas transporta-
tion system and obtain the certainty of no further disruptions due to disputes with the 
transit countries. Such reasoning makes sense when the gas dispute is placed within the 
wider context in which it occurred characterized by declining global economies in fi-
nancial difficulty. Pirani, Stern, and Yafimava (2009) summarize the main motivations 
of the Russian actions by claiming that exasperation played a relevant role especially on 
                                               
34 See Pirani, Stern and Yamifava (2009), Oliker et al (2009, 95) and also Youngs (2009, 90). 
35 The levels cannot be rationally justified given the inconsistencies and the lack of data collection rela-
tive to gas sales at the domestic level. See previous note. 
36 Higher gas prices entail first of all higher income for the Russian government, which taxes gas energy 
exports (Bindi 2010, 143). 
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the Russian side. Seeing that Ukraine was able to threaten a diversion of the gas from 
the pipelines, frustration mounted among the top Russian political spheres and enabled 
them to take advantage of the situation by using its “gas weapon” to achieve more con-
trol of the network or extract some other benefits from the dispute
37
.  
The authors also believe that Russia purposefully decided to involve Europe in 
the dispute intending to employ them as an additional source of pressure for Ukraine to 
accept Russian requests. Also, this would therefore restart discussions of a closer colla-
boration over the construction or refurbishment of existent or new transportation net-
works (Pirani, Stern, and Yafimava 2009, 35-36). Putin was reported to have claimed 
that: 
The gas pipeline system is the creation of the Soviet Union. We intend to retain state control 
over the gas transport system and over Gazprom. We will not split Gazprom up. And the Euro-
pean Commission should not have any illusions. In the gas sector, they have to deal with the 
state38. 
 
It is not surprising therefore that Russia incurred in the escalation of the dispute 
a reasonable risk that was promising in order to assure that the financial situation of the 
debtor country worsened, thus leaving it vulnerable to concessions over the transporta-
tion system management. In this sense, the gas crisis at the end of 2005 and beginning 
of 2006 reflected another major desire of the Russian leaders: the disengagement of the 
                                               
37 See Pirani, Stern and Yafimava (2009). 
38 Fredholm (2006). Oliker et al (2009, 87-88) describe Russia as prestige-seeker state, a trait which more 
clearly emerged in Putin‟s second term. Starting from 2004, Russia foreign policy has been consolidating 
around a few important goals, and that is the promotion of the Russian economy and the re-establishment 
of Russia as a „modern great power‟. Russian might should not only be based on its policies and its ar-
mies, but also on its economy, technology, culture, and authority. According to Shaffer (2009, 123) the 
oil and gas export policy are deeply entrenched with other major goals, namely making these energy mar-
kets as profitable as possible, reducing dependence on transit countries, maintaining (and possibly im-
proving) its centrality as the key supplier of energy to Europe, and gaining control over foreign networks 
in order to increase its economic and political influence over those countries. 
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transportation of its gas towards Europe from other states‟ systems to avoid the crises 
that have often undermined Russia‟s credibility as a gas supplier. Lucas (2008, 168) 
points out that it was Russia‟s prerogative to ask its customers a price it felt was reason-
able. However, as said above, that does not mean that any price requested by Russia de-
cides provides a viable and sustainable commercial and political relationship with the 
transit countries. Moreover, it was the European Union that asked Russia, as a term for 
entering into the WTO, that it charge higher prices for its gas thereby forcing the coun-
tries that depended on it to improve the efficiency of their industries (Lucas). Increasing 
the price of the gas would have pushed Gazprom to renovate and refurbish its pipeline 
systems since a higher price would have consequently meant that any gas waste 
represented a larger loss of profits.  
The author also confirms Pirani, Stern and Yafimava‟s (2009) main conclusions ; 
that the 2006 gas dispute, which damaged so many countries and in a significant fashion 
was an occurrence that someone from an economical perspective would have avoided at 
all costs, even though such a move carries some significant economic and political ad-
vantages. Lucas (2008) confirms that the 2006 action of doubling the price requested for 
gas supplies was overly ambitious, given the economical and financial situation in the 
Ukraine at the time. A political reason was the one behind the start and the continuation 
of dispute. The Orange revolution
39
, which inaugurated the rise to power of Victor 
Yushcenko, who is still popular for his pro-Western visions
40
, had apparently slowed 
                                               
39 Similar revolutions occurred also in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. For Russian leaders, all these represent a 
security threat given the danger that Islamist governments could be installed especially in Georgia and 
Kyrgyzstan (Oliker et al 2009, 101). 
40 Yushcenko‟s election was particularly controversial, in that after strong allegations of voting irregulari-
ties against his main political rival, Viktor Yanukovych, a revolution, called the Orange revolution, 
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down Russia‟s dream to regain control over the ex-Soviet territories, seeing that 
Ukraine was moving further away from the Russian influence to move closer to that of 
Europe (Shaffer 2009, 42). “Punishing” Ukraine for allowing a pro-Western regime41 to 
take power by doubling the gas price has been interpreted as an evidence of the Russian 
will to extend its control over at least the Ukrainian economy and its transportation sys-
tem (Lucas 2008, 168; Bindi 2010, 134). 
Several political scientists, as shown above, have tried to reconstruct Russian 
preferences, suggesting what the main drivers of Russian energy policy are. However, 
how do we exploit this knowledge and how can we model it to have a better understand-
ing of the dynamics that define the outcome of these bargaining situations? Are there 
political bargaining models which can model these political crises? The answers to 
these questions will be discussed in the next section. 
 
2.3 Modeling gas disputes 
 
Political bargaining theory has evolved to the point where several different theo-
ries have been adopted and accepted in the academic world. Among these are „proto 
models‟ like utility models and critical risk models. However, probably due to its do-
minance in the field of economics, game theory has become the primary political bar-
                                                                                                                                          
emerged and new elections were set in motion again to discover that the true winner was indeed Yush-
cenko (BBC News 2010). 
41 Shaffer (2009, 41-42) also maintains that similar observations apply for the case of the Georgia, which 
Russia has tried to destabilize with its support for South Ossetia for over a decade given its strategic posi-
tion between Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia, in fact, benefits from the Central Asian countries in-
ability to export directly to other markets other than Russia by exporting their gas at two or even three 
times the original price. 
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gaining theory. For sake of completeness, a brief review of utility models and critical 
risk models is offered in this chapter; however, a much larger portion of this work is 
dedicated to game theory, given its centrality to the main argument here. 
2.4 Utility models 
 
Snyder and Diesing (1977) present an interesting review of formal models of 
bargaining. The authors note that these models tend to represent in general the same 




Utility models study the distribution of goods among the (usually two) bargain-
ing players. Their interaction is usually represented in a Cartesian plane (see below), 
where offers that can be placed in the first quadrant represent a gain for both parties (X 
and Y), offers in the second quadrant offer some benefits for player Y, but lead to a 
worse status quo for player X. The third quadrant is one where both players lose, while 
the fourth quadrant describes a situation in which the offer accepted benefits player X, 
but entail losses for player Y. The Cartesian plane can be further restricted by drawing 
limited areas within which the two parties can reach an agreement. These areas may or 
may not be centered on the origin (where there is no agreement) or have particular 
shape which potentially leads to more benefits/losses for one party rather than the other 
one. 
                                               
42 See page 33. 
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Figure 2.4 
Cartesian plane in utility models. 
 
Source: http://content.tutorvista.com  
Utility models can be mixed with strategic models (game theoretical approaches) 
by identifying subareas where cooperation or defection occurs. Such models as the Pris-
oner‟s dilemma (described below) can be modeled also by utility models; CC (Coopera-
tion of player A and Cooperation of player B) for example, will therefore be located in 
the subarea in the first quadrant, where both players improve their situation by finding 
an agreement in this area, while DD (Defection of player A and Defection of player B) 
will label the subarea that belongs to the third quadrant. 
 
2.5 Critical Risk Models 
 
This model was developed to study coercion and persuasion and differs especial-
ly from game theory for its use of cardinal utility values and exact likelihood statements 
(Snyder and Diesing 1977). It follows that each player makes probabilistic guesses of 
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what the other player‟s strategy is, instead of deciding that the other player is going to 
take a specific course of action, given the individual‟s structure of pay-offs and the 
strategies available. Moreover, unlike other models, critical risk models do not assume 
that each player knows the other player‟s payoffs; nonetheless, a player can make rough 
estimates of these payoffs, which this theory further assumes to be vulnerable to bar-
gaining tactics. The outcome of the bargaining depends on how high the maximum risk 
a player is willing to take before deciding to cooperate; if this limit is set much lower 
than the expected likelihood that the other player is going to cooperate, given its reputa-
tion or its credibility, then the former will cooperate. If the maximum risk is set higher 
than the credibility/commitment of the other player, then no cooperation will occur. 
Clearly, the assessment of the other player‟s credibility is based on the same individu-
al‟s estimates, which could bias the estimation and make it unreal. However, players 
have at their disposal several sources of information like ideology, personality profiles, 
economy, intercepted communications (Snyder and Diesing 1977, 51) which they can 
use to better approximate their estimates to the true value. 
 
2.6 Game theory 
 
A majority of the literature covering the topic of bargaining derives from the 
field of economics, but given the nature of the problems dealt with in many political 
disputes, it is applicable to political science and energy disputes. Strategic interactions 
occur at any level in a society, and in order to study these social interactions one needs a 
theory: game theory is one of the more prominent. Brams (1975), Ordeshook (1986), 
Brams and Kilgour (1988), Dixit and Nalebuff (1991), Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 
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(1994), Morrow (1994), McCarty and Meirowitz (2007), Dixit, Skeath, Reiley (2009) 
provide a deep analysis of the use of strategy and formal modeling in political science 
and the main issues that follow. Game theory started becoming popular in 1943 with the 
publication of Von Neumann and Morgenstern‟s Theory of Games and Economic Be-
havior, even though some works had already started as early as the 1920s (Morrow 
1994, 2). After the Second World War, game theory quickly developed into a field in 
which its mathematics and its applications also prospered due to the flow of resources 
dedicated to social sciences. The theory evolved from simple two-person, zero sum 




Game theory is the model that is without any doubt among the most commonly 
used in political science to analyze strategic interactions. As its name suggests, game 
theory views the behavior of the participants in ways analogous to a game in order to 
understand the most likely result of the interaction between the players. A game can be 
defined as a situation in which the behavior of the parties determines the “pay-offs” of 
their interaction (Bennet 1995; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). 
The behavior that is being studied can be defined by the number of the players 
involved, the rules used in the game, the “pay-offs” and their structure, the outcomes 
and the strategies involved to win the game. In each game, the players do not have com-
plete control and their decisions rely on the other players‟ actions (Dixit and Nalebuff 
1991; Dixit, Skeath and Reiley 2009; Myerson 1994). 
                                               
43 The assumption of complete information has been relaxed and has been dealt with by signaling games, 
in which communication play a pivotal role in reaching an agreement (Dixit, Skeath, and Reiley (2009, 
317-318; Morrow 1994, 237). 
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Games are usually characterized by the presence of at least two players, who in-
teract with each other in two (or more) possible ways. Players can be single individuals, 
or larger groups that operate as a single entity: game theory assumes then that the prefe-
rences of the members belonging to the larger group can be properly aggregated, thus 
assuming first that it is possible to do so
44
, and therefore that the internal preferences 
can be well-represented in such a manner (Shubik 1982, Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 
1994; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). Players have at their disposal specific resources, 
the opportunity to choose among a predefined set of actions, the possibility to commu-
nicate their actions and probable collaborations, and a set of preferences they can use to 
select the best strategy (Shubik 1982, 16). The players can in fact participate in some 
games in which the players take an action which is then followed by the other players‟ 
actions and thereby what others have done already, a sequential game. The decisions of 
the players occur in a social context, other times called the “structure”. The structure de-
fines the choices that the players have, how their choices are followed by the outcomes, 
and how the players judge the outcomes (Morrow 1994, 1). In all games, players are as-
sumed to have well-defined goals while choosing within specific limits among the poss-
ible actions (Shubik 1982, 16).  
A second type of game is one in which players make their move ignoring what 
the others have done, but being aware that the game is also played by other players who 
know in turn that they are not alone in the game. Playing a specific game does not mean 
                                               
44 In reality, it is often impossible to aggregate the preferences of the single members in one function. The 
evidence of such a statement is more evident when one tries to reconstruct the preferences of entire states 
or communities (Shubik 1982, 18). The voters paradox illustrated the probable case in which three play-
ers, with specific sets of preferences may never reach an agreement as to what their preference as a group 
is (Shubik 1982, 109). A caveat to this problem has to do with reconstructing the preference of the leader 
of the country or the community being studied. 
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that features of the other kind of game are automatically excluded. There are in fact 
games among two or more players that share features of both games (Dixit and Nalebuff 
1991; Dixit, Skeath and Reiley 2009; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). In soccer, for ex-
ample, players alternate their moves, a sequential game, but they also have to make 
moves for example, preparing the line of defense or constructing a sequence of scoring 
moves without the intervention of the other players. This is accomplished often without 
knowing exactly how the other team is organizing itself or is adjusting to the new situa-
tion. 
Dixit and Nalebuff, in particular, point out that in sequential games every action 
is followed by a reaction
45
, which implies that when a game has started, then a reaction 
should be expected and be accounted for before taking an action. Playing a static game 
or participating in a conflict or dispute involves taking actions that must account for the 
possible reaction that the counterpart may take and minimize its effects. Meanwhile, this 
is done considering what the other player might do so in return (Rumelt, Schendel and 
Teece 1994; Ordeshook 1986). Being firm on a decision may bring benefits on the one 
hand
46
. On the other hand it can also be the reason for the inability of finding an agree-
ment even though a reasonable counteroffer was made
47
. Acting first is not the factor 
that always leads to a successful outcome for the initiator (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991, 10), 
and unpredictability, culture, pride, and different rationalities are important variables 
that significantly change each game‟s outcome (26). 
                                               
45 See „To Lead or Not to Lead‟ (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991, 10-11). 
46 For example, by signaling the other player that offers not in the acceptance range will be firmly re-
jected. 
47 See De Gaulle‟s case (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991, 14-16). 
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In order to better understand the nature of game theory, one imagines a typical 
game, similar to those found in the literature, where two players are involved and where 
one player (player B) has to decide between spending resources on defense or saving 
them and risking being attacked and defeated by the potential invader (player A).  
In such a situation (game), the attacker (player A) has two options. If he does not 
attack, his payoff will be zero (nothing occurs); if he does attack, two scenarios are 
possible: 
1. Player B is unprepared and the player A‟s attack is successful. A large 
positive payoff is attributed to player A, since he/she has obtained the sum desired, and 
a negative payoff is attributed to player B, because of the substantial loss; 
2. Player B has mounted a defense that can repel player A. A large negative 
payoff is attributed to player A, since he/she has lost the army for no gain, and a nega-
tive payoff is attributed to player B, but of smaller entity, because an expensive defense 
system was put in place which, however, has led to a victory over the invader.  
If Player A does not attack, costs for Player B are assumed to be equal. A justifi-
cation for this could rely on the fact that if Player A does not attack and Player B de-
fends, Player B will have to face the costs for having employed a useless defense and 
justifying a useless expenditure to the public. If it does not defend, player B might have 
to pay the same amount of costs in terms of internal instability due to the absence of any 
defense with the possibility of an external threat. See Figure 2.5
48
. 
                                               
48 In game theory two types of representations can be used. The strategic form is the one used for this ex-
ample, while the extensive form is the one in which each possible move is represented so as to entirely 
reproduce the whole game starting from the initial, triggering event and moving on to the very last deci-
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Figure 2.5 
Example of a game. 
 
 
Considering the model illustrated in Figure 2.5, one can see that Player B has a 
dominant strategy, that is, it is always convenient for him/her to defend. In fact, in case 
Player A decides not to attack, Player B will still prefer to defend (payoff=-200). How-
ever, should Player A attack, Player B would minimize the negative pay-off by having 
in place defending troops. One can therefore expect that Player B will spend resources 
to defend, regardless of whether Player A will attack or not. Should Player A realize 
that Player B has a dominant strategy, he/she might choose not to attack, in order to 
avoid the consequences associated with an unsuccessful attack. Even if Player A is the 
first to move in this game, the outcome of the game does not change, given that one is 
assuming that the players profit from ideal information of pay-offs and the available op-
tions. In fact, in deciding what to do, Player A knows that Player B has a dominant 
strategy, which is defending and will minimize his losses by not attacking. Once again, 
                                                                                                                                          
sion, branching out every move every time the two players have to make a decision (Shubik 1982, 34; 
Snyder and Diesing 1977). 
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the game reaches the same solution: Player A does not attack and Player B defends. The 
game is not likely to depart from this equilibrium for if Player A decides to attack, it 
will incur a lower pay-off because Player B will be already defending and it will suc-
cessfully repel the attack. If Player B decides to leave the equilibrium by not defending, 
it will do so at the cost of a lower pay-off (due to having to justify lack of defense in a 
very unstable conjuncture) and at the expense of giving the other player the opportunity 
to attack at an unexpected moment, achieving a higher pay-off while inflicting a much 
lower pay-off to the defenseless Player B.  
The game just described is a basic rendition, but it helps to understand the use-
fulness of such an approach in order to foresee the most likely outcome of the game. As 
said above, there are many different kinds of games, and they can be defined by the 
rules used in the game, the payoffs and their structure, the outcomes and the strategies 
involved to win the game. The game discussed most often in the literature is that of the 
Prisoner‟s dilemma, in which both players have a dominant strategy49, This, however, 
leads to a sub-optimal solution of the game since both players, not knowing the actions 
of the other party, will solely base their strategies on the maximization of their payoff 
(Dixit, Skeath, Reiley 2009, 398; Morrow 1994, 78).  
A different outcome, however, can be reached in the case where the amount of 
the interactions amongst the players are known to be infinite, in which parties are aware 
that they will establish long-term relationships with the other players (Myerson 1991, 
308). In an infinitely repeated game, there are an infinite number of rounds during 
which players make new decisions given the new information they have acquired in the 
bargaining process. Since in this kind of game the players know that their move is not 
                                               
49 Thus differing from the one reported here, where only one player has a dominant strategy. 
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going to be the only one (or the last one), they are aware of the consequences of their 
actions, and they know that the other players will react to the strategies. Thus, players of 
repeated games are relatively more extreme in behavior, that is more cooperative or less 
cooperative than they would otherwise be in a simple game (McCarty and Meirowitz 
2007, 46; Myerson 1994, 309; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007, 251). In finitely repeated 
games (Morrow 1994, 100), players know that at the last round, the 10th, cooperation 
would achieve unfavorable results in terms of convincing the other party to cooperate, 
opting for defection. Similarly, the two players would choose not to cooperate once 
again, knowing that the other player is not willing to cooperate in the 10th round. Both 
players will not only defect in the 9th round, but also in all the previous rounds for the 
same reason: defection is the dominant strategy, given that during the following round 
generosity would not induce cooperation (McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). 
A different result is obtained in infinitely-repeated games. As said above, the in-
ability to determine when the game will finish will render the payoff, which can be ob-
tained through cooperation, an interesting incentive for the players to cooperate. If play-
ers adopt the so-called “tit-for-tat” strategy, according to which a player starts out with a 
less aggressive move and then mirrors the other player‟s move in the following rounds 
(Myerson 1994, 325), what results is that both players end up cooperating in all rounds 
and therefore possibly maximizing their individual pay-offs. This solution represents an 
equilibrium in that if one player decides to become more aggressive and chooses not to 
cooperate, then the other player will retaliate by not cooperating as well, preventing the 
other player from gaining due to their refusal to cooperate. “Tit-for-tat” is therefore a 
strategy that punishes the non-cooperative player, because once this strategy is enacted, 
it is followed by lower payoffs which do not justify engaging in more aggressive prac-
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tices (Myerson 1994, 326). A different outcome for the Prisoner‟s dilemma can also be 
obtained by allowing the two players to communicate among themselves and, if they 
deem it necessary, signing contracts that bind them to specific courses of actions. In 
contract-signing games, players are shown to receive more than the Minmax value 
(Myerson 1994, 329), which is the value they would obtain by following a mixed strat-
egy (Myerson 1994, 329). 
Another classical symmetric game
50
 is chicken, traditionally represented by two 
teenagers that challenge each other in a test of manhood, in which both of them are driv-
ing at full speed towards each other. The winner is the one that does not swerve. Being 
the winner in this game is certainly the best outcome, but if at least one player does not 
swerve, both players die and victory is not achieved. Such an unstable game has been 
shown to have two equilibriums, characterized by one player choosing a different strat-
egy from the other player‟s (Brams 1975, 39; Brams and Kilgour 1988, 40-42; Morrow 
1994; Shubik 1982). 
According to Snyder and Diesing (1977) there are two more games, out of the 
possible 78 2 x 2 games, that are particularly interesting given the presence of conflict 
between players
51
. The authors define these four models as the archetypes among 2 x 2 
games (42). Usually, these symmetric games are based upon an ordinal ranking between 
                                               
50 Mixed strategies are (pure) strategies to which are assigned specific probabilities. For example, a pure 
strategy is a strategy that is played with a 100% probability, while mixed strategies are played with a 
probability that is less than 100% (Morrow 1994). Symmetric games are those whose have the same or-
dinal structure for all players. Asymmetric games like Called Bluff, Bully, Big Bully and Protector have 
payoff structure that differ from player to player (Diesing and Snyder 1977, 46; Dixit, Skeath, Reiley 
2009, 214; Brams 1975, 17). 
51 In another game that the authors present, Deadlock, both players prefer defection rather than coopera-
tion. 
  
49 Gas Disputes and Soviet Foreign PolicyGas Disputes and Soviet Foreign Policy 
preferences: for games like the Prisoner‟s dilemma, for example, preferences are or-
dered as follows (see Figure 2.6) (Ordeshook 1986, 13) 
Figure 2.6 
Distribution of payoffs in a prisoner’s dilemma game 
 
Rapoport and Guyer 1966 
Following the general notation, the distribution of payoffs in a prisoner‟s di-
lemma is ordered in such a manner that: 
T(4)>R(3)>P(2)>S(1) 
where T, R, P, and S represent the two players‟ payoffs which are distributed as 
shown in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7 
General distribution of payoffs in 2x2 games 
 
Rapoport and Guyer 1966 
Chicken games, as explained above, have a direct clash of interests and are 
based on a preference ranking in which  
T>R>S>P 
Snyder and Diesing (1977), drawing on Rapoport and Guyer‟s (1966) work, 
identify two other important games, the Hero game and the Leader game. In these two 
games, the opposition of interests is less complete and for this reason they are defined 
by the authors as alliance games. Hero and Leader, in fact, may lead to cooperation even 
though one of the players uses coercion (p. 45), because for the other player it is still 
convenient in terms of high-payoffs (p. 3) to cooperate, even if that occurs in the face of 
defection. In these two games, players must struggle over how to cooperate; however, if 
both of them struggle, the situation returns to the point in which both defect. More spe-
cifically, Hero is based on the payoff structure 
T>S>P>R 
while Leader follows the payoff order  
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T>S>R>P. 
Other games employ mixed strategies
52
, characterized by the lack of the Nash 
equilibrium
53
, that is a solution from which there are no players that want to depart by 
making a unilateral move. Assume, for example, that the pay-off for not defending and 
Player A is not attacking is zero. There would not be a dominant strategy in the game. 
Therefore the players‟ best strategy would be to estimate the other player‟s most proba-
ble action so as to then make the successive move to maximize his own pay-off (Mor-
row 1994, 81; Ordeshook 1986, 133).  
Calculating the expected utility for each move is typically the approach em-
ployed to solve this kind of game. In fact, by attributing a probability to the event that 
one player chooses a strategy over another one, the second player is in the position to 
estimate what his/her strategy is. The key to playing these games are to prevent the oth-
er player from understanding what the strategy is that will be played and to choose the 
strategies that maximize the expected utility. However, the expected utility depends on 
the probability of one player choosing a certain strategy. If Player A is known to choose 
a specific strategy more frequently, the expected pay-off of that strategy is automatical-
ly reduced. The reason behind this reduction of value is that Player B, knowing this fact 
will choose in turn another strategy that will counter that player A‟s strategy, which 
maximizes his own pay-off. The reasoning of such a game is even more evident for ze-
ro-sum games in which the gains of one player are the losses of the others. In fact, if a 
player possesses a strategy that he or she should prefer because it is more likely to be 
beneficial, due to the efficiency of that strategy, that player should not opt for such a 
                                               
52 A review of the games described in the literature is needed in order to understand the value of the con-
tribution of the present work. 
53 Like the one just seen above. 
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predictable strategy and the other player, knowing the relative advantage of that strate-
gy, will be prepared to counter it with a proper strategy
54
. Following this line of reason-
ing, it emerges that it is in both players‟ interests to be as unpredictable as possible, 
therefore to assure that all options are equally likely to be chosen. As a result, in fact, 
the other player will be forced to consider all of his un-dominated strategies, rendering 
him or her indifferent to them. Having more certainty, that is knowing what strategy has 
a better chance of producing a higher pay-off is actually a weakness for the same player. 
This will push the other player to counteract with a best reply that has the potential to 
not only cancel the benefits inherent in the better strategy, but has the potential to im-
pose costs on the predicted player. However, the same line of reasoning on the other 
side as well, turns the game into a mutual adjustment game that is based on the rando-
mization of moves. In fact, a player must conduct a mixed strategy in order to prevent 
the other player from anticipating his moves, making him unable to benefit from know-
ing the other player‟s strategy. By doing so he is making his actions unpredictable since 
the goals of mixed strategies are to avoid the other player have the advantage of know-
ing what is the most likely action that another player will take (Morrow 1994, 87). As 
shown in the section 2.9, such a situation closely resembles that of a simplified gas dis-
pute between Russia and Ukraine. In fact, although other similar crises have occurred in 
the past, Russia is showing its firm intentions of gaining more influence over Ukrainian 
economy and politics by increasing gas prices and leveraging the Ukrainian debt to con-
solidate its position. Ukraine, aware of being in a weaker bargaining position, it expects 
Russia to be consistent with its behavior and to continue with its hard line policy. By 
                                               
54 It is important here to remember that games are being played in which both players enjoy perfect in-
formation (Ordeshook 1986, 120) 
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having more certainty about Russian strategy, Ukraine counters with a less expectable 
reaction, that of resisting even at the cost of bringing its own economy to disaster. 
According to the Minimax Theorem, for every two-person and zero-sum game 
with limited strategy sets, there is always a mixed strategy for Player A that guarantees 
him a total payoff of at least a value v, and a total payoff that is at most v for Player B 
(Shubik 1982; Morrow 1994; Dixit, Skeath, Reiley 2009; Ordeshook 1986, 149-153). 
According to this theorem the two mixed strategies reach an equilibrium which produc-
es a payoff equal to v and both strategies are at equilibrium as well. The consequence of 
this theorem is important, in that it states that an equilibrium can be found for every 
two-person, zero sum game. Moreover, even if there are multiple equilibriums, all of 
them produce a payoff that is equal for both players and it equals v, from which it fol-
lows that all players‟ strategies are in equilibrium with each other. This means that no 
matter what a player chooses to do, an equilibrium that leads to a payoff equal to v can 
be found (Morrow 1994, 90). 
It is crucial to quickly look at the assumptions of this theory in order to under-
stand the real contribution of this work. Scholars have suggested many critiques that 
weaken the validity of the game-theoretic assumptions
55
. At the center of those criti-
ques
56
 is the belief that players do not always behave in a utility-maximizing fashion, 
and thus are never affected by temporary issues or changed environmental conditions 
(Rumelt, Schendel, Teece 1994, 55). 
                                               
55 See also Goeree and Holt (2001) for a study of strengths and weaknesses of applying game theory to 
phenomena that closely resemble political crises. 
56 See for example prospect theory, which claims that there are behaviors, or more general biases that 
consistently invalidate the predictions and explanations of utility-maximizing theories (Thaler 1980). To 
know more about prospect theory and other critiques to rational theory, see Simon (1947), Becker (1962), 
Kahneman and Tverski (1979), Posner (1998), Parisi and Smith (2005), Rumelt, Schendel, Teece (1994), 
Jervis (1976, 1989), Lebow (1984), Shubik 1982, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1987), List (2004) and 
Harrison and Rutström (2009. 
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In the section that follows, I do not criticize the validity of the rationality as-
sumption. I briefly review it with the intent of reporting how several other authors have 
dealt with the problem, and, more importantly, because it helps understanding the con-
tribution of the present work under the assumption that rational choice is a reasonable 
representation of reality. In other words, I review the discussion about the rationality as-
sumption to show that two rational actors like Russia and Ukraine need to account for 
an evolving environment, which can even have the ability to modify the structure of the 
pay-off of the political bargaining game that describes it. 
 
2.7 The Rationality assumption in game theory 
 
Game theory may prove to be a powerful tool in the hands of decision makers 
because it can provide insight into what is likely to happen in a wide range of events. 
Game theory assumes that all the players in the game behave in a rational fashion, that 
is, they understand what their preferences are and base their decisions on the maximiza-
tion of their payoffs (Morrow 1994; Bennet 1995, Doron and Sened 2001). According 
to rational choice theory, choices are made in a rational and individual fashion, which 
means that it is the maximization of those pay-offs that determines the final result of the 
social interaction (Dixit, Skeath, Reiley 2009). The participants of a game are not neces-
sarily single individuals; they can be organizations or even states, as long as their prefe-
rences are coherent and consistent (Doron and Sened 2001, 20). Rational choice theory 
further assumes that social agents possess some goals that they try to achieve by know-
ing what the other actors in the same environment are expected to do. In order for this 
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assumption to hold true, three conditions must be met: completeness, transitivity and 
reflexivity (Doron and Sened 2001).  
Completeness refers to the requirement that every player is able to order any pair 
of possible outcomes and select the pair that is relatively better. Such a condition is 
based on the assumption that players have enough information to understand that an 
outcome is to be preferred over another outcome. Also that the value of the outcomes, if 
complex, can at least be reduced to a meaningful measure that players can refer to in or-
der to preference order the outcomes. 
Transitivity assumes that a player that prefers outcome A over B, and prefers B 
over C, must also prefer A over C. The assumption here is that players are logical actors 
and are able to correctly identify the differences among all options and therefore transi-
tively rank them in a logical manner. Such an assumption may seem reasonable for a 
very limited set of outcomes, which can be differentiated among them given well-
understood and clear features. But when the outcomes are unclear or, in very complex 
situations which cannot be fully described, then such an assumption becomes untenable. 
In fact, a real world situation in which two actors are bargaining often results in out-
comes that cannot fully be described or that the player does not fully understand and 
therefore are likely to not be ordered in a logical way as required by the rationality as-
sumption.  
Take for example the case in which a player has to decide whether he or she pre-
fers low gas supply prices (A) over maximizing economic independence from foreign 
control (B), and also it prefers maximizing economic independence from foreign control 
(B) over the minimization of the chance of being occupied (C). Thaler (1980) describes 
the player‟s risk aversion and shows that they do not follow the rationality assumption, 
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according to which participants should prefer outcomes whose expected utility is great-
er, even if improbable. In fact, he shows that what happens often in reality is that parties 
tend to prefer certain outcomes over probable outcomes, even though the expected utili-
ty of the probable outcome is higher. The same, however, does not apply in „negative 
situations‟, where players have been found to prefer probable outcomes, instead of ac-
cepting a sure loss of lesser value (reflection effect). Risk aversion thus disappears when 
it comes to a situation in which the actors have to choose between two prospects that 
both entail a loss in property, value or any other good.  
According to Thaler (1980) and Dixit, Skeath, Reiley (2009), there are situations 
in which participants have been found not to behave rationally, because the transitivity 
property does not hold. In fact, that may well be the case for the example cited above, 
where a player may prefer lower gas supply prices (A) over the maximization of eco-
nomic independence from foreign control (B), and the maximization of economic inde-
pendence from foreign control (B) over the minimization of the probability of being oc-
cupied (C). The transitivity property would require that A be preferred over C, but, as 
Thaler shows, that is not often the case, in that the player may prefer minimizing the 
chance of occupation over low prices. This particular circularity of preferences
57
, where 
A is preferred over B, B is preferred over C and C over A, which violates the rationality 
assumption, can then easily occur whenever the circumstances permit the understanding 
of all unclear scenarios and are therefore fully understood by the player. In fact, the 
player may be able to prefer low gas prices over an infinite period of time, given the ac-
tual value that it has at the expense of conceding the other player some access to its 
economic structures. The same player may also prefer to maximize economic indepen-
                                               
57 Similarly as presented in the discussion about the Arrow‟s Paradox (Arrow 2008) 
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dence because he or she believes that it is more valuable than reducing to its minimum 
the probability of being invaded by complying with the opponent‟s requests. However, 
the player may judge that the economic value of being guaranteed an infinite gas supply 
for a lower value may be of less value if compared to the minimization of the possibility 
of being occupied by not complying, since after all, an economic advantage, even if 
over the long term, cannot be preferred over the chance of losing both economic and po-
litical independence. Such a chain of preferences, even though realistic, is a direct viola-
tion of the transitivity assumption, upon which the rationality criterion is based upon. 
As shown above, such a violation is likely to occur when the outcomes being ordered 
are very complex situations, where not only numbers and quantifiable entities are com-
pared to each other, but also perceptions, risk assessments, and influence of prejudices. 
Reflexivity refers to the requirement that every possible outcome be weakly pre-
ferred to itself. This means that an outcome may be judged by a participant as equiva-
lent as or of lesser value than the same outcome itself (Doron and Sened 2001, 22). 
Rational choice has been widely misunderstood by scholars for its alleged at-
tempt to explain human cognitive processesand its focus on players‟ preferences over 
outcomes where rational choice theory studies choices given their preferences (Morrow 
1994, 21). Other critics have claimed that rational choice is not useful due to the exis-
tence of well-documented behavior that go against the preditions of this theory. But as 
Morrow (1994) explains, this is just part of what one should expect from a utility func-
tion which encompasses different attitudes (for example risk aversion), even though 
they share at least one important characteristic: all parties try to maximize benefits from 
their interaction with the other players. In addition, Morrow argues, actors can make 
mistakes and make choices that lead to sub-optimal results because in many interac-
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tions, risk is a part of the game, information is limited, and actors may not be fully 
aware of the consequences of their actions (Brams 1975, 8-9; Morrow 1994, 21). 
Rational choice theory has also been criticized because it is of rarely of practical 
use in real policy-making decisions (Walt 1999), and for the lack of consideration of 
more concrete elements, such as communication among players, that would render the 
game or the bargaining process  more comprehensible (Geva and Mintz 1997). One cri-
tique is that interactions between actors in a given environment might be defined not 
only in terms of preferences over strategies, but also in communicative terms, stressing 
the importance of information, or lack thereof (Geva and Mintz). Incomplete informa-
tion partially deletes all rational-choice projections toward a more favorable explanation 
of political affairs because the impossibility of having impeccable environmental infor-
mation regarding other actors‟ behaviors minimizes the ability to analyze political 
games using this framework. Geva and Mintz discuss both strengths and weaknesses of 
rational choice theory and through the use of mathematic models show the appropriate-
ness of a rational-choice approach as the main strength of the theory. Moreover, as with 
any quantitative approach, the result is precise in the explanation, transparent and repro-
ducible. According to the authors, the main weaknesses are repetitiveness, loss of gene-
ralization (since the models are designed to more favorably coincide with the specific 
situation analyzed, and distance with the real world, due to the oversimplifications as-
sumed by the model (Geva and Mintz 1997). As Morrow (1994, 1) points out, the only 
thing game theory does (and therefore the rationality assumption) is to predict what be-
havior should be expected given the assumptions of the theory and it does not tell much 
about whether game theory is an accurate description of the reality.  
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Another benefit of using a rational choice approach is its flexibility (Geva and 
Alex Mintz 1997; Martin 1999). Flexibility is provided by the use of mathematical 
models such as game theory (Geva and Alex Mintz 1997), and the pliable possibility of 
building transversal bridges and trans-paradigmatic connections among different politi-
cal models or schools (Martin 1999). It is used as well as to facilitate connections 
among macro-level and micro-level approaches (Geva and Alex Mintz 1997). Martin 
(1999) defends the ability of rational choice to analyze the micro foundations of polit i-
cal phenomena, but she criticizes its ability to explain details. This hinders the ability of 
the political scientist to generalize from each case and to understand the broader picture 
of the phenomenon.  
Formal modeling helps to determine empirical regularities, and promotes repro-
ducibility, transparency, originality, and empirical validity. Rational choice focuses on 
players as the main political actors, while simultaneously taking into account the envi-
ronment where they act by defining a set of strategies and outcomes that well represent 
the environment in which the political bargaining takes place (Lake and Powell 1997). 
According to Lake and Powell, rational-choice has offered an original solution to the 
anarchy dilemma which is a milestone for neo-realists and neo-liberals who define 
anarchy as an absence of central authority (Keohane and Nye 1977; Axelrod and Keo-
hane 1985). They observe that the presence of formal institutions, governments and ter-
ritorial powers develops a formal authority at the domestic level whereas all of these 
features are absent in the international system where states have no formal constraints 
and operate in an environment in which commitments are not enforced. Rational-choice 
theorists solve this problem observing that strategic interactions take place everywhere; 
in the international arena and the domestic arena. At any level, actors use similar strate-
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gies which then nullify the traditional distinction between domestic formal institutions 
and international absence of them (Lake and Powell 1997). 
In sum, game theory is based on the rational choice assumption following which 
players try to gain as much as they can from the situation they are involved in. The so-
cial events in which the players participate are called games. As already mentioned 
above, they are characterized by the existence of a set of rules, a range of possible out-
comes, the probabilities and the pay-offs assigned to each outcome and the sequences of 
actions that lead to specific outcomes that can be defined as strategies. All games are 
played between at least two or more players (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991; Doron and 
Sened 2001) and reach a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to change strat-
egy, based on the actions and the strategies of the other players. In other words, the 
players of the game, being fully rational, will immediately or after a certain number of 
stages, reach a situation in which both will not change their strategy. To change strategy 
would entail gaining a lower pay-off which would violate the rationality assumption ac-
cording to which social actors are utility-maximizing. 
Political scientists mainly use two models to explain social bargaining situations: 
cooperative and non-cooperative game theory (Dixit; Nalebuff, 25). In cooperative 
games, all outcomes that are found inside a specific set of outcomes called core are situ-
ations that cannot be dominated by any other outcome (Shubik 1982, 145; Ordeshook 
1986, 340). Players can reach binding agreements throughout the game during which 
they are able to communicate among themselves (Morrow 1994, 75). Following this, 
only the outcomes in the core will survive and all are likely to be stable solutions since 
by definition a better solution cannot be found for all players. A weakness of the coop-
erative model is that it is based on the assumption that the communication among play-
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ers is costless and that there are precise authorities that can enforce the agreements 
reached by the players (Doron and Sened 2001, 24). Arguably at the international level, 
there are no relevant enforcers for the agreements and therefore non-cooperative game 
theory may be a better choice to explain complex bargaining events. Non-cooperative 
bargaining theory focuses more on the strategic behavior of single players without mak-
ing any assumptions of the existence of cores and in which a pay-off is connected to 
each specific choice of strategies for all the players of the game. Binding agreements 
cannot be made while communications among players may or may not be allowed be-
cause players define their own strategies
58
, even though traditionally communication is 
not allowed in non-cooperative games (Morrow 1994, 76). This theory also helps politi-
cal scientists to predict the expected outcome of very complex bargaining processes and 
to analyze the strategic choices of the players. 
In non-cooperative games each player chooses a specific strategy out of the 
available strategies with the intent of maximizing his or her pay-off. This pay-off is the 
result of the interaction of each player with the other players, the expectation of their 
strategies and the lack of knowledge of what the other players have agreed upon (Doron 
and Sened 2001, 25). It is worth noting that the main difference with cooperative games 
is that players in non-cooperative games develop decisions that are independent from 
the other players‟ and without the ability to define a core in which the players know that 
a possible agreement is present. For non-cooperative games the solution is found by 
looking for a Nash Equilibrium, which Donon and Sened (2001, 25) define as a situa-
tion in which no players can unilaterally gain more than what they currently hold by un-
ilaterally changing their strategy, given the strategies that the other players have already 
                                               
58 See Morrow 1994, 75. 
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chosen. Given the circumstances, it is in no players‟ interest to change the situation and 
for that reason the game stalls where it would be unfavorable for a single player to un-
ilaterally adopt a different strategy resulting in a lower pay-off. 
A Nash Equilibrium does not necessarily pertain to a positive situation. In fact, 
two players may find themselves locked in a situation in which both could gain higher 
pay-offs, for example in the well-known Prisoner‟s dilemma, in which both players 
have a dominant strategy resulting in a lower-than-optimal benefit. This particular game 
is often used in politics to describe domestic and international conflict and to illustrate 
why individuals may not achieve cooperation (Donon and Sened 2001, 26). In the sim-
plified dispute I describe in section 2.9 to describe the relevance of an evolving envi-
ronment, two are the possible Nash Equilibria: in both one player chooses a different 
strategy from the other player‟s (Morrow 1994; Shubik 1982). 
As said above, in the present work I will not criticize the rationality assumption 
and I will not add to its limitations. Reviewing the basic tenets of the Rational Choice 
theory and its main weaknesses, however, contributes to a better understanding of the 
addition of the present work to the existing game theory literature. Other authors have 
already made efforts pointing out flaws and the limits of the rationality assumption. 
Here I want to argue that, in addition to the critiques made by others, game theory might 
be constrained also by its lack of consideration of an evolving environment. This was 
clearly the case in the 2006 Ukrainian crisis, which quickly ended especially thanks to 
the European customers‟ intervention and prompt reaction to the disruption of supplies 
(Nichol, Woehrel and Bernard 2006; Yhiah 2008). 
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2.8 Advantages and disadvantages of rational choice theory 
 
Despite their applicability for real world problems, non-cooperative bargaining 
processes have often been criticized for the leeway political scientists possess in defin-
ing the pay-offs linked to each strategy adopted by the players. Such flexibility is vital 
for the definition of this kind of game because the structure of the pay-offs can heavily 
affect the problem. Moreover, given the nature of the conceptual framework, some have 
also argued that the analysis of a political bargaining affair may result in an oversimpli-
fication of a problem which in reality is more complex than represented by the model. 
The arbitrariness of the political scientist in deciding the overall structure of the model 
is also relevant in identifying the bargaining problem as a prisoner‟s dilemma or as a 
game of chicken; the conclusions drawn by the selection of either model can significant-
ly change. 
Such an assumption can severely constrain the usefulness of these models, be-
cause not all participants are likely to follow the same mindset. One must ponder actors 
who make their decisions in order not to maximize utility (viewed here in terms of fi-
nancial resources), but to maintain an internal status quo (religious or social). In this 
case, we are dealing with “non-monetized” utilities, which, however, cannot be reliably 
and consistently measured due to their particular nature.  
Assuming that the other players‟ reasoning coincides with that of Western coun-
tries, mirror-imaging one‟s mindset is probably the major issue that decision makers 
have to confront. Mirror-imaging can also lead strategists to think that all actors perce-
ive the game in the same way. One can consider, for example, all instances where one 
group perceives a situation as that of defeat; while the other party perceives it as a victo-
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ry (US troops that kill thousands of terrorists believe that they are the winner. As is the 
same for terrorists who perceive themselves as winners by killing few US marines, even 
if at the cost of thousands of men) (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991). 
Another limitation of game theory is the simplicity of its models. Although game 
theory can be useful to better understand the dynamics underlying a particular game, it 
can be useless or even dangerous, to reduce a very complex situation to a Prisoners‟ di-
lemma or Chicken (Bennet 1995). 
Negotiations, like the ones that occur in price disputes between Russia and 
Ukraine, are particular games that take place under specific rules, and in which „time is 
money‟ (Bennet 1995, 45). In fact, as time passes the conditions under which the nego-
tiation is taking place change so as to make on some occasions the game end. In a hypo-
thetical case, Russia halts the supply of gas to Ukraine and decides not to accept counte-
roffers from Ukraine regarding the price of Russian gas being used that does not equal 
its first request Both actors lose something from their failure to reach an agreement. 
Russia, in fact, loses revenues from the lack of sales to Ukraine and is potentially con-
tractually vulnerable to pay for the damages inflicted on the Ukrainian economy. On the 
other side, Ukraine also loses (much more than Russia at the beginning), because the 
unexpected cut of the supply cripples its economy, potentially harming its infrastructure 
and even its population. In fact, if the cut off of supplies occurs in winter, that may 
damage the pipelines due to a potential freeze, increase their costs for repair and main-
tenance. In addition, dire consequences may result such as the suffering and deaths of 
civilians who do not expect the sudden halt to gas flow. In this particular negotiation 
then, large costs are immediately translated by one of the parties involved, while the in-
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creasingly larger costs are placed upon the other party, where serious consequences will 
be dealt with at a later time
59
. 
The disputed final price can change by simple ways, if one assumes that its re-
duction occurs at equal rates in the chosen time unit. For example, one can assume that 
with every passing day without an agreement that satisfies both parties, following which 
the gas supply is resumed, a large cost is inflicted upon Ukraine in terms of sudden in-
terruption of energy in the country and the lack of other energy sources given the unex-
pected event. However, as time passes, Ukraine may find means to remedy the situation, 
shifting the burden to the other player which was done by redirecting the gas that was 
supposed to be delivered to Europe to its own needs.  
One can think of such a relationship as a linear function in which time is on the 
x-axis and the total costs of not accepting the other player‟s requests on the y-axis. In 
this context, the initial cost is much greater for Ukraine (sudden interruption of gas 
flow), and much smaller (close to zero) for Russia, assuming that Russia has taken 
every proper step towards the interruption of the gas supply in order to minimize its im-
pact on its own infrastructure and its economy. However, such an interruption will be 
more costly as time progresses in that the expensive pipeline system needs not only to 
be maintained and repaired, but it is also costly in terms of revenues lost by the coercive 
strategy that was adopted. 
In game strategy, the number of players is vital to understanding the likely out-
come of the interaction among the players because they significantly change the balance 
and the rules of the game. The importance of this statement can be understood 
                                               
59 Such a situation reflects the Ukrainian need of a strategy of developing alternative energy sources or a 
strategy of energy supply diversification. 
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representing the interaction among the actors using a game tree, where one starts at the 
first node, at which a player finds him or herself at a specific situation in which they 
have to decide whether a determined strategy will be followed or not. According to the 
specific chosen strategy, the other player may decide to follow a specific course of ac-
tion among potential strategies, to which the first player can reply with a set of possible 
actions and so on. Game trees are very useful because if one knows in advance the 
number of interactions among the players, one can reason and determine the optimal 
way to approach the bargaining
60
. There are some games that end after a finite number 
of steps and are complex due to the number of players and possible moves or strategies 
so that the solution of the game is not within reach of easy calculation. In complex 
games, players construct a smaller game tree consisting of fewer interactions with the 
intent of devising a strategy that leads to a relative improvement of the current situation. 
These games are usually approached by reconstructing the whole game tree and starting 
from the desired outcome to determine the possible pay-offs associated with and ex-




2.9 Can today’s game theory explain the outcome of a simplified dis-
pute? 
 
I have shown above that Russia has strong economic and political reasons to ex-
ploit to its maximum extent the potential of the gas weapon on those countries that used 
                                               
60 See Dixit and Nalebuff 1991, 42. 
61 This is what Dixit and Nalebuff refer to as “Think forward and reason back”. 
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to be under the Soviets‟ influence in order to increase its economic and political pres-
ence in the region. 
In a simplified game, the two players Russia and Ukraine know that they cannot 
keep the gas interruption continuing for a long period
62
. On one side there is Russia, 
who is determined to achieve control over the energy transportation networks, and it is 
not limited by any strong diplomatic relations with other European countries. On the 
other side there is Ukraine, which after no more than 1 year would be completely de-
stroyed, with an economy that produces little, no revenues coming from the transporta-
tion of gas, and a starving population that is potentially completely exposed to the frigid 
temperatures of the winter season. 
One can view this bargaining context as consisting of several of a finite number 
of interactions, for the preferences of the leaders (or their representatives) involved in 
finding an agreement already have in mind the required conditions for agreement. Only 
offers that are within their acceptance range will be admitted, while other offers will be 
rejected. The leaders can reschedule other meetings for the purpose of finding additional 
information, evidence that can improve their bargaining position, or simply to seek do-
mestic support for reaching an agreement that is not strictly within their bargaining 
range, due to possible side-payments or via issue-linkage. Meetings cannot be assumed 
to repeat for an infinite amount of times, due to the fact that the reputations of both 
countries are being damaged, and they require some time to be planned and organized, 
as well some negotiations in dealing with domestic forces. As seen above, time is li-
                                               
62 Howorth (2007) notes that after 1 year the consequences of the gas supplies interruption would backfire 
also on the Russian economy. 
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mited, because after about 1 year there will not be any benefits to be shared by both ac-
tors. 
I believe that, especially if one looks at the 2006 Belarusian dispute, characte-
rized by the firm belief of the smaller country that it had a bargaining advantage in 
terms of being able to shift the burden of supply reductions to Europe and therefore 
back to Russia, a Chicken game can describe rather well this type of bargaining situa-
tion. As seen previously, Belarus firmly believed in its position. Russia, however, was 
also strongly motivated by economic consideration to increase gas prices and gain 
access to the pipeline system. Assuming a symmetric game, that coming to no agree-
ment in the long term will be the least preferable solution for both countries, the distri-
bution of the preferred payoffs can be as described in Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8 
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For Russia, the highest payoff is certainly that of defecting, that is not complying 
with Ukraine‟s request of keeping the same price and having Ukraine accepts all its de-
mands. A similar situation would apply for Ukraine. 
However, unlike a Prisoner‟s dilemma, the payoff for accepting the requests of 
the other player is slightly higher than the payoff that corresponds to the situation in 
which both players decide not to cooperate and reach an agreement. In fact, in this case 
Ukraine would witness a quick decay of its economy due to lack of supplies, while Rus-
sia would lose an important customer, thus losing its grip on both its economic and po-
litical structure. The situation in which both players find common ground for their re-
quests represents a quasi-optimal solution in terms of payoff for both players. In fact, 
having at least some requests accepted by both players represent a better outcome than 
having to comply with the other‟s requests only, or suffering long term economic dam-
ages due to lack of agreements. This situation, however, is clearly worse than that of 
having one own‟s requests accepted by the other player without conceding anything. 
This payoff structure matches that of a game of Chicken. In fact,  
T>R>S>P 
As said above, the game of Chicken has been shown to have two equilibriums, 
characterized by one player choosing a different strategy from the other player‟s (Mor-
row 1994; Shubik 1982). For games that are played only once, the players cannot 
choose which equilibrium they should approximately settle on. Bornstein, Budescu, 
Zamir (1997, 387) note that without coordination, mixed strategy chicken games tend to 
settle on an equilibrium which does not maximize the utility for all the players taken to-
gether. 
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The authors point out that signaling, that is costless communication outside the 
game, and/or repetition are two items that allow not only a fairer outcome which is also 
more Pareto-efficient, but it allows the settlement on one specific Nash equilibrium 
point (387-388). In the case of Russia and Ukraine, this means that negotiations have to 
be repeated a specific amount of times in order for the two players to resolve the dispute 
(McCarty and Meirowitz 2007, 252). Alternatively, or in addition to repetition, players 
need to signal their resolve or their commitment to one option in order to stabilize a 
game on a particular outcome.  
Other issues must be taken into account when trying to explain why a specific 
equilibrium was reached (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991, 33-34). First of all, one party may 
be advantaged because it can replace the service, product, or term of the agreement with 
a temporary version. Having an opportunity to do better regardless of what the other 
party does represents a strong bargaining advantage. For example, even though Ukraine 
can divert some gas that was directed to other countries to make up for its requirement 
to survive and its economic growth, Russia knows that it can suddenly cut the gas 
supply that will cause Ukraine to consequentially suffer from large costs. The gas diver-
sion is only a temporary solution and in the long term will cost lost revenues (for the 
lack of revenues coming from transportation fees) and it costs the loss of customers who 
will look for a more diversified source for energy
63
. Russia, knowing this, will be more 
                                               
63 This is actually something that happened, since the recent gas disputes have shown that the political 
agenda of Russia and its surrounding countries can make the flow of gas to Europe unreliable (Shaffer 
2009, 45). 
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likely to support an agreement that closely reflects the imbalance in the costs that the 
two parties suffer from not resolving the dispute
64
. 
Similar reasoning describes another advantage, using once again the Russia-
Ukraine dispute. The Russian gas supply disruption damages, in the short term, Ukraine 
more than its own economy. As said above, it has been assumed that the Russian econ-
omy will start being severely damaged by the loss of the revenues of gas sales to 
Ukraine and Europe after a period of about one year. During the first months, the losses 
are unlikely to hit the Russian economy too harshly, but expected to do damage by 
striking violently the Ukrainian economy, causing it to stop its significant production 
and endangering its population. The disruption of gas, in other words, is seen here as 
something that both parties know that, especially in the short term, will be more detri-
mental to one party than the other one. Following Dixit and Nalebuff (1991, 291), this 
will further improve the bargaining position of Russia, and the agreement reached is 
likely to reflect also this advantage in terms of deviation from an agreement that is 
moderate between the two requests. 
A deviation from the agreement that is balanced between the two extremes 
represented by the two party preferences is more likely to occur when the party that is 
less fearful can play a game in which it threatens the other party to keep the dispute 
open until the demands are met (in this case the party is Russia, given the fact that its 
economy would significantly suffer from the gas cut only after a significant period). 
Every day that passes, a total breakdown of the negotiations becomes more and more 
likely, because of the increasing tensions among the players. If there is a party that can-
                                               
64 On this regard, I have assumed that a symmetric game better represents the situation, since for both 
countries no agreement is the least preferable (ordinal) outcome in the long term. 
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not afford to have the negotiations collapse and to lose the opportunity to find an 
agreement that would return the situation to normality, this will expose them to the use 
of brinkmanship. This is prolonging of the bargaining with the goal that each additional 
day will improve their position regarding the settlement of the dispute with the other 
party (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991, 294).  
However, in disputes, as well as in militarized conflicts, perceptions do matter. 
Jervis (1976) notes that a state must often go to extremes because moderation and re-
conciliation can be taken for weakness. Even though the state may be willing to settle 
on a dispute that involves some concessions, it may not concede for the fear that the 
other side will not accept the settlement, but would rather attempt to gain additional 
benefits. Players, according to Jervis, have an incentive to mask their own willingness 
to enter the spiral that leads to the destruction of the benefits that the dispute is actually 
trying to divide between the parties involved. However, if on one side this approach 
may convince one party to concede, there is a chance that both players will find them-
selves moving towards mutual destruction. This is the total breakdown of negotiations 
and a catastrophe for both economies (Jervis 1976, 293). The solution that Jervis offers 
regarding this kind of situation entails the claim that one side must make an initiative 
that increases the other side's perception that a mutually beneficial solution can be 
found. This is accomplished by demonstrating its amicable intentions and a lack of in-
terest in harming the other party. All of this lies in a context that justifies and supports 
the first state‟s intentions to respect the other state‟s legitimacy. 
Thus, how the final prize will be divided highly depends on psychological fac-
tors, which one can employ to explain why people only apparently behave irrationally 
and risk the chance of ending up in a situation in which both players lose everything 
  
73 Gas Disputes and Soviet Foreign PolicyGas Disputes and Soviet Foreign Policy 
they can. In fact, states tend to develop a specific image of one other, and once they do 
so, ambiguous and even discrepant information will be attached to that image. This me-
chanism, however, does not apply to the state itself since each state knows that it is fol-
lowing its own preference which is not intended to harm the counterpart, even though 
they may be perceived to be doing so. However, states often assume that the other states 
are also fully aware of this. A negative image developed by a state has a strong effect on 
the stability of the relations between the parties, since they will start an escalation of 
preventive reactions which will magnify the dispute (Jervis 1976, Lebow 1984). As 
seen above, threats, like halting the gas flow perpetually, are more likely to work when 
the other side sees the high costs associated with standing firm. More specifically, this 
will be the case when the other is risk-averse, has a short-term predominant point of 
view, is relatively weak or vulnerable and it values the lives and property of its citizens 
(Jervis 1976). Also according to Jervis, states tend to be unable to deal with random 
events and to see the behavior of others as more centralized and coordinated than they 
actually are in an attempt to draw inferences from complex and unrelated events. On the 
other end, states exaggerate the centrality of their role in others' policies, especially if it 
is somehow connected to the favorability of that specific outcome. This in turn leads to 
the consequence of believing that deterrence actually works since a state will tend to se-
lect the explanation of why the adversary has not harmed him or her and to believe that 
random events are not as such, but were the product of the intentions of the other (Jervis 
1976, 1989; Brams and Kilgour 1988, 128-129). Thus, Jervis recommends realizing that 
actors come to harm others more than they mean to because they do not see the degree 
to which their policies conflict with the other's interests. The problem is further compli-
cated by the fact that the actor usually does not realize that the perceiver tends to con-
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clude that if the actor's behavior has harmed him, that it was purposeful. The actor also 
assumes that even if he or she has inadvertently damaged the other's interest, the other 
will realize that this was not the actor's goal, thus failing to comprehend that the other 
will perceive more hostility (Jervis 1976, 1989).  
Thus, perceptions may ruin the game initiated by the party who believes they are 
in a favorable position, and to use it to reach an agreement that coincides with its own 
preferences. Such a move is called brinkmanship
65
, and it consists of a set of actions 
which take the opponent to the “brink” of disaster which forces him or her to exit the 
situation. The core of this approach relies on the creation of a risk that is substantial 
enough to change the opponent‟s mind and make him or her follow the desired line of 
thought (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991, Lebow 1984).  
Brinkmanship is based on three pillars (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991). The first re-
fers to the fact that the threat that creates the risk has to be credible. If one desires the 
opponent to change his/her mind, one will have to make a threat that is viable enough to 
represent a danger for the opponent, but that is not too strong to be appropriate for the 
specific situation. For example, threatening to start a nuclear war only because a state is 
alleged to have some unimportant documents is not a credible threat. The term brink-
manship is often referred to as one of the strategies employed by the US to solve the 
Cuban Missile Crisis (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991). In this conflict, the US created a risk of 
starting a nuclear war should the Russians have failed to comply with American re-
quests. The threat they made was a credible one because the US created a threat that 
was strong enough to raise the concern of the Russians and was believable. Brinkman-
                                               
65 Although brinkmanship and game of chicken are sometimes used as synonyms (Rapoport and Cham-
mah 1966), brinkmanship refers to the move that brings the two players on the edge of disaster, while the 
game of chicken refers to game with a payoff structure as previously described. 
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ship relies on a threat that does not imply a certainty of retaliation in the absence of 
compliance. It is rather based on defining a situation in which repeated violations lead 
to an increase of the risk of the occurrence of a substantially detrimental event (Dixit 
and Nalebuff 1991).  
This condition does not suffice to make brinkmanship a useful strategy. The very 
fact that one of the two parties is in full control of the happening of the harmful event (it 
was up to the US to decide whether to start the war or not), that makes such a threat not 
credible, since that party might still decide that, despite the repeated violations, it is not 
worth going to war. It is therefore necessary to devise a way to convince the opponent 
that there is not going to be consideration of a second option. A common strategy used 
for this purpose is losing control of the possible actions that may follow non-
compliance. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, such a strategy relied on the proce-
dures entrenched in the US naval fleet, which weaken the overall control that President 
Kennedy had over the operations. In other words, by pointing out that he did not have 
full control of what would happen due to internal procedures rooted in the Naval fleet 
that formed the blockade, Kennedy created what Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) defines as a 
credible “slippery slope”, where the two (or more) players might find themselves after 
some undeterminant time, suddenly plunging “deep in the abyss” of the nuclear war. 
Repeated violations would have pushed the two parties further and further “down the 
slope”, increasing the chances of war (Allison 1971). 
Brinkmanship has been successfully employed to explain US behavior in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, the Cold War, and is possibly the strategy that is being used to 
deal with Iran‟s nuclear program. The Bush administration created the impression of 
willingness and ability to push a highly dangerous situation to the limit (war) rather than 
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concede and permit Iranians to continue to acquire the technology needed to develop a 
nuclear weapon (Young 2008). The US made this threat credible by moving many U.S. 
Navy units into the Persian Gulf and by placing pressure on Iranians about their pres-
ence in Iraq. Therefore the US showed themselves focused upon the efforts to stop the 
Iranian nuclear program and also willing to go to war if that was deemed necessary 
(Young). However, one has seen that for brinkmanship to produce any effect, it is ne-
cessary to let chance play a role or at least lack full control of the final decision of going 
to war. This element appears to be missing, for the US seems to want to rely more on 
the pressure it is exerting on Iranians to force them to yield
66
.  
In conclusion, the deviation from the mean in the agreement reached in the sty-
lized example of the gas between Russia and Ukraine depends also on the presence of 
other issues the two countries may be interested in resolving. In other words, the partic-
ular agreement of gas prices may be settled by taking into account the fact that one of 
the two countries may be willing to concede more in terms of gas price for the sake of 
improving the benefits stemming from arriving at a deal relative to another issue (Dixit 
and Nalebuff 1991, 295-296). Axelrod and Keohane (1985) talk about „issue-linkage‟, 
                                               
66 As an example of working brinkmanship, one can look at the situation of December 2007 when the Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran‟s nuclear program, Iranian hardliners had found grounds to 
keep supporting their nuclear program and therefore becoming more willing to push the game even fur-
ther. In the National Intelligence Estimate mentioned above, the U.S. appears to have considered an attack 
on Iran unlikely in the near future, leading Iran‟s hardliners to go their way, without concern of possible 
consequences. Such a situation highlights the main issue related to the use of brinkmanship that limits its 
usefulness. In fact, if all players do not yield, there is a possibility that the situation becomes uncontrolla-
ble, possibly causing a major disaster (in Iran‟s case, the start of a war and in all likelihood, a new burst 
of violence in the Middle East). Brinkmanship has been successfully employed in several occasions prov-
ing its value at resolving complex international crisis. However, it can be a volatile strategy that might 
turn out to be lethal for the brinkman itself; this can be especially true if the other party involved in the 
game is not a rational actor who bases his/her decisions on a different set of values than just utility. 
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that is the practice of linking together several issues with the intent of improving the 
overall bargaining position possibly by conceding on one issue to obtain a more favora-
ble payoff from another issue. In the Russia-Ukraine case, the resolution of the gas price 
dispute could have been resolved by offering to lower the cost of the gas sent to Ukraine 
for its own use but simultaneously allowing Russia to gain partial control of the pipeline 
system that transports the gas to Europe, which is exactly what occurred. 
Issue-linkage, asymmetries, repetition, signals, perception, and brinkmanship 
moves are all elements that the literature describes as relevant in order to understand 
why a specific outcome was the result of the negotiation process. They all assume a 
constant environment, in which players and their involvement is constant throughout the 
entire game. However, a changing environment, in which other players (countries or 
large European institutions) gradually enter the game, played a key role in the 2006 
Ukraine-Russia dispute. Current game theory does not deal with such a dynamic envi-
ronment. However, this becomes a relevant issue only in the case there is empirical evi-




As stated above, Europe heavily depends on Russia especially in terms of gas 
supplies which Russia has used to advance its political agenda. The relationship be-
tween the Russian government and the state-owned Gazprom makes the distinction be-
tween purely economic decisions (which could be assumed by such a large company) 
and politically-motivated decisions barely discernable. In fact, it is impossible in the 
Russian case to distinguish when it is politics, rather than economics, that is guiding the 
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behavior of the energy giant. Such a statement is especially true for the gas disputes that 
occurred from 2004 on, where economic decisions to disrupt gas supplies and the politi-
cal allegations behind these decisions cannot be easily distinguished and weighted.  
Given the importance that Russia has as an energy supplier, it is important to 
understand not only why these crises started, but also especially how these disputes 
were solved. Game theory provides some useful insights to understand why some dis-
putes were settled much earlier than other. Deviations from the expected outcome of the 
dispute can be attributed to the particular distribution of pay-offs, and elements like is-
sue-linkage, asymmetries, repetition, signals, perception, and brinkmanship. As seen 
above, all these elements assume that the environment in which the game takes place is 
constant during the entire length of the game.  
Nonetheless, I argue that the very onset of the dispute changes the nature of the 
problem, as it was clear in the case of the 2006 Ukraine-Russia dispute. Thus, from a 
two-actors clash of interests, the gas dispute needs to be treated as a larger problem, 
where not only the preferences of the two disputing actors need to be examined, but also 
the larger international arena need to be accounted for. If this is clear in situations where 
gas disruptions have caused visible damages (the gas disputes examined above all oc-
curred in the coldest months of the year), the fact that the larger environmental context 
matters is not similarly evident. However, if one finds evidence that gas disputes have 
an effect on the economy of other countries, one has the evidence that supports our 
claim that external actors have a non-ideological reason to intervene in the gas dispute 
and make sure that it ends in the way that least damages the surrounding economies. For 
these reasons I hypothesize that gas supply crises have an impact on the real GDP 
growth and the stock market of other economies. Clearly, the longer the effect of these 
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crises can be observed on these two economic measures, the more likely is that the po-
litical leadership of the surrounding countries will take steps towards helping the gas 
dispute resolve at a faster pace.  
Finding evidence of this sort is important for measuring the impact of political 
bargaining crises on the oil and gas markets, which in turn I assume to be able to affect 
the preferences of the actors involved in the dispute because of the diplomatic actions 
that external actors, damaged by the effects of the crisis, can take to help the crisis re-
solve.  
Thus, I hypothesize that: 
1. Gas disputes negatively affect the real GDP and stock markets of energy 
importing countries like Spain, Sweden, the UK, France, Italy and Germany, Neth-
erlands, Czech Republic, and Poland. These countries are not only net energy im-
porters, which makes them vulnerable to the start of a new dispute, but are also im-
portant members of the Council of the European Union, which hold legislative initi-
ative in the EU; 
2. Negative effects in the economies of states in the proximate environment 
will give rise to new actors entering the dispute.  
3. The statements and institutions whose significance is studied in the stock 
market model have a significant and positive relationship with the trends in the 
stock markets studied in this work. I represent these statements and institutions with 
what I call „reaction functions‟.  
The hypotheses for each specific case study are formally summarized in Table 
2.2, Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.3 
Hypotheses for the Russia-Ukraine case studies 
H1a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the GDP growth and the start of the 2006 
dispute. 
H1b: There is a significant and negative relationship between the GDP growth and the start of the 2009 
dispute. 
H2a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the stock market trend and the start of the 
dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2006. 
H2b: There is a significant and negative relationship between the stock market trend and the start of the 
dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2009. 
H3a: There is a significant and positive relationship between the stock market trend and the reaction func-
tion in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2006. 
H3b: There is a significant and positive relationship between the stock market trend and the reaction func-
tion in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2009. 
 
Since no relevant official reply to the start of the disputes between Russia and 
Belarus in 2006 has been found, only two hypotheses on the relationship between stock 
market and the reaction functions will be tested. 
Table 2.4 
Hypotheses for the Russia-Belarus case studies 
H4a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the GDP growth and the start of the 2004 
dispute. 
H4b: There is a significant and negative relationship between the GDP growth and the start of the 2006 
dispute. 
H4c: There is a significant and negative relationship between the GDP growth and the start of the 2007 
dispute. 
H5a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the stock market trend and the start of the 
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dispute between Russia and Belarus in 2004. 
H5b: There is a significant and negative relationship between the stock market trend and the start of the 
dispute between Russia and Belarus in 2006. 
H5c: There is a significant and negative relationship between the stock market trend and the start of the 
dispute between Russia and Belarus in 2007. 
H6a: There is a significant and positive relationship between the stock market trend and the reaction func-
tion in the dispute between Russia and Belarus in 2004. 
H6b: There is a significant and positive relationship between the stock market trend and the reaction func-
tion in the dispute between Russia and Belarus in 2006. 
H6c: There is a significant and positive relationship between the stock market trend and the reaction func-
tion in the dispute between Russia and Belarus in 2007. 
 
In Table 2.4 are presented the hypotheses that will be tested for the Russia and 
Moldova 2006 dispute. 
Table 2.5 
Hypotheses for the Russia-Moldova case study 
H7: There is a significant and negative relationship between the GDP growth and the start of the 2006 
dispute. 
H8: There is a significant and negative relationship between stock market trend and the start of the 2006 
dispute. 
H9: There is a significant and positive relationship between the stock market trend and the reaction func-
tion in the dispute between Russia and Moldova in 2006. 
 
Brams (1975), Ordeshook (1986), Brams and Kilgour (1988), Dixit and Na-
lebuff (1991), Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1994), Morrow (1994), McCarty and 
Meirowitz (2007), Dixit, Skeath, Reiley (2009) all describe game theory, and its 
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numerous variations, within a constant framework, where the number of players is 
unchanged and their preferences are fixed. 
If my analysis supports at least part of these hypotheses, I can conclude that 
taking into account external actors‟ preferences should occur not only when there is 
a substantial gas disruption, but also whenever a crisis starts. In fact, a damaging ef-
fect on other countries‟ economies will slowly push European leaders to put pres-
sure on the countries involved in the crisis to find an agreement and restore the bal-
ance in the market. Moreover, change in the environment can occur where state-
ments or other acts from relevant institutions have such a strong influence that they 
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3 Research Design 
 
 
Testing these hypotheses formulated for examining these gas disputes will re-
quire the use of Time Series models. Time Series models are often affected by this pres-
ence of dependence of the observation at time t to the previous time-lag(s). In other 
words, what one can see in time series is that the level of each observation of the depen-
dent variable usually depends on the levels of the observation of the previous time 
unit(s), that is that the previous lags themselves define to a certain degree the level of 
the successive observations. For example, the value of the assets of company XYZ on a 
specific day depends to a large degree on the value it had the day before, since the in-
vestors usually rely on that value as a rough estimate of the current value in absence of 
new developments that may affect the estimate of that value. The current value can de-
pend on more than just one observation: in fact, it is possible, but rather more usual in 
the social sciences, to discover that a phenomenon‟s observations depend on the obser-
vations at time t-1 and time t-2, or that there are seasonal influences of the process gene-
rating the data. Seasonal corrections may be needed for variations that occur annually, 
monthly or weekly: e.g. sales of ice creams reach higher levels during the summer time, 
while during the winter season they are at their lowest. All these processes can be mod-
eled by a time series analysis
67
, so that the understanding of the data-generating process 
                                               
67 Time series are defined as a set of observations xt measured at a specified time t. Time series are conti-
nuous if their observations can be measured at any moment over a specified time frame. However, statis-
tical time series models are usually discrete, that is they present observations that are measured at some 
(fixed or varying) intervals (Brockwell and Davis 1987, 1). 
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improves, enabling the researcher to perform a successful description, control or predic-
tion of the studied phenomenon (Chatfield 2001, 12-13). 
Plotting of a time series is always the starting point of a scholar that wishes to 
study a phenomenon across time (Brockwell and Davis 1987, 14). The plots can reveal 
not only seasonal differences, but also trends (upwards or downwards), shocks, outliers, 
cyclical variations and other irregular fluctuations (Chatfield 1984; Chatfield 2001; 
Brockwell and Davis 1987). A proper graphical approach to the afore-mentioned issues 
is a good start to the understanding of the processes being studied when using classical 
methods.  
Even though the detection of trends
68
 may be effective simply by looking at 
plots of the data, the definition in the literature changes widely (Chatfield 2001, 19). 
However, even though in a few cases a deterministic linear trend may be appropriate, 
local models, in which parameters vary according to time t seem to be have been ac-
cepted by most researchers (Chatfield 2001, 18). Seasonal variation can depend on the 
local mean, and in that case is defined as „multiplicative‟69. Seasonal effects, once prop-
erly identified, can be removed by using dummy variables for each period of the year 
affected by the seasonal effects and if they are assumed to be constant in time. Other-
wise, seasonal differencing can be an effective way of removing this effect. Assuming 
the use of data collected on a monthly basis, the difference between the current observa-
tion (time t) and the observation at time t-12 represent a valid method to eliminate the 
seasonal effects rather than running statistics to estimate them (Chatfield 2001, 22; 
Brockwell and Davis 1984, 15). 
                                               
68 Defined by Chatfield (2001, 18) as “long-term change in the underlying mean level per unit time”. 
69 Seasonal variation which does not depend on the local mean is called “additive” (Chatfield 2001, 21). 
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It is important to note that an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model 
would likely not be appropriate in that the autocorrelation in the residuals that is typical 
of time series would heavily bias downwards the estimation of the standard errors, thus 
biasing the testing of the hypothesis that gas disputes do bring change in external econ-
omies in terms of GDP and the stock markets. For large sample sizes, however, the OLS 
estimates are found to be minimum variance if the assumption that the trend is “poly-
nomial in time, trigonometric polynomial, has seasonal means or a linear combination 
of these” holds true. Generalized Least Squares (GLS) are in all other cases the un-
biased and minimum variance estimators, but they require perfect knowledge of the co-
variance function of the stochastic component (Cryer and Chan 2008, 40). 
Serial correlation
70
 or residual autocorrelation occurs whenever the order of ob-
served errors is statistically significant in explaining the level of the observed variable.  
Pure serial correlation indicates that in a correctly specified model the error term is cor-
related with another error term in a different, usually contemporaneous, time lag. First-
order autocorrelation indicates that an error term is a function of the (temporally) pre-
ceding error term (plus an error term). This autocorrelation can be positive or negative, 
in which cases the error has respectively a tendency to following the ongoing trend, or 
to behave by switching back and forth between a positive sign and a negative sign. Au-
tocorrelation does not bias OLS the coefficients, which will be still centered on the true 
mean. Typical causes of autocorrelation are omitted variables (like inflation), poor func-
tional forms, and lagged effects (Studenmund 2005).  
Serial correlation is often the product of a misspecification of the model, in 
which a variable has been omitted, there is a measurement error, the functional form in 
                                               
70 See Studenmund (2005), Chapter 9. 
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nonlinear or it is pure stochastic error. All these problems may be characterized by seri-
al correlation that cannot be resolved in ways other than by adding the missing variable, 
finding the proper functional form, or a correct measurement. Serial  correlation makes 
OLS no longer as the minimum variance estimator and it biases downward the estimate 
of the standard errors of the coefficients, leading to unreliable hypothesis testing in 
terms of increasing the chances of Type I errors, that is the probability of rejecting a 
true null hypothesis. Serial correlation can often be detected by plotting the residuals, or 
using a statistical test for autocorrelation such as the Durbin Watson d test, especially if 
its requirements are met. In Generalized Least Squares, the error terms are corrected for 
autocorrelation and thus the model is minimum variance and the beta coefficient of the 
independent variables converge to the values calculated by a standard OLS regression, 
but the estimated R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 are not directly comparable with the OLS equiva-
lent since the dependent variable is transformed. Finally, Newey-West standard errors 
are specifically design to estimate the standard errors of the estimated parameters with-
out causing bias in them taking into account first-order autocorrelation. First differenc-
ing can provide an easy solution to the problem of autocorrelation (Chatfield 1984, 21). 
 
3.1 Applications of time series models in the literature 
 
Time series analysis has been successfully applied also in political science. 
There are a number of similar studies, that are somewhat related to the present work.  
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Schneider and Troeger (2006), noting that little is said in the literature about the 
effects of war on the economy
71
, while much more has been said about the causes of 
war, warn that a better understanding of what follows wars in terms of stock market os-
cillations may provide policy-makers a deeper understanding of what the consequences 
are of deciding that war is the only solution to a crisis. Schneider and Troeger (2006) 
note that there is some uncertainty about the reactions of the stock market to wars. In 
some cases, like the one after the Second World War, the economy of the US had large-
ly expanded, probably as a result of the fact that the war had been waged on foreign ter-
ritory. In other cases, where war is waged on national territories, the reaction of the 
stock market to the event is generally negative
72
. In other cases, the Dow Jones lost a 
6.31% due to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in 1990, but it gained more than 
twice as much when the coalition reacted to Saddam‟s aggressive expansion policy in 
the following months
73
. Schneider and Troeger (2006), aware of the complexity of the 
issue, conclude that the impact of wars on financial markets is largely dependent on the 
degree of gravity of the conflict and the degree to which economic actors are able to 
predict the events, whether they were inherently cooperative or war-prone. They place 
their study inside a larger context, that of classical mercantilism, which maintains that 
international markets react in a negative manner to destructive events like wars, since 
they damage existing economic relationships. Classic mercantilism does not contem-
                                               
71 See also Braun and McGrattan (1993). The authors provide a refined econometric model to document 
the effect of war on the main macroeconomic factors both the First World War and the Second World 
War. Chappel and Eldridge (2000) offer a test for market efficiency (which assumes an expected return 
equal to zero, which implies a white noise process) based on a GARCH model using the data of the UK 
FT30 stock index during the Second World War, in the period 1939-1945. 
72 See Schneider and Troeger (2006, 624). 
73 See also Earle and Foster 2003. 
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plate positive reactions to wars, as it has been demonstrated to be the case when wars 
are waged on foreign territories, and it does not even account for the expectations that 
economic actors may have regarding the outcome of a conflict. In fact, it makes perfect-
ly sense that markets react positively when a hostile act is exerted if that act represents a 
clear signal that the war will soon be over or that that act will bring the end to the con-
flict. In order to test this hypothesis, Schneider and Troeger (2006) study how the Dow 
Jones, the British FTSE and the French CAC stock market indices reacted to the inva-
sion of Kuwait, the Israeli conflict and the internal conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia.  
In order to do so, they use variants of the Generalized Auto Regressive Conditional He-
teroskedasticity model (GARCH)
74
 and they conclude that the stock markets considered 
all reacted negatively to most of the hostile events considered that characterized each 
conflict. However, they also note that international crises trigger different reactions in 
the stock markets that reflect the importance of the conflict to the local actors and that 
negative events influence the volatility much more strongly than positive events. More 
specifically, the authors seem to find evidence to conclude that economic actors change 
their trading patterns according to their perception of severity of the future of the current 
crisis and the belief that something of consequence is going to follow the specific event 
(Schneider and Troeger 2006, 642-643). The more a country has deep ties with the con-
flict, the more pronounced will be the reactions of that country‟s financial markets. 
Frey and Kucher (2000) were interested in testing whether all main historical 
events in the 1933-1948 period are reflected in the Swiss bond market. More specifical-
ly, they use the Swiss market to test whether there are deviations from a random walk at 
                                               
74 See below for a description of this statistic technique and a review of some important modification to 
Bollerslev and Engle‟s model. 
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the times that correspond specifically, for example, to when the Second World War 
broke out or when Poland was invaded, using the value of five countries that were in-
volved in the events (Switzerland, Belgium, France, Germany and Austria). Not only 
did the values of the bonds issued by these governments reflect the importance of all of 
these events, but they also provide additional information of how the market and inves-
tors operate. In fact, when Germany invaded Poland, the Swiss bonds gained more val-
ue because at that point it was clear that it would have been easier for the Swiss gov-
ernment to fulfill its financial obligations than France, Germany, Belgium and Austria 
(Frey and Kucher
 
2000, 490). However, their model, which combines the use of an OLS 
model
75
 to estimate a regression curve for the behavior of the bonds/markets and the F-
test, which was used to check for differences from the estimated equation was unable to 
find any statistical deviation from the random walk on the occasion of the defeat of 
Germany in 1945. They suggest that this can be explained by the fact that traders had 
already predicted the occurrance of that event and had already adjusted their portfolio 
accordingly. 
In a very interesting work, Leigh, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2003) show that the 
probability of war
76
, in the specific case the war against Saddam, is strictly related to the 
price of oil and the performance of the S&P 500. Moreover, they find that this proba-
bility is able to explain over 30 percent of the variance of the S&P 500 and over 75 per-
                                               
75 The authors tested the same hypothesis also considering autoregressive processes up to the sixth order, 
finding no statistical difference in results. They controlled for inflation and real interest rates. 
76 In an attempt to bypass polls in order to reconstruct the probability that war, the authors use the now 
defunct website www.tradesports.com whose business was that of running double auction on well-defined 
futures. They recorded the performance of the future “Saddam Securities” under the assumption that fi-
nancial market of this sort are able to measure and aggregate the information that individuals hold about a 
specific topic, in this case the probability that Saddam is still a President or not by a certain date (see also 
Surowiecki 2004), and are therefore a good tool to estimate the probability of staying in power. 
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cent of spot oil prices (Leigh, Wolfers, Zitzewitz 2003, 2). More specifically, they con-
clude that a ten percent rise in the probability of war is able to influence the spot oil 
price by $1, or 3-4 percent of its value, which suggests that when war breaks out, that it 
is able to push up the oil price by $10 at least in the short term. Moreover, they discov-
ered that the US stock market reacts to small variations of the probability of wars. They 
estimate that a rise of ten percent in the risk of war can cause a decline in the S&P 500 
that roughly equals 1.5 percent of its value, which in turn suggests that war is capable of 
affecting a fifteen percent loss of S&P 500 value. The negative consequences of war on 
option prices are estimated by the authors to amount to between no effect and fifteen 
percent with a probability of seventy percent, between fifteen and thirty percent change 
in option prices with a probability of twenty percent and an effect of thirty percent or 
more with a probability that equals to ten percent. Rigobon and Sack (2005), criticizing 
the previous authors, reach, however, similar conclusions by implementing a genera-
lized method-of-moments (GMM) estimation procedure
77
 to measure the sensitivity of 
financial market variables to war risk. They measure this by just assuming that in cor-
respondence with the publication of some war-related news, the risk of war changes. 
The authors find that several of the financial variables they study are significantly af-
fected by war risk as they measured it. More specifically, an increase war in the risk of 
is often followed by an increase in year-ahead oil futures contracts by 2.9%, a decrease 
of equity prices by 4.8%, while the corporate yield spread rose
78
. Even though the au-
thors find that all yield spreads are widened, they note that the lower quality ones are 
                                               
77 In this case, the GMM method appears to be a good option for its ability to deal with the heteroskedas-
ticity that occurs whenever news about the possible outcome of the war is published and the fact that 
there are other variables affecting the variance of the financial markets. 
78 See Rigobon and Sack 2005. 
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those that showed a larger increase. An increased risk of war pushes down the ten-year 
yield and the two-year yield about the same amount, and it reduces the value of the dol-
lar by 0.6%. However, the authors find no evidence of any effect of war risk on the li-
quidity of Treasury notes, which the authors interpret as the fact that investors react to 
news about war not by changing their investments preferences, rather by changing their 
opinion of the future of the US economy.  
Li and Sacko (2002) attempt to bridge the realist and liberalist theories (war dis-
rupts trade) and the findings of Morrow (1999), according to whom trade and military 
conflicts should be two uncorrelated events. The authors do so by employing a pooled 
cross sectional time series analysis (PCSTS) to support their hypothesis that govern-
ments have the power to modify the cost-benefit analysis of trading companies, thus in-
cluding realist and liberal claims, they also note that there are conditions under which 
some characteristics of the war like its duration, and its intensity should influence the 
trading relations between the two fighting countries. More specifically, Li and Sacko 
(2002) claim that even in the presence of restrictions on economic relationships with the 
opponent, what truly matters is the cost-benefit differentials upon which the trading 
companies base their decisions. Governments, however, can influence trading relation-
ships by modifying this differential with specific policies. Expectations play an impor-
tant role in trading relations, and if trading companies can foresee an increase in risk of 
their relationships with their trading partners, they will rationally reduce their trade even 
before the war breaks out. In the case their expectations do not meet the reality of the 
facts, the trading companies re-adjust their optimal decisions to the new situation: if a 
war starts, companies take into account not only the fact that it started, but also its se-
verity, and its duration (Li, Sacko 2002). 
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A similar study, justified by slightly different motivations, is that of Anderton 
and Cartier (2001). They are interested in studying whether war really disrupts trade, 
since other authors (Barbieri and Levy 1999) showed that the assumption that „trade 
promotes peace‟ relies on the false claim that due to conflictual events trade exchanges 
are disrupted. The authors find that there is no significant relationship between wars and 
the interruption of trade among war-prone countries. They employ an interrupted time 
series model which shows that even though there is no long-term disruption in the trade 
among war-waging countries, there are usually some temporary reductions in the 
amount, which are sometimes even replaced by an increased volume of trade in the long 
term. A weakness of Barbieri and Levy‟s (1999) study is that their analysis is confined 
to merely seven cases (dyads), making it highly vulnerable to case-selection critiques. 
Thus Anderton and Cartier (2001) attempt to solve the issue by running a similar inter-
rupted time series analysis but extending it to a total of twenty-seven dyads, half of 
which represent great powers conflicts (Anderton, Cartier 2001, 455). Even though 
there are interesting methodological and operationalization differences, the two authors 
come to different conclusions, claiming that the statistical model supports the general 
assumed idea that war does indeed disrupt trade. A similar conclusion is drawn by the 
same authors in a later book (Anderton and Cartier 2003, 306). 
Caplan (2002) is interested in drawing generalizations about the consequences of 
war at the macroeconomic level. Criticizing what other authors claimed (Braun and 
McGrattan 1993) regarding the main effects of the two World Wars on the global econ-
omies, Caplan (2002) provides a pooled time series analysis to show that both the UK 
and the US were atypical cases, and that what happened to their economies during the 
two World Wars do not represent cases from which scholars can easily generalize to 
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form new theories. More specifically, Caplan (2002) draws his own conclusions, noting 
that his pooled time series design demonstrates that all wars raise expenditures and taxa-
tion (both raw and as a percentage of GDP)
 79
. Domestic wars are usually followed by a 
diminution in output, an increase in monetary supply (which leads to higher inflation), 
but it increases slightly if the war is waged in foreign lands. Domestic wars are also cha-
racterized by an increase in taxation as a percentage of the total output, but the same ef-
fect is not found for wars in foreign lands, which are found sometimes to even bring a 
tax reduction. In conclusion, the author also finds evidence that there are significant dif-
ferences between the results obtained for advanced industrialized countries and the rest 
of the world. In particular, Caplan (2002)‟s model shows that government expenditure 
as a percentage of the output does not suffer from the distinction between wars con-
ducted domestically or abroad. In fact, in both instances government spending grows for 
advanced industrialized countries, but the same cannot be said for the rest of the world, 
for which the governmental tendency to spend more occurs only in the case of foreign 
wars. 
Collier (1990) also studies the consequences of war, but he does so without dis-
tinguishing between domestic and foreign wars. Collier‟s main conclusions, that are 
based on simple OLS estimates, are that during civil wars annual GDP tends to decrease 
by 2.2% which is explained in terms of both output reduction and asset destruction. The 
collapse of GDP does not uniformly affect the structure of internal production, in that 
war hits first the transportation, manufacturing, construction, distribution and finance 
sectors, while the agricultural sector is shown to expand. Collier also draws interesting 
                                               
79 Results are proof of problems like autocorrelation and the lack of consideration for hyperinflation pe-
riods. 
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conclusions about the duration of internal conflicts. If they are long enough, the finan-
cial market shrinks to such a low point that when the conflict is over, it quickly returns 
to its pre-conflicts levels. Capital comes back from abroad and fosters the economy and 
its reconstruction (Collier 1990, 191). However, if the civil war is short enough (one 
year or less) then the financial market is assumed not to have the time to reach that 
point, and it is assumed to keep losing strength even though the internal conflict is over. 
More specifically, the author quantifies this decline in the amount of 2.1% per year for 
the first five years of the post-conflict period (Collier, 192). 
Neumayer (2004) studies the impact of war on tourism and he does so by using 
Arellano and Bond‟s Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, a dynamic 
panel estimator, which relies on the use of all prior dependent variables (Neumayer, 15). 
The author, not surprisingly, discovers that episodes of violence and/or political insta-
bility affect tourists‟ choice of holiday destinations, since they are assumed to play 
against the relaxed and pacific atmosphere that a vacation is supposed to offer. For this 
reason, the decision-makers of countries that highly depend on tourism as a source of 
income are inclined to care about maintaining low levels of instability and violence. The 
author shows that politically-motivated violence is able to reduce tourists‟ arrivals by up 
to 25 percent, and that being an autocratic regime is not enough to prevent tourism from 
becoming a major source of income for the country. No statistical significance is found 
that supports this claim, especially if they have the reputation of a stable and pacific au-
tocracy (Neumayer 2004, 27). 
 
3.2 Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models 
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The vast majority of the works described above entail the use of at least some 
parts of the Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models, also known 
as Box-Jenkins models
80
. These models are based on the observation that with time-
series data the dependent variable Yt can be explained not only by correctly specified 
independent variables, but also by the previous values (in temporal terms) of the depen-
dent variable Yt-1 and values of the independent variables that do not refer to time t.  
An ARIMA model is based on some assumptions: first of all, the shocks must 
have a zero mean
81
; shocks have constant variance, are statistically independent from 
each other and are normally distributed (McDowall et al 1980, 15; Cryer and Chan 
2008, 16). At this point it is necessary to be aware of the difference between trend and 
drift. A time series is said to have a trend when it shows a steadily increasing or de-
creasing slope for the whole time frame under analysis. In a case where a time series is 
trended, ARIMA requires differentiation
82
. However, in the case of drift, which is ran-
dom and not systematic variation in the data, then no differentiation is necessary in or-
der for the ARIMA model to function properly. McCleary and Hay (1980) describe the 
event of flipping a coin as a random walk
83
. Some long runs of just heads or tails can 
happen, since the probability of such an event will never be zero, and it might take a 
                                               
80 Box and Jenkins should not be credited for the creation of all the elements of the ARIMA models. 
However, they should be credited for their comprehensive formulation of the ARIMA model (McDowall 
et al 1980, 14). 
81 Such requirement of stationarity, if strict, ensures with finite variance that the covariance function is 
only a function of the time lag (Cryer and Chan 2008, 16). 
82 Differentiation is performed by using the vector of differences between Yt and Yt-1 as dependent varia-
ble. 
83 Chatfield (2001, 28) more generally describes a random walk as a process that generates observations 
based on the previous lag and a purely random process, in turn defined as “sequence of uncorrelated, 
identically distributed random variables with zero mean and constant variance”. See also Cryer and Chan 
2008, 12). 
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while before the average of score between heads and tails becomes even. More general-
ly speaking, it might take a very long series of coin flips to have a number of heads and 
tails that is (almost) even. Differencing the series removes trends and allows the obser-
vation of the random shocks (Chatfield 1984, 21), which represent the complex way all 
the variables of the model interact among themselves. Formally, an ARIMA model that 
requires one differencing is described as an ARIMA (0,1,0) model, where the central 
term in the parenthesis indicates that the series had to be differenced once in order to 
model the random walk and to remove the trend. A time series that has been de-trended 
by differencing and has no other temporal variation is said to be „white noise‟84. 
In order for an ARIMA model to work properly, it is also necessary that the time 
series has a constant variance. This requirement entails a single constant variance 
throughout the whole time series. A common solution for this kind of requirement is to 
log-transform the series. By doing so, it is rather likely that the log-transformation mi-
nimizes the difference in levels of variance.  
Once a model is constant in both level and variance, the researcher has to decide 
which processes can better describe the time series. The same scholar can choose be-
tween first order autoregressive processes or second order autoregressive processes, 
which are respectively described as an ARIMA (1,0,0) model and a ARIMA (2,0,0) 
model, and are regressed on the preceding one (or two) observations
85
. Less common 
are second-order autoregressive processes, where the observation under analysis is a 
function of the two preceding observations.  
                                               
84 White noise is stationary by definition, when the mean of the observations are zero and when the va-
riance is constant (Cryer and Chan 2008, 17). 
85 In social science, it is uncommon to study process that can be modeled with second-order or higher-
order autoregressive processes (McDowall et al 1980; McCleary and Hay 1980). 
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Moving average processes are characterized by the limited effect of previous er-
rors on the present output. In other words, the present output is affected by some 
processes which, once entered the system, completely disappear from it once a certain 
amount of time (lags) has passed. The difference between autoregressive and moving 
average processes should be therefore clear. Autoregressive processes assume that some 
shocks enter the system and keeps affecting it for a long period of time, before its effect 
becomes so small as to be considered insignificant. Moving average processes assume 
that a shock enters the system and after a well-defined period of time its effect vanishes 
completely from the model (McCleary and Hay 1980). There exist also second-order 
processes
86
, which can be more formally represented as ARIMA (0,0,2). In that case, 
the effect of two or more time lags has to be considered when regressing the dependent 
variable on the independent variables. Finally, it is worth noting that a time series can 
be affected by seasonality that is a cyclical shock that occurs over specific ranges in 
time and affects the present observation in this cyclic pattern. Models that take into ac-
count seasonality effects are generally formally represented as ARIMA (p,d,q)(P,D,Q) 
models
87
, where P denotes the order of the seasonal autoregressive process, D the sea-
sonal differentiation, and Q the order of the seasonal moving average process (McDo-
wall 1980, 56). 
In order to decide whether the underlying processes are autoregressive (of any 
order) and/or moving average (of any order), the researcher has to look to the AutoCor-
                                               
86 Higher order moving average processes are possible, but are rarely found in social processes commonly 
studied (McDowall 1980).  
87 Brockwell and Davis (1984, 310-313) formally represent such a model as SARIMA (p,d,q) x (P,D,Q)s. 
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relation Function (ACF)
88
 and the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) of the data 
series. Autoregressive processes have decaying ACF graphs and spiking PACF graphs, 
while moving average processes have spiking ACFs and decaying PACFs (McDowall et 
al 1980; McCleary and Hay 1980). Should both of these graphs be decaying, that would 
mean that the underlying processes are a mix of moving average and autoregressive 
processes. Once the model has been correctly identified, and the parameters estimated, 
it must be diagnosed both in terms of checking if the processes identified make the resi-
dual variance white noise, and in terms of whether the model can explain a large amount 
of variance in the model (by using the Residual Mean Squared Error statistic). Moreo-
ver, the model to be selected has to be chosen among those that show a plot of the resi-
duals that is stationary around a certain level. Quantile-Quantile plots are often used to 
test the normality of the models selected. A model respects the assumption of normality 
of the residuals if the points plotted seem to be following the line closely. As additional 
supporting evidence, it is possible to use the Shapiro-Wilk normality test applied to the 
residuals (Cryer and Chan 2008, 178). The independence of the noise terms can be veri-
fied with the χ2, or Ljung-Box G test, or the sample autocorrelation function of the resi-
duals; autocorrelations values that exceed the significant threshold are to be interpreted 
as statistically different from zero and will possibly require a change in the model speci-
fication (Cryer and Chan, 180). The Ljung-Box Q test considers the magnitude of the 
residual autocorrelations as a group, not just one by one. The idea behind the statistic is 
that of measuring whether the autocorrelations are too high as a group even though none 
of them exceeds the significance level of ±2/ n  (Cryer and Chan 2008, 183). Finally, a 
                                               
88 Every process has its own ACF, which characterizes it. A stationary stochastic process is fully de-
scribed by its mean, variance and ACF (McDowall 1980, 24). 
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model can be diagnosed by „overfitting‟, that is by fitting a more general model that it is 
similar to the one that has been chosen as the best-performing. Such model would be 
confirmed to be so if the estimates of the overfitted parameters are not significantly dif-
ferent from zero and if the estimates of the parameters of the overfitted model do not 
significantly change from the original estimates (Cryer and Chan, 185). 
 
3.3 Interrupted Time Series models 
 
Interrupted Time Series analysis has been well described by Campbell (1963) 
and Campbell and Stanley (1966) for the purpose of measuring the impact of shock or 
an intervention on a social process (McDowall et al 1980, 10). The time series that de-
scribes such phenomenon is usually represented by a set of „Os‟ and an X in correspon-
dence with occurring of a particular shock or intervention which breaks the time series 
in two periods
89
. The latter, unlike the former, is characterized by the presence of the 
phenomenon and its effects on the social process being studied. An ARIMA model can 
be developed to study the significance of a variable similar to the one described above. 
By using zeros instead of Os and a 1 instead of the X, one can study the impact and the 
statistical significance of this independent variable.  
These models have been widely applied to behavioral data (Hartmann et al 1980; 
Eden 1982; Wagner, Rubin, Callahan 1988; Sheldon et al 2004), medical applications 
(Tryon, W 1982; Fowler et al 2007; Grijalva et al 2007) and also to social science 
(Rundquist and David 1976; Bonham, Fujii and Mak 1992; Glick and Rose. 2002). In 
the political science field, interrupted time series analysis has been implemented to as-
                                               
89 Os and an X are used in the original description by Campbell and Stanley (1966). 
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sess the effect of war on trade (Anderton and Carter 2001), the impact of reforms on 
taxation and expenditures (Morgan and Pelissero 1980), to test the impact of change of 
social order on the level of crime and deviance (Pridemore, Chamlin and Cochran 
2007), or to measure the impact of anti-terrorist policies on the frequency of terrorist 
acts (Brophy-Baermann, Conybeare 1994), just to name a few of the most significant 
applications. 
As said above, Interrupted Time Series analysis divides the time series into two 
parts: one that is unaffected by the shock or intervention, and another one which is in-
deed affected by it (McDowall et al 1980, 12). It follows that the analysis will be a test 
of significance between the two parts, the pre-intervention series level and the post-
intervention model. This can be more formally represented as (McDowall et al). 
 
tpostpret ebbY   
and also as 
ttt INY  .
 
By modeling the serial dependence as a time series process using ARIMA mod-
els, one can control for the autocorrelation that is typical for time series and properly 
study the significance of the difference between the two levels.  
The intervention function It can be represented as a variable consisting of zeros 
before the intervention and 1s during or after that. The intervention function can take on 
different shapes, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
  




Source: McDowall et al (1980) 
The intervention functions described above are characterized by an abrupt onset 
of the intervention and assumed to be lasting permanently (McDowall et al 1980). 
However, a similar function can be used also to represent an intervention whose effect 
is only temporary by assuming that its effect manifests itself only for a certain amount 
of time and then suddenly disappears. 
When an intervention is assumed to be „abrupt‟ and of permanent duration, the 
intervention component can be represented as: 
tt IIf )(  
Where  is a parameter to be estimated and It is a dummy variable of zeros be-
fore the shock or intervention is introduced, and 1s after the shock. Since the estimation 
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model is linear, the noise component can be removed from the time series and the level 
of the time series, which does not consider the random behavior of the observations, is 
tt Iy   
Pre-intervention, the level will be equal to 0, while after the shock has been in-
troduced in the time series (assuming it is permanent and constant) its level will equal 
the value of the estimated parameter (McDowall 1980, 67). 
A gradual permanent impact entails the use of a lagged value of the series in the 
intervention component, that is 
ttt Iyy   1  
where 10    is required in order to maintain stationarity (McDowall et al 
1980, 75).  
McDowall et al. point out that for low values of the parameter   the change in 
the intervention component is rather rapid, with the abrupt jump from zero to   if   
equals zero. On other hand, the more   approaches 1, the more balanced the increased 
per lag unit. In the particular case that   equals 1, the increased per time lag is constant 
and equals . 
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Figure 3.2 
Gradual permanent impact patterns 
 
Source: McDowall et al (1980) 
This model assumes that the intervention affects the time series permanently. For 
shocks on the stock markets following gas disputes, other temporary patterns are more 
likely to be more useful. 
A pulse function tP  is characterized by zeros before the intervention, 1 at the 
moment of its occurring and zeros thereafter (McDowall et al 1980, 80). The weakness 
of this model, which makes it unable to represent certain real world phenomena, is the 
assumption that the effect of the intervention is evident in just one moment in time and 
that it does not carry over other time lags. Thinking of gas disputes, one cannot expect a 
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model to work properly, if it assumes that its effects are evident in just one time lag 
(day) or few days and then it disappears. As it is the case for many other social science 
processes, a shock is more likely to be modeled as if it was reabsorbed slowly, as de-
picted in the Figure represented by abrupt and temporary impacts. 
The intervention component for this kind of impact is 
ttt Pyy   1  
where Pt equals to zero before the intervention and Pt is equal to 1 at the moment 
of the intervention onwards. It follows that the expected level of the time series follows 
a similar behavior, in which 
 nniy   
It is clear from the above formulation that as time passes, the level of the time 
series ty  converges back to zero, since   is constrained to be a value between zero and 
one. For low values of   the post-intervention levels quickly assumes values close to 
their pre-intervention levels. On the contrary, for values close to 1 many more time lags 
will be needed to converge to the pre-intervention levels (McDowall 1980, 81). As 




                                               
90 See picture below. 
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Figure 3.3 
Gradual temporary impact patterns 
 
Source: McDowall et al (1980) 
Theory should guide the researcher‟s choice of the proper impact model. In the 
absence of such theory, McDowall et al. (1980, 84) suggest to first use an abrupt, tem-
porary intervention model. If   is estimated to be too close to 1 given its 95% confi-
dence interval, then this model should be rejected and a gradual, permanent impact 
model should be assessed. If the estimates of   are in this case too close to zero, mak-
ing it not statistically different from zero, then the abrupt, permanent model is the right 
one for the specific case to be studied (McDowall et al. 1980).  
Britt, Kleck, Bordua (1996, 362) suggest that the researcher‟s understanding of 
the underlying process, rather than statistical tests guide the construction of the inter-
vention model. The authors discuss another important issue, the robustness of the re-
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sults. Can they be generalized? If so, is it still the case if the time series under study is 
shortened or is made longer by inserting additional data? Only if that is the case then the 
results found are valid and robust. Britt, Kleck, Bordua (1996) are concerned that to-
day‟s researchers are tempted by avoiding dealing with these issues, even though they 
may be so relevant to undermine the results obtained, risking the production of results 
that will lead to unsuccessful policy making. 
 
3.4 Heteroskedasticity models (ARCH/GARCH) 
 
ARCH (and GARCH) models do not attempt to treat heteroskedasticity (or as-
sume it to be nonexistent), as it happens in the case of ARIMA and OLS models. They 
model heteroskedasticity, and as a result of it the overall performance of the model im-
proves, enabling the researcher to improve predictions about the variance at future lags 
(Engle 2001). A first prototype of Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) and Generalized ARCH models used a standard deviation that was calculated 
using a limited amount of the most recent observations, which means that the standard 
deviation at a specific time t depensd on a weighted average of the squared residuals 
from the past observations. Such a model immediately fails to attract the researchers‟ 
attention because of its treating all past observations equally: common sense would in-
dicate that the most recent observations are also the ones that on average best are able to 
determine the level of the current standard deviation. Engle‟s (1982) ARCH model pre-
scribes that these weights be calculated so as to maximize the forecasting performance 
of the time series. 
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The GARCH model revised by Bollerslev (1986) is based on a weighted average 
of the past squared residuals that asymptotically tend to zero as one moves farther in 
time from the present time lag t. However, researchers commonly assume that an adap-
tive behavior, based on the prediction of the variance of the next period with a weighted 
average of the long run average variance, the variance predicted for this period and the 
value attributed to it at the present period is the best approach (Christoffersen 2003, 23; 
Engle 2001, 160). In other words, unlike other models of the conditional variance
91
, the 
GARCH model more realistically assumes that variance will eventually revert to the av-
erage value sooner or later. 
The most recent financial models take into account the conditional variance of 
tY  given the values that it assumes in previous time lags from its conditional mean 
),...,,|( 21  ttt YYYE . If a typical ARIMA model can be fitted in the distribution, the con-
ditional variance is assumed to be equal to the noise variance. The ARIMA or OLS 
models all assume that the variance is constant (or it is made constant by logging the 
dependent variable), but this is not a good approximation for financial data. In fact, dai-
ly returns of stock are usually found to have a larger conditional variance when the se-
ries is characterized by higher volatility of the prices than in calmer period (Cryer and 
Chan 2008, 277). That is because the conditional variance can be seen itself as a random 
process, and is commonly referred to as the conditional variance process. 
There exist some models that are able to unite the properties of an ARIMA mod-
el with that of a model of conditional heteroskedasticity and the McLeod-Li test can be 
utilized to check the existence of ARCH processes in the data.  
                                               
91 See for example the RiskMetrics model (Christoffersen 2003). 
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Cryer and Chan (2008, 283) suggest plotting the results of this test for a certain 
number of lags and plot the p-values resulting from this test. A long series of significant 
McLeod-Li tests supports the need to take into account ARCH processes which could 
be visible with the inspection of the ACF of the squared distribution. The inspection
92
 of 
the distribution of the dependent variable can reveal, for example, that there exist vola-
tility clusters, that is segments of the distribution that are affected by larger or smaller 
variance
93
. This can be done with a QQ normal plot, which can reveal that the distribu-
tion may deviate from the normal distribution because of a larger or smaller tail and the 
distribution is skewed to either sides of it. The Jarque-Bera test can be implemented in 
order to verify the normality of the distribution (Christoffersen 2003, 284) and if all 
these tests support the hypothesis that the distribution possesses a heavy tail (or a light 




A similar task is performed by the ARCH model
95
, a regression model in which 
the conditional variance is the dependent variable and the past lags of the squared distri-
bution are the independent variables. In more formal terms, an ARCH (1) model gene-
rates a series tr  as follows: 
ttttr  1|   
                                               
92 Cryer and Chan (2008) strongly recommend the use of both statistical tests and visual inspection. The 
reading of their work in many instances reminds the reader that the observation of the results of these 
tests can reveal much more than just running the tests. By visually inspecting the data, in fact, many other 
problems can be seen, along with explanations for why deviations from the optimal situation occur. 
93 Christoffersen (2003, 27) reports that it is now a well-established phenomenon that the days that follow 
the weekend are also the days that have a higher variance than average. 
94 Financial data are mostly found to be of similar nature. 
95 See Engle (1982). 
  




1|   ttt r  
where   and   are parameters to be estimated96 and assumed in an ARCH 
model to be nonnegative
97
, t  is a vector of random variables called also „innovations‟ 
that are independent of ,....2,1,  jr jt  and are independent and identically distributed 
with zero mean and variance equal to 1.  
An ARCH (1) can be specified if it is warranted by an autoregressive process of 
first order, and   must be a positive value less than 1 in order to grant stationarity to 
the model. It is important to note that even if the innovation has a normal distribution, 
the distribution of an ARCH (1) model with the   value comprised between 0 and 1 
(stationary) has fat tails, that is its kurtosis is strictly positive (Christoffersen 2003, 
287).  
ARCH models are usually implemented to predict to predict the future condi-




|     
 
ARCH models have been generalized by Engle (1982) to 
 






11| ...  , 
where q simply refers to a more generic q ARCH order.  
                                               
96 The parameters are in general estimated through a Standard Maximum Likelihood estimation or a Qua-
si-Maximum Likelihood Estimation (Christoffersen 2003, 28). 
97 Since also the squared values of the distribution must be nonnegative. 
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Combining the findings of Bollerslev (1986) and Taylor (1986), who introduce 
into the model also p lags of the conditional variance, one can synthesize all these mod-
els into a GARCH (p,q) model
98
, where p, as indicated above indicated the autoregres-
sive lags and q the ARCH (moving average) order
99
. Moreover, an ARIMA(p,q) model 
can be used to identify the p and ),max( qp
100
. The requirement for nonnegative para-
meters   and  , sometimes adopted, does not necessarily apply for GARCH models, 
in that it can be shown that a nonnegative variance can be achieved even with negative 
parameters (Cryer and Chan, 290). This has the additional property of enabling the 
modeling of several other patterns, without violating the requirement of a nonnegative 
conditional variance. 
The estimates of the GARCH parameters are usually compared with those of ri-
val models, since the analysis of the EACF may not clearly reveal which is the right 
combination of p and q to be selected. The comparison is made by selecting the model 
whose AIC value is the lowest as in ARIMA models. 
Before a GARCH model is approved, some diagnostics need to be run in order 
to test whether any assumptions are violated with the specific sample being analyzed. In 
case one or more assumptions are not met, a new model needs to be re-specified until all 
assumptions are met. Tests need to be run in order to verify: 
                                               
98 For applications of GARCH models in political science see Schneider and Troeger (2006) and Brunner 
(2009). 
99 See Cryer and Chan (2008), page 289 and Engle (2001), page 160. 
100 Cryer and Chan (294) suggest to first fit a GARCH(p,q) model and then to estimate q by looking at the 
significance of the estimated ARCH coefficient. Since mixed autoregressive and moving average 
processes are usually hard to define, Cryer and Chan (2008, 116-117, 294) suggest the use of the Ex-
tended Autocorrelation Function (EACF) of the squared observations. The best combination of p e q val-
ue will correspond to the upper-left vertex of the triangle of zeros, where p is the row and q is the column. 
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1. the normality of the residuals: the model assumes that the resi-
duals do follow a normal distribution and can be visualized, as said above, by 
inspecting the QQ normal scores plot (deviations from the straight line indicate 
lack of normality and provide information about the distributional properties of 
the innovations. From a numerical point of view, the normality test can be con-
ducted with the Shapiro-Wilk test or the Jarque-Bera test. Estimates of these 
tests that exceed the significance level of 5 percent lead to the failure of rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis that the innovations are normal. 
2. the assumption according to which the standardized residuals 
should be at least roughly independently and identically distributed must be 
tested next. Cryer and Chan (2008, 303) suggest to observe the sample ACF and 
to use the „generalized Portmanteau test„, a test that does not suffer from the in-
ability to identify uncorrelated but serially dependent innovations
101
. 
3. the nonnegativity of the conditional variance can be tested by ve-
rifying whether the GARCH parameters are all nonnegative. However, as said 
above, these constraints can be relaxed and nonnegativity of the conditional va-
riance can be found to hold even if some parameters are found to be negative
102
. 
GARCH models are commonly used to forecast financial data, which are often 
affected by heteroskedasticity, and it does so by iteratively calculating the estimated va-
riance at each future lag and use the newly generated information to build further fore-
casts, 
                                               
101 Cryer and Chan (2008), page 303-304. 
102 For more information, see Cryer and Chan (2008), page 308-310. 
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In conclusion, GARCH models can be further generalized
103
 by applying them 
to the residuals of the ARIMA model; in this case the ARIMA parameters will be iden-
tified according to the time series tY , while the GARCH parameters can be estimated 
according to the squared residuals from the fitted ARIMA model (Cryer and Chan 
2008). Engle (2001) briefly describes other GARCH extensions, which take into ac-
count also the directions of the observations of the time series. These models are found 
to be especially useful for broad-based equity indices and bond market indices, where 
market declines predict an increased variance that similar to market increases. Among 
the models that perform such asymmetrical analysis of the conditional variance are 
EGARCH models
104




2 ln])[(ln ttttt RERR    
 
where 0  indicates that the usual leverage effect is being displayed. The 
EGARCH model is able to ensure the positivity of the variance due to the use of the lo-
garithmic specification, but is unable to calculate analytically the future expected va-
riance beyond the first time lag. 
There exist also TARCH models
105
 and TGARCH model
106
, which account for 
the fact that a negative return leads to an increased variance that is higher than one 
                                               
103 GARCH models that consider moving average processes and autoregressive processes of order greater 
than one (GARCH (p,q)) are defined as „Long Memory in Variance‟ (Christoffersen 2003, 26). 
104 See Nelson (1991). 
105 See Rabemananjara and Zakoian (1993) and Glosten, Jaganathan and Runkle (1993). 
106 See Sabiruzzaman et al (2009) for a comparison of the two statistical tools. 
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would have in the case of a positive return of the same size
107
. This happens to be the 
case because a negative return on a stock is generally viewed as a deterioration of equity 
value of the company and the consequent increase risk associated with that company
108
. 
The GARCH model can be modified so as to allow it to take into account this property 
of the markets according to which negative turns of the market affect the returns more 
heavily than positive ones. Nonlinear GARCH models (NGARCH), are therefore 
represented as follows 
 
22222
1 )()( ttttttt zR   , 
where it is evident that a negative piece of news ( 0 ) has a greater effect than 
tz , a positive piece of news ( 0tz ) (Christoffersen 2003, 27). 
Another model defines a variable tI  that captures with a value of 1 the negative 
return, and with zeros otherwise. The variance of this model, called the GJR-GARCH 
model is represented as follows 
 
222
1 tttt RIR    
 
where 0  captures the presence of the leverage effect. 
Nonlinear Asymmetric GARCH (NAGARCH) models are the results of a gene-
ralization of Higgins and Bera (1992) NARCH models, which were created with the 
specific intent of generalizing the basic ARCH model to a model with a nonlinear con-
                                               
107 Christoffersen (2003) defines this property as the „leverage effect‟. See Chapter 1. 
108 See Christoffersen 2003, 26. 
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ditional variance (Engle and Ng 1993). According to Higgins and Bera, it is important 
to identify the correct conditional variance functional form in order to improve the accu-
racy of the forecasts of the model and to correctly identify the presence of ARCH 

























The models have the additional property of modeling differences in variance in corres-
pondence with negative shocks. In fact, NAGARCH attributes a different (larger) future 
variance whenever a negative return enters the series, a feature which is rather common 
especially in stock market data.  
Several other generalizations and modifications of Engle (1982), Bollerslev 
(1986) and Taylor (1986) models have made their appearance in the statistic and eco-
nomic literature. The revision of all these models goes beyond the scope of the present 
work; the reader interested in such a review may refer to Bollerslev‟s (2008) work. 
 
3.5 Methodology and hypothesis testing 
 
Given the particular nature of the hypotheses to be tested (see Chapter Model 
Selection and Validation), I selected a particular type of GARCH model for testing the 
hypotheses that measure the impact of the gas disputes on the GDP growth of the 9 
countries selected (pooled panel design) and for all case studies considered. However, in 
the attempt to allow a more efficient estimation of the model, a simpler Box-Tiao inter-
vention model is used to test both the hypotheses that disputes have an impact on the 
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stock markets under investigation and that statements and other official acts had an ef-
fect on the stock markets for all case studies analyzed. In this case, given the desire to 
have a better look at the micro level of the dependent variable (the stock market), the 
analysis will not be performed using a pooled panel design; it will simply omit the other 
reaction functions and the other variables that measure the impact of the contemporane-
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3.6 Data and Variables: real GDP growth and stock market mod-
el 
 
Youngs (2009, 79-80) notes that even though Russia is often cited simply as just 
one of the largest energy supplier in the world, its importance for the European coun-
tries largely varies according to the country at which one is looking. As shown in earlier 
sections of this work, the dependence of European countries varies significantly, since 
some of them only slightly depend on Russian gas, while others depend entirely on Rus-
sia‟s energy. Youngs split European countries mainly in three groups; countries with 
low dependence on Russia, like Spain, Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, Portugal, Bel-
gium, and Ireland; countries with moderate dependence on Russia‟s energy like France, 
Italy and Germany, and countries with high to total dependence on Russian energy like 
Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovakia
109
. In this work I am taking into account the fact that analyzing 
just countries with high dependence on Russian energy I might be biasing the results of 
the statistical analysis proposed below. For this reason I selected a total of 9 countries, 3 
for each of the dependence level as described in Youngs (2009). The time frame spans 
from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2009 for the GDP model, and it spans 200 days 
for the stock market model
110
. Such time span has been chosen given Youngs‟ notation 
that in the last 6 years Russia has clearly been using the gas weapon to achieve prede-
                                               
109 Germany, Italy, Turkey and France are the biggest energy importers (Youngs 2009). 
110 An exception is made here for the 2004 Belarusian crisis. In this case, the time frame considered is 317 
days, 100 days prior to the start of the dispute and 100 days after the onset of the reaction to the crises, 
which occurred later than the other disputes. 
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fined political and economic goals. In doing so, I hope to capture a phenomenon that is 
rather constant over the years analyzed, thus reducing the probability of making incor-
rect inferences. The 2010 Belarusian dispute
111, which has also shown that the „early 
warning‟ system described below needs further refinement, has not been considered in 
this work due to data collection issues. In fact, many data on 2010 have yet to be pub-
lished, including not only real GDP growth data, but also the stock market data used in 
the second model proposed in this work. 
The time series models used in this work are based on the use of an independent 
variable for each crisis that measures the statistical significance of the effect of the gas 
dispute on the trends assumed by GDP and the stock market. I assume that such a phe-
nomenon can be better reproduced by using a function that spikes on the quarter the 
dispute starts (when the two parties openly declare that no agreement was reached – see 
Figure 3.4) and declines as time passes, since it is reasonable to assume that once the 
crisis has been solved its effects will slowly be reabsorbed. However, as suggested by 
McLeary and Hay (1980), a practical analysis of the statistical model has been per-
formed in order to test the fit of the assumption that the gas dispute can be better 
represented by a spiking and decaying function or a simpler step function
112
. In Figure 
3.4 the reader can visualize GDP levels and disputes
113
. A similar procedure has been 
adopted to hypothesize the duration of the gas dispute effects and reaction function ef-
fects on the stock market. 
                                               
111 See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/world/europe/22belarus.html?_r=1&fta=y . 
112 See below. 
113 Please note that in correspondence to the third dispute, two disputes occurred at the same time: the 
Moldovan crisis and the 2006 Ukrainian crisis. 
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Figure 3.4 
GDP levels and gas disputes114 
 
The duration of the effect of gas disputes on external economies has been esti-
mated by observing the dependent variable and building hypotheses regarding the dura-
tion of the impact. The results of this analysis for both models are summarized in Table 
3.1 . 
                                               
114 The disputes presented in the figure are ordered chronologically: Belarus (2004), Moldova (2006) and 
Ukraine (2006), Belarus (2006), Belarus (2007), Ukraine (2009). 
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Table 3.1 
Observable daily duration of impact of gas crises and observable daily effect of 
reaction functions (Stock Market model) 
Crisis Dispute (GDP 




(Stock) - days 
Belarus-Russia 
2004 
1,2 3,9,10,11,12 4,5 
Moldova-Russia 
2006 
1,2 1,2,23,40 3,4,18 
Belarus-Russia 
2006 
1,2,4,5 1,3,6,9 - 
Ukraine-Russia 
2006 
1,2 9,2,1,17,21 1,4,8 
Belarus-Russia 
2007 
1,2,4 6,7,13,14,15 2,4,8 
Ukraine-Russia 
2009 
1,2,3 24,26,27,66 3,7 
 
In order to maximize the internal validity of the model, several other control va-
riables need to be introduced. More specifically, following other examples in the litera-
ture, variables accounting for the exchange rate between the euro and the dollar, ex-
change rate between the local currency and euro (UK), exchange rate between the dollar 
and the euro, gas prices
115











, balance of payments
121
, real 
                                               
115
 Natural gas prices in Europe cannot be easily accessed. Some agencies release this kind of information 
only under the payment of a fee, but for privacy reasons the identity of all traders and the prices charged 
by them are not disclosed. For this reason, I decided to resort to Nymex Henry Hub Natural Gas prices, 
futures that are traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), as a measure of the level of gas 
prices in Europe. I assume that the prices levels by these quarterly figures of these futures well approx-
imate the same trend of gas prices in Europe. 
116 Data is seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by working days. Percentage of GDP. 
117 Minimum sampling frequency: 1 month. Base year: 2005. 
118 Data is seasonally adjusted and adjusted by working days. Percentage of GDP. Minimum sampling 
frequency: 1 month. 
119 Data is seasonally adjusted and adjusted by working days. Millions of euro, chain-linked volumes, ref-
erence year 2000 (at 2000 exchange rates). Minimum sampling frequency: quarters. 
120 It refers to EU citizens between 15 and 64 years. Minimum sampling frequency: quarters. 
  
120 Changing Games and Evolving Contexts: Political Bargaining in European Energy Disputes 
consumption
122
, deposit/ lending interest, government consolidated gross debt
123
 are 
used as controls (Schneider and Troeger 2006, 642-643; Schneider and Troeger 2006; 
Frey and Kucher 2000; Hamilton 2003).  
Table 3.2 
Table of sources 
Variable Data source 
Exchange rate between the 
euro and the dollar, ex-
change rate between the 
local currency and euro 
(UK), exchange rate be-










Domestic demand Eurostat website 
Inflation Eurostat website 
Industrial production Eurostat website 
Exports and imports  Eurostat website 
Unemployment rate Eurostat website 
Balance of payments Eurostat website 
Real consumption Eurostat website 







                                                                                                                                          
121 Millions of Euro. Current account, Goods and services. Minimum sampling frequency: quarters. 
122 Final consumption expenditure. Data is seasonally adjusted and adjusted by working days. Index, 
2000=100. 
123 Government consolidated gross debt. Percentage of GDP. Minimum sampling frequency: quarters. 
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The data relative to these variables are publicly available not only through the 
Eurostat database system and the European Central Bank, but also through several other 
institutions like the World Bank. In this analysis, however, I preferred to extract as 
many variables as I could from a single source (Eurostat) so as to reduce to minimum 
measurements errors, especially across countries. See Table 3.3 for summary statistics 
of the variables just discussed. 
Table 3.3 
Summary statistics of dependent, independent variables and control variables 
(GDP model) 
Dependent Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Real GDP growth .4345894 .9670259 -4.12844 2.486839 
Independent Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Belarus 2004 (2 Quarters .1071429 .2794926 0 1 
Moldova 2006 (2 Quarters) .0714286 .2580519 0 1 
Belarus 2006 (2 Quarters) .0714286 .2580519 0 1 
Belarus 2007 (4 Quarters) .1428571 .3506235 0 1 
Ukraine 2006, 2009 (1&2 Quarters) .0396825 .1956008 0 1 
Control Variable (no PCA)124 Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Gas price 7.588007 1.929084 4.528833 12.90081 
Oil price 59.69777 24.072 26.17857 121.6884 
Exchange rate BRP/Euro 1.384727 .1310551 1.101 1.4994 
Exchange rate Euro/US Dollar 1.301698 .12023 1.0733 1.56252 
 
Given that all these data are measured on a quarterly basis, all independent and 
control variables have been downloaded or transformed into quarterly data. Doing so 
                                               
124 See below. 
  
122 Changing Games and Evolving Contexts: Political Bargaining in European Energy Disputes 
not only guarantees a better estimate of the parameters of the true variables (which do 
not have to be estimated nor averaged), but it won‟t significantly affect the estimation of 
the independent variables, which happen to measure phenomena whose effects general-
ly manifest themselves at the beginning of a quarter. The estimation of the effect of the 
gas crises requires controlling for a wide set of variables, which, however, are measured 
on a monthly, quarterly or even yearly basis. Controlling for these variables entails 
making assumptions on the behaviors of these variables before transforming them into 
daily data, which might render the job of introducing control substantially meaningless, 
given that the real frequency of these variables cannot be measured nor precisely est i-
mated. Measuring the effects of these crises on other economies can be done by looking 
at changes on real GDP growth, even if measured quarterly. Despite the loss of several 
degrees of freedom (which can be compensated with PCA – see below), adopting this 
kind of measure should not lead to results of lower quality. In fact, the central interest is 
to test whether there are long terms effects of these crises and such a goal can be 
achieved by using quarterly data like real GDP growth, especially if the start of these 
gas disputes coincides with the start of a new quarter (see picture below). 
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Table 3.4 
Dates corresponding to the start of the disputes analyzed 
Crisis Start 
Quarter 
Date negotiations failed 
Belarus-Russia 2004 Q1-04 January 1, 2004 
Moldova-Russia 2006 Q1-06 January 1, 2006 
Belarus-Russia 2006 Q2-06 
 
End of March 2006125 
Ukraine-Russia 2006 Q1-06 January 1, 2006 
Belarus-Russia 2007 Q3-07 August 1, 2007 
Ukraine-Russia 2009 Q1-09 January 1, 2009 
 
The analysis is performed on 9 EU countries, which are divided in three groups 
according to their dependence on Russian gas. In fact, in the EU there are countries with 
low dependence on Russia like Spain, Sweden, the UK. There are also countries with 
moderate dependence on Russia‟s energy like France, Italy and Germany and countries 
with high to total dependence on Russian energy like the Netherlands, Czech Republic, 
and Poland. These countries were chosen for their importance as members of the Coun-
cil of the European Union, an important legislative institution in the EU (Bindi 2010, 
Young 2009). The total number of votes of the countries considered in this work 
amounts to 59.42% of the total available to all EU countries. A pooled design is em-
ployed to better deal with country-specific reactions to the gas crises; this design will be 
then re-applied for every group of countries chosen based on their dependence on Rus-
sian energy. 
                                               
125 In the stock market model, this event has been approximated to have happened on March 20, 2006 
given the lack of more precise information. Please note that this crisis refers to the unilateral statement 
from Gazprom to increase the price of gas supplied to Belarus which was not followed by any significant 
statement or action from the EU. 
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Table 3.5 




Real GDP growth: 
1) Spain (27)
 126
, Sweden (10), the UK (29) - 
low dependence 
2) France (29), Italy (29), Germany (29) - 
moderate 
3) the Netherlands (13), Czech Republic 
(12), and Poland (27) - high 
Independent variable 
Impact of gas dispute on economies (dummy va-
riables, 0-1) 
Control variables 
Exchange rate between the local currency and Euro 
(UK) 






Exports and imports 
Unemployment rate 
Balance of Payments 
Deposit/ lending interest 
Government consolidated gross debt as percentage 
of GDP 
By controlling for all these variables, I argue that the effect of the gas dispute 
can be more precisely identified by the model. Other political variables like research 
expenditure and country regime (Polity 4 data)
127
 were considered, but dropped given 
their annual measurement frequency. 
The use of daily data (stock market data), however, should produce more precise 
estimation of the real effects of these crises from the exact day the negotiations failed. 
Moreover, daily data allows me to test the impact of countries‟ or the European Com-
mission‟s reactions to the rise of these crises, by checking the statistical significance of 
events like public statements of creation of diplomatic institutions dedicated to the reso-
lution of energy disputes on the stock market. However, using financial data entails an 
                                               
126 Votes assigned to each country in parenthesis. 
127 See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm . 
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increased risk of Type I error, given to the fact that much more is going in a financial 
time series. In fact, not only traders‟ expectations matter in stock market data, but also 
simple speculation and randomness affect the fluctuations of this kind of data. Other po-
litical and economic controls were not introduced in this model in order to avoid biases 
deriving from an incorrect estimation of the daily variation of variables that are meas-
ured only monthly, quarterly or yearly. It is important to note that gas disputes had a 
similar effect (in terms of duration) in both the GDP and the stock market model (Table 
3.6). 
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Table 3.6 
Stock market model: summary statistics of dependent and independent va-
riables 
Dependent Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Main Stock Market indices (9 coun-
tries) 
6634.828 9395.41 1.95 44324 
Independent Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Belarus 2004 (4 months) .0053014 .0726187 0 1 
Moldova 2006 (1 month) .0125147 .1111692 0 1 
Belarus 2006 (2 months) .0242545 .1538418 0 1 
Belarus 2007 (1 year) .1431365 .3502196 0 1 
Ukraine 2006 (2 weeks) .0054752 .0737931 0 1 
Ukraine 2009 (2 months) .023465 .1513783 0 1 
Reaction functions     
Belarus 2004 (1 day) .0003911 .0197724 0 1 
Moldova 2006 (2 weeks) .0062573 .0788571 0 1 
Belarus 2006128 NA NA - - 
Belarus 2007 (2 months) .0242472 .1538189 0 1 
Ukraine 2006 (2 weeks) .0054752 .0737931 0 1 
Ukraine 2009 (1 year) .1415722 .3486184 0 1 
 
 
                                               
128 In this case, since Gazprom only threatened to increase price only, without doing much else, no inter-
vention of external actor was recorded (see above). 
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Table 3.7 
Stock market model: summary statistics of dependent and independent va-
riables 
Dependent Variable Data Source 
IBEX 35 (Spain) http://finance.yahoo.com 
FTSE 100 (UK) http://finance.yahoo.com 
OMX 30 (Sweden) http://finance.yahoo.com and 
http://shb.solutions.six.se 
CAC 40 (France) http://finance.yahoo.com 
MIB30 (Italy)  http://uk.finance.yahoo.com 
DAX (Germany) http://finance.yahoo.com 
PX-GLOB (Czech Republic) http://www.pse.cz 
WIG20 (Poland) http://gielda.wp.pl 
AEX (Netherlands) http://finance.yahoo.com 
 
The reaction functions selected in this work refer to the most important form of 
reaction, as found in the news, reporting the development of the disputes. More specifi-
cally, I selected for the 2006 Ukraine-Russia dispute the statement made by the Euro-
pean Commission President Barroso on February 9, 2006 regarding the need for more 
cooperation among the EU to reduce dependence on Russian energy and that alternative 
sources of energy were needed. This was supported the next day by the Polish Prime 
Minister‟s statement about the need of creating a “Euro-Atlantic Energy Security Pact”. 
For the 2009 Ukrainian crisis I selected the statement made by the Presidency of the Eu-
ropean Union of January 4, 2009, urging the two countries to find an urgent solution to 
the commercial dispute and to immediately resume full deliveries of gas to the EU 
member states. 
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For the first Belarusian crisis, the reaction functions refer to the Directive of the 
Council of the European Union 2004/67/EC of April 26, 2004. This directive advocates 
common EU policies and responsibilities on each EU country and establishes a proce-
dure to be followed in case another dispute arises. For the 2007 crisis the European 
Commission‟s statement of August 1, 2007 regarding the deep concern of the whole EU 
and the activation of the EU's Network of Energy Security Correspondents (NESCO) 
forum is used
129
. Given the lack of a severe collapse of negotiations (which did not real-
ly take place at the end of March 2006 between Belarus and Russia), no reaction func-
tion has been added in the statistical model given the lack of relevant statements made 
by external actors regarding the Russian statement of rising gas price to Belarus Euro-
pean levels. 
Finally, the reaction function added in the model regarding the Moldovan dis-
pute refers to the EU‟s statement made on January 9, 2006 regarding the need to "ur-
gently recommence negotiations and reach an equitable compromise" (Socor 2006).  
See below for a summary for the reaction functions adopted in this work. 
                                               
129 See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/629&format=HTML&aged=0&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en . See below for more information. 
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Table 3.8 
Reaction functions 
External actors reaction Date Description 
Belarus-Russia 2004 April 26, 2004 2004/67/EC Directive 
Moldova-Russia 2006 January 9, 2006 EU statement 
Belarus-Russia 2006 NA NA 




Belarus-Russia 2007 August 1, 2007 EU statement + NESCO 
activation 
Ukraine-Russia 2009 January 4, 2009 Statement of EU president 
 
 
3.7 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
The high multicollinearity stemming especially from the macroeconomic data of 
the GDP model
130
 requires the generation of statistically independent factors through 
the use of PCA. Linear algebra allows the dimensional reduction of a complex database 
not simply by arbitrarily selecting those to be eliminated, but by using a scientific me-
thod that supports the generation of a set of statistically independent factors that retains 
the highest informational content, and dismissing the variables that represent just noise 
or that are redundant
131
. PCA generates factors with which it is possible to draw bi-
dimensional maps to test the real usefulness of the factors for the final outcome, the ex-
                                               
130 Mean VIF=151,934.33. 
131 More specifically, PCA rotates the original matrix so that the main axis is aligned with the most im-
portant dimension, the second axis, perpendicular to the first one, is aligned with the second most impor-
tant axis and so on. The rotated matrix is also centered on the mean of the distribution. 
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planation of the dependent variable
132
. Factors are generated by a correlation matrix, 
which is then processed in such a manner to obtain a set of factors (new variables) in 
equal amount of that of the original variables (Gujarati 2009). As said above, factors 
have the property of being statistically independent and are the result of a linear trans-
formation of the original variables. The generated factors are then ordered in descending 
order based on their informative content. Scholars usually choose the number of factors 
that satisfy at least one of the following criteria (Mortara 2006):  
1. auto-values exceed 1; 
2. new factors contain more than 66% of the original variance; 
3. new factors contain more than 75% of the original variance; 
4. all factors that are on the left of the “elbow” of the curve drawn by INSTAMAP or 
any other software for the selection of factors to be retained; 
5. all factors that can be meaningful from a conceptual/theoretical standpoint; 
However, it is important to note that PCA can be successfully employed to bet-
ter deal with the outliers, limiting their effect on the remainder of the data. 
The independent variables and the original control variables selected appear to 
produce large quantities of collinearity; thanks to the ability of PCA of creating statist i-
cally independent factors I hope to reduce this issue to manageable levels. In this work, 
I retained as few factors as possible, with the additional goal of keeping at least 85% of 
the original variance. PCA generated 3 factors using the information from the 12 quar-
terly macroeconomic data series listed above, retaining, on average, over 90% of the to-
                                               
132 This is true if one considers that using statistically independent variables will reduce the collinearity, 
while at the same time, retaining almost all the information possessed by the original variables. 
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tal variance for each country. Control variables like the exchange rate between the Euro 
and the Dollar, Euro and British Pound, Oil price, Gas price were not processed with 
PCA in order to be able to test the ability of the model to estimate correct parameters for 
these control variables. Highly collinear variables (even if not significant) were not re-
moved from the model in order not to bias the estimation of the parameters. By doing 
so, the average VIF equals 5.67, thus just slightly more than the value of 5 suggested by 
the literature (Mason and Perreault 1991). 
 
Table 3.9 
Control variables processed by PCA and resulting factors (GDP model only) 
Control Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Domestic Demand 99.34821 4.282491 91 107.3 
Industrial Production 101.0157 9.044397 81.1 130.3 
Exports 89418.29 68623.62 11600.2 295831.6 
Imports 89165.76 62947.49 12619 256117 
Unemployment 8.10935 3.635263 2.4 21 
Balance of Payments 2043.925 13520.04 -22426 47923 
Inflation 102.569 4.883392 92.67 113.5 
Real Consumption 114.082 9.117031 101.01 139.86 
Deposit Interest 1.218929 0.832248 0.25 3.22 
Lending Interest 3.2095 0.844887 1.981 5.22 
Government Debt 55.89325 21.80309 27.4 117.1 
     
Factors Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Factor 1 .0000317 .9868027 -1.9 2.338 
Factor 2 6.28e-10 .9839433 -2.093 2.333 
Factor 3 .0015873 .9869499 -2.6 2.2 
 
 
3.8 Model selection and validation 
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The visual inspection of Figure 3.5 reveals that the stationarity criterion for the 
GDP model is not respected, that is the series is nonstationary in the homogeneous 
sense.  
Figure 3.5 
Raw series of the dependent variable (GDP model) 
 
In fact, the observation of the data plotted below clearly reveals that there is an 
upward trend in the data. It is therefore necessary to differentiate the time series. 
The stock market model reveals only a slightly upward trend for all disputes, ex-
ception made for the 2009 crisis. Here, the 9 stock markets analyzed were slightly fol-
lowing a downward trend. Thus, differencing is applied also to the stock market model 
in order to remove these trends. The results for the GDP model are as follow. 
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Figure 3.6 
First differencing of the dependent variable (GDP model) 
 
First differentiation is enough for both models to reach stationarity. 
Once differentiated, both time series show another problem, non-stationary va-
riance. The variance is lower in the first part of the series, and increases from that point 
on. The distribution is divided in two parts: the first part is characterized by low va-
riance, while the second part is characterized by a larger variance. It is necessary then to 
proceed with the logging of the dependent variable. 
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Figure 3.7 
First differencing of the logged dependent variable (GDP model) 
 
However, even by doing so, the problem is not resolved, and it is for this reason 
that I chose not to use a simple Box-Jenkins ARIMA model. Additional logs of the de-
pendent variable have not produced significant results, since the distribution continues 
to show volatility clusters. The implementation of a GARCH is therefore required for 
the GDP model, as also supported by the significantly better fit of the models
133
 and the 
visual inspection of residuals showed below.  
                                               
133 AIC and BIC for the pooled cross sectional time series GDP model equal respectively 418.4 and 
455.7, compared to the PP-NARCH(0,0) model‟s values of 361.8 and 408.8. Similarly, AIC and BIC for 
the pooled cross sectional time series stock market model equal respectively -125889 and -125792.5, 
compared to the values of the PP-NARCH(1,1) model with autoregressive and moving average processes 
of first-order -131765.4 and -131628.7. 
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Figure 3.8 
Residuals of a pooled cross sectional GDP model with first order autoregres-
sive and moving average disturbances 
 
Similar comments apply for the stock market model: especially in the case of the 
Italian Mib 30 index in the dataset relative to the 2009 dispute, higher volatility charac-
terizes the first part of the time series. Logging, in this case, produces the results as 
represented by Figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.9 
First differencing of the logged dependent variable (stock market model, 2009 
dispute) 
 
The implementation of a GARCH model, which could be justifiable given the 
presence of some heteroskedasticity model in the Swedish series, is not required for the 
stock market model. Since a better fit generally corresponds to the Box-Jenkins ARIMA 
model (fixed effects)
134
, I adopt this model to perform my analyses. This will also allow 
me to have better understanding of the impact of the variables on the dependent va-
riables by estimating several models and comparing their results. The datasets relative 
to all the other disputes show an even lesser degree of heteroskedasticity, which sup-
ports the use of a simpler Box-Jenkins ARIMA model (fixed effects) for the analyses of 
stock markets fluctuations. 
                                               
134 AIC and BIC respectively equal to -6828.903 and -6812.431 for the Box-Jenkins ARIMA model and 
AIC and BIC equal to -7161.561 and -7117.596 for the PP-NARCH model. 
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Figure 3.10 
Residuals of a pooled cross sectional Stock Market model with first order au-
toregressive disturbances (2009 dispute) 
 
The GARCH model identified as „best‟ for the GDP model is not only a pooled 
panel, but it is also nonlinear, which refers to the nonlinearity of the conditional va-
riance function
135
. The model is further enriched with autoregressive and moving aver-
age disturbances of first-order. The correlograms of each panels supports the use of ei-
ther autoregressive or moving average processes or a combination of both, and first-
order processes (commonly found in real data) are introduced in the model for an over-
all increase of fitness of the model
136
. 
The Shapiro-Silk normality test shows that the residuals of both models do not 
follow a normal distribution, results which are also confirmed by the Skewe-
                                               
135 See Higgins and Bera (1992). 
136 AIC and BIC are now respectively equal to 307.4725 and 360.4221. 
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ness/Kurtosis test for normality
137
. For this reason, robust standard errors are employed 
in the GDP model for a more reliable estimation of the standard errors (Bollerslev & 
Wooldridge 1992). This model is the best one found according to the AIC and BIC 
tests; it reasonably follows the straight line, but, as shown below, it clearly fails to mod-
el some variance at the extremes of the distribution, pointing that there are some minor 
residual patterns in the data.  
Figure 3.11 
QQ Normal Scores of Standardized Residuals from the fitted PP-NARCH Model 
with AR and MA disturbances 
 
Nonetheless, a search conducted following Cryer and Chan‟s method (2008) for 
a fitter model is inconclusive, for all models show (significantly) higher AIC and BIC 
values (see below). 
                                               
137 P-values are less than 0.0001 for both the GDP and Stock Market model. 
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Table 3.10 
Alternative model specifications 
Model AIC BIC 
1. PP-NARCH, ma(1) ar(1) 307.4725 360.4221 
2. PP-NARCH, ma(2) ar(2) 345.8964 398.846 
3. PP-NARCH 361.7706  408.8369 
4. PP-ARCH (1), ma(1) ar(1) 313.4452 363.4532 
5. PP-GARCH (1,1)138 NA NA 
6. PP-GARCH (1,1), ma(1) ar(1) 139 NA NA 
7. PP-ARCH (1) 353.5005 397.6251 
8. PP-GARCH (2,1)140 NA NA 
9. PP-GARCH (1,2) 355.4905 402.5567 
10. FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances 418.3667 455.7443 
11. Fixed-effects (within) regression 318.1499 356.8474 
12. PP-NAGARCH(1,0) 310.4295 363.3791 
13. PP-NAGARCH(1,1) NA NA 
Thus, I accept the current model, a Pooled Panel Nonlinear GARCH model with 
first-order autoregressive and moving average disturbances. 
For the stock market model, a simpler pooled cross sectional model is adopted 
given the significant increase in fit of the PCTS model. The Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity demonstrates that in both the PCSTS model and 
NGARCH model some residual heteroskedasticity affects the results, as shown in Fig-
ure 3.12. 
                                               
138 Error returned by STATA: “flat log pseudo likelihood encountered, cannot find uphill direction”. 
139 Error returned: “flat or discontinuous region encountered, numerical derivatives are approximate”, 
which returns no parameters estimation. 
140 See Cryer and Chan 2008. 
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Figure 3.12 
QQ Normal Scores of Standardized Residuals from the fitted PCSTS Model with 
AR (1) disturbance 
 
More specifically, the last part of the curve shows a sharp deviation from the 
line, which describes the inability of the model to deal with the fluctuations of the stock 
markets of the 9 different countries. The introduction of proper controls is likely to re-
duce the weakness of this model and reduce the omitted variable bias that is very likely 
to affect the estimates of this model. However, given the better fit of the PCSTS model, 
I accept it. Given the lack of options in STATA for using a PCSTS model
141
, I will use 
only the results offered by the model described above
142
. 
                                               
141 The “xtregar” command allows only the use of autoregressive disturbance processes of first order. 
Higher-order autoregressive processes or moving average processes of any order can be introduced in 
STATA 10. However, given the lack of significant differences in terms of AIC and BIC value between 
the GARCH model with autoregressive and moving average processes, I believe that such lack of option 
does not significantly affect the validity of the results found in this work. 
142 The NGARCH model with first-order autoregressive and moving average processes finds very similar 
results, where only the p value take on different values, more strongly rejecting the null hypotheses that 
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4 Case Studies 
 
Among all the cases discussed in the present work, the ones between Russia and 
Ukraine (especially the 2009 crisis) are of particular relevance. In January 2006, Gaz-
prom reduced gas exports through Ukraine mainly because of the large financial sums 
owed by Ukraine, which were unsettled in the previous agreements. These were then 
connected to the price of gas imported to Ukraine and the transit fees of Russian gas 
(Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009; World Gas intelligence 2009). Both countries have 
benefited from a more favorable agreement since Gazprom gains around two-thirds of 
its revenues from the European markets and Ukraine‟s political spheres have earned 
considerable fortunes from the business (Nichol, Woehrel and Bernard 2006). Ukraine 
is the biggest importer of Russian gas, but it is also the largest corridor through which 
over 80% Russian gas reaches its European customers. In other words, Russia highly 
depends on the Ukrainian pipeline system to be able to extract from its natural re-
sources, gas in this case, since Belarus is the supplier of less than 20% of the gas sold to 
Europe
143
 (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009; Youngs 2009, 88). Russia and Ukraine 
have been cooperating on energy matters since the 1960s, during which Ukraine was 
independent in terms of gathering the energy sufficient to support its economy. Howev-
er, its gas production declined in the 1990s; at that time Ukraine was already heavily 
dependent on Russian gas, but, as a transit country, it was still an important country in 
the area. The pipeline system in Ukraine and Belarus was built lacking any kind of ex-
                                                                                                                                          
are also rejected by the PCSTS model, while failing to reject the null hypotheses that are found to be so 
also in the PCSTS model. 
143 With the construction of the Yamal pipeline Belarus was traversed by conduit of Russian gas to Eu-
rope (Stern 2005). Before then, only Ukraine and Moldova were the two main countries through which 
Russian gas was being transported. See above, figure 3. 
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pectations of a similar Soviet Union collapse. Cooperation between these countries was 
ideally supposed to last and therefore a large investment was made in an expensive 
pipeline system. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost legal con-
trol of large portions of its energy sector
144
. It only lost important production hubs like 
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, but it witnessed the nationalization of the 
important oil pipes and gas pipelines that were used to supply Europe (Bindi 2010, 
133). Energy production dropped as a consequence and it was apparent to Russia that a 
restoration of its control over its energy sector was to be a primary objective, even 
though several countries were resisting the Russian attempt to exert influence over the 
newly independent territories (Barylski 1995). 
However independent Ukraine was trying to be from Russia  after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, it was certain that the two economies were already deeply intertwined 
145
. During its first years, Russia noted in gas and oil sales an emergency financial 
                                               
144 Oliker et al (2009, 93-94) report that according to a recent survey, CIS countries are on the top of the 
list of the Russian foreign policy. Russians, in other words, deem their relationship with CIS countries 
very important for security and economic reasons. As explained earlier in the book (87), their centrality 
for Russia economic success and security is based on prestige, historical, economic, security considera-
tions. CIS countries, in fact, have been under Russian control and influence even since before the Soviet 
Union and it is because of this that many Russians consider these countries as natural partners. Without 
them, Russia cannot be seen any longer as a great power that deserves as much attention as it used to in 
the best days of the Soviet Union. It is because of this perception that attempts from any other external 
state/group to influence CIS countries represent a direct threat to Russian security and prestige. Finally, 
CIS countries are important trading partners, and represent buffer-zones that can prevent external con-
flicts from reaching the Russian territory. 
145 More specifically, three other major issues link Russian and Ukrainian politics. The importance of the 
Ukrainian economy which in the pre-1991 period when it was an essential part of the Soviet economy and 
military, the Russian desire of maintaining Ukraine within its own influence, so as to use it as a buffer 
zone (and certainly the Ukrainian access to NATO will not help this happen) and the current situation of 
Crimea, where a large portion of Russians live and where the Russian Black Sea Fleet is located (Bindi 
2010, 138). 
  
143 Case StudiesCase Studies 
source and could not afford to lose it. On the other side, Ukraine‟s economy was so 
heavily dependent on Russian gas that it was nearly impossible for it to switch to alter-
natives (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 5; Bindi 2010, 137). Such a mutual depen-
dence gave birth to several disputes over issues which have continued to present-day 
and are mainly based on two facts. First, the countries that were now consuming the gas 
were no longer under direct control of the Russian leadership, and as such, they were 
comparable to other European countries who paid much higher prices for the gas con-
sumed. Second, these newly independent countries did not have enough financial re-
sources to afford paying
146
 for the gas that was once supplied at prices that barely cov-
ered the transit costs (Stern 2005, 66). As a consequence, the relationship between Rus-
sia and Ukraine became more complicated and several issues were raised. These issues 
consist of gas sales to Ukraine that were later estimated to not produce any profit for 
Russia, Ukrainian debt due to the lack of domestic payments
147
, the siphoning of Rus-
sian gas from the pipelines and Russian attempts to convince Ukraine to relinquish a 
portion of its control of the transit network (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava 2009, 5; Bindi 
2010, 137; Shaffer 2009, 116)
148
. Given these problems, Russia has repeatedly at-
tempted to use its „gas weapon‟ to force the ex-Soviet Republics to pay the debt they 
accumulated over years of consumption while at the same time trying to gain access to 
                                               
146 Thus, for these countries, both affordability and reliability were the main issues for their energy securi-
ty. 
147 Given the fact that Ukrainian customers could not afford to pay for the gas supply received. 
148 Russia does not allow the sale of its own transit and distribution networks by foreign companies (Shaf-
fer 2009, 116). 
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In particular, the gas imports by Ukraine and Belarus represent over 75% of all 
CIS trade, while most gas traded by Russia with Europe transits through Ukraine, Bela-
rus and Moldova, and a remaining portion of Russian gas sales goes to Finland and to 
Turkey via the Blue Stream pipeline
150
. The economic value of the exchanges among 
these countries is substantially large enough that dealing with them requires the com-
mitment and involvement of large portions of the executive power of all the countries 
involved. In particular, the gas flowing through Ukraine, which represents around 80% 
of all Russian exports (Stern 2005, 87), has started a vicious circle that initiated with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union; which is namely the inability of Ukraine to fulfill its fi-
nancial obligations related to its large consumption of Turkmen and Russian gas. This 
in turn led to the establishment of a Russian practice of cutting off the gas supply in or-
der to enforce the payment of the large debt contracted and the consequent diversion of 
gas directed to Europe to compensate for the reduction of gas destined to Ukraine (Stern 
2005, 87). The clashes that followed between the two countries are numerous, but in the 
late 1990s Russia and Ukraine, recognizing the need to find an agreement, settled the 
dispute by linking the price of gas to be paid by Ukraine and the transit fee to be paid by 
Russia. Nothing, however, was decided about the large debt Ukraine accrued from 1991 
                                               
149 See Stern (2005, 67). A good example of this example is the gas cut that occurred in the winter 2006 in 
Georgia. In that case, the gas cut occurred at the same time of electricity cut from Russia, the latter that 
was attributed by the Russian government to a terroristic attack. Shaffer (2009, 44) maintains that if the 
Moscow‟s gas cut was purely commercial, then it should have occurred at a later moment, when the elec-
tricity line had already been repaired. However, that did not occur, leaving Georgia without electricity 
and gas in the middle of the winter season, suggesting that Russian intended punishing Georgia for its 
pro-Western attitudes. 
150 See picture below. 
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(Stern 2005, 88). Following the financial and economic crisis that started in 1998, ten-
sions between the two countries re-ignited, given the necessity that Gazprom had to 
maximize its revenues originating from those countries that were hardly struck by the 
economic crisis and had in turn reduced the global consumption of gas lowering not on-
ly its price, but also that of oil. The crisis reached a climax in November 1999, when oil 
and electricity exports to Ukraine were stopped; however, knowing that that would have 
not achieved much, and given the Russian lack of control over the Ukrainian pipeline 
system, Russia decided that it was in its interest to bypass Ukraine and find an alterna-
tive way to supply gas to Europe
151
. It was at this time that the idea of building a pipe-
line to be used to bypass Ukraine was under serious consideration. Even though several 
diplomatic issues were connected to the building of this expensive infrastructure, 
Ukraine perceived that the realization of the new pipeline, that was supposed to bypass 
up to 50% of the pipes system in the Ukrainian territory, was a serious threat to its cen-
trality and gas delivery to Europe
152
. For this reason, a wave of agreements followed 
and finally all the problems seemed to be settled, despite its complexity and notable 
omissions
153
. Following these agreements, Ukraine was to receive gas only from Turk-
menistan, while Gazprom would have provided only enough gas to pay for the transit 
fees, an additional security amount of no more than five billion cubes meters (Bcm) was 
needed to compensate the eventual lack of gas supplies from Turkmenistan and a bonus 
supply of gas for two months in winter. In exchange, Ukraine would guarantee Russia 
the transit of 124 Bcm of gas through its network. Nothing had been decided other than 
                                               
151 Stern (2005, 89) maintains that the new pipeline would have paid itself off very soon, given the large 
losses due to acts of siphoning of gas. 
152 Its centrality represented its main bargaining advantage in the negotiations with Russia. 
153 See Stern 2005, 90. 
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the amount and repayment method of the large debts accumulated by Ukraine and it can 
be the source of additional clashes in the future relationship of Ukraine and Russia. It 
took several months before the agreement was formalized. In fact, it was in 2002 that 
the two countries signed a contract in which most of the aforementioned elements were 
confirmed, which was once again renewed, with slight modifications, in 2005 (Stern 
2005, 91). The tensions among the two countries quickly decreased and a more peaceful 
environment characterized the formalization of the agreements to be reached. Moreover, 
less and less attention was given to the project of bypassing Ukraine; actually, this at-
tention was diverted towards expanding or improving the Ukrainian network. This is at-
tributed to the improved diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
Foreign policy reasons were alleged to be behind the 2006 gas dispute. Among 
them was the idea to punish Ukraine for becoming more pro-West (mainly for its desire 
to join NATO
154
). Also Putin was reported to have hinted that the dispute with Ukraine 
was different given the poor relationship between the two countries. Moreover, some 
observers have noted that the crisis occurred sometime before the legislative elections in 
Ukraine and that the crisis may have been started in order to deliver a significant blow 
to the incumbent administration. The crisis was then supposed to make apparent that the 
newly elected members will have to regard Russian influence more closely if Ukraine 
still wanted to thrive through exports of steel and iron, whose production is based on the 
supply of cheap gas
155
 (Nichol, Woehrel and Bernard 2006). The allegations that Russia 
did this with the intent of causing instability in the Ukrainian government are mitigated 
                                               
154 Bindi 2010. See also Shaffer (2009). 
155 Others have argued that if some pointed to the use of gas weapon as a tool for achieving political 
goals, a similar statement could be made by claiming that in the absence of such raises in price, Russia 
was buying political support by subsidizing the gas prices (Bindi 2010, 143). 
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by the evidence that Russia asked a higher price also to Armenia, who is well-known 
for supporting the Russian government. This suggests that economic reasons played a 
significant role as well (Nichol, Woehrel and Bernard).  
 
4.1 Russia and Ukraine 
 
The 2006 crisis started in early 2005, when Gazprom requested a higher price for 
gas imported by Ukraine, even though, according to the latter, there was an agreement 
that was binding Russia to provide gas at the price of $50 per thousand cubic meters. 
Gazprom first asked Ukraine to pay $160 and at the end of 2005 they asked them to pay 
$230, thus this price is very close to what the other European markets were paying for 
the gas (Nichol, Woehrel and Bernard). Ukraine refused to comply with Gazprom‟s re-
quests and on January 1, 2006 Gazprom reduced the gas flow to Ukraine who then 
reacted by diverting some gas that was meant for the European market to its own popu-
lation and industry (Nichol, Woehrel and Bernard). The reduction of gas towards Eu-
rope triggered an immediate reaction by the European customers. The following day the 
two countries restored the gas flow and on January 4, 2006 an agreement was reached, 
according to which Ukraine was to purchase for $95 from an intermediary company, 
RosUkrEnergo
156
 (owned in equal shares by both Russian and Ukrainian figures) 
(Yhiah 2008), which in turns buys Central Asian gas for a lower price and from Russia 
for a higher price. Part of the agreement reached entailed also a higher transit fee to be 
paid by Russia, but also access to half of the Ukrainian domestic market for the RosU-
                                               
156 More precisely, the ownership of RosUkrEnergo is to be attributed to Gazprom and two Ukrainian 
businessmen, who own respectively 50%, 45% and 5% of the shares of the company. 
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krEnergo 
157
. The crisis lasted only three days, but two years later, another crisis was to 
happen. That year in fact, Turkmenistan reduced its exports to Iran who in turn cut its 
exports to Turkey who then reduced its exports to Greece in order to have enough gas to 
run its own economy that was later replaced by Russian exports (World Gas Intelligence 
2009). Once again, in January 2009, following further disagreements over the same 
terms of their contracts which are transit fees, gas price and Russia‟s halt of the gas 
supply to Ukraine, and this can be defined as one of the worst energy crises in Europe 
since the 70s (World Gas Intelligence 2009). Unlike the dispute that occurred in 2006, 
this gas crisis lasted almost seven times longer with a partial gas reduction first and a 
total stop just six days later. It is still unclear whether it was Russia cutting the supply or 
rather Ukraine who prevented Russian gas from reaching the European market. It was 
not clear whether this was intended to damage Russia from a diplomatic point of view 
or simply to replace the gas that was being transported to Europe with the missing gas 
that was needed to fuel the Ukrainian economy. Nineteen days after the dispute started, 
Russia and Ukraine finally found a common ground for their requests and settled their 
dispute over the gas price and the transportation fee. After, gas started flowing again 
towards the European countries. With the resumption of gas exports to Europe, soon 
over 420 million cubic meters flowed into the Ukrainian pipeline system, 75 of which 
was destined to support the smaller country and the rest exported to Europe (World Gas 
Intelligence 2009). 
                                               
157 See Nichol, Woehrel and Bernard 2006. 
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Figure 4.1 
Countries affected by the 2009 gas crisis and gas pipeline system. 
 
Source: BBC News 2009. 
According to the two decade-long agreements reached on January 20, 2009 be-
tween the Russian Gazprom and the Ukrainian Naftogaz Ukrainy
158
, both countries 
fixed the terms for the Russian gas supply and the Russian usage of the Ukrainian pipe-
line system to Europe. As emerged in previous discussions, the economic relationship 
between the two countries would occur without the presence of the RosUkrEnergo 
(RUE), with the intent of making the transactions much more transparent (World Gas 
Intelligence 2009; BBC News 2009). The price dispute was settled establishing that 
                                               
158 The agreement reached did not mention any resolution of the dispute regarding the $650 million in 
fines and penalties for 2008 allegedly owed by Ukraine to the Russian Gazprom (World Gas Intelligence 
2009). 
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Ukraine pay the same price applied to the sales of gas to Europe minus twenty percent, 
thus settling the price to be paid by Ukraine at $360 per million cubic meters, which is 
slightly over double the price paid just one year later. The intent of Gazprom was, in 
fact, making Ukraine pay an average of $250 per million cubic meters for the year 2009, 
thus just $30 lower than the price paid by European countries, with the intention of ap-
plying the same price in the Ukrainian case to all the other European countries starting 
in 2010 (World Gas Intelligence 2009). Ukraine declared itself ready to pay the full gas 
price, given that it was time to reduce its gas consumption by minimizing its energy 
waste. The other portion of the deal involved a transit fee to be paid by Gazprom for 
2008 gas exports equal to $1.70 for transporting 1,000 cubic meters of gas (Willershau-
sen 2009). Russia depends on Ukraine for its pipeline system as much as Ukraine de-
pends on Russia for the supply of reasonably priced gas (Nichol, Woehrel and Bernard 
2006). In fact, the main Ukrainian export sectors, iron and steel production, are heavily 
dependent on cheap Russian gas to compete in the international arena and a higher price 
will justify efforts of maximizing the energy efficiency of the country (Nichol, Woehrel 
and Bernard 2006).  
Experts who have studied the 2009 gas crisis have claimed that there was evi-
dence that Ukraine did shut down its pipelines at night between the 6th and the 7th of 
January 2009, thus further damaging its relations with Russia. Russia also significantly 
contributed to an escalation of the dispute by asking a $400-450 per mcm price, and 
then reducing the gas flow down to 65 mcm, which represented less than 50% of the gas 
need of the country (Pirani, Stern, Yafimava 2009, 33). Both these events, combined 
with Russia‟s manipulation of the issue of technical gas into that of a „theft‟ of gas, led 
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to what evolved into the gas disruption of gas exports to Europe (Pirani, Stern, Yafima-
va, 34).  
In conclusion, it is worth noting that at the time of the 2006 gas dispute, there 
were discussions over the construction of North Stream, a pipeline that was supposed to 
connect Russia and Germany underwater starting from Vyborg, on the border with Fin-
land. Large financial resources have been mobilized to start the project whose end goal 
is clearly that of reaching European territories without being involved in political con-
flicts with transit countries. After almost two decades of conflicts with Ukraine and 
Moldova, and then also with Belarus, Russia seems to have developed a preference for 
constructing alternative ways to reach European soil. Such a strategy has power not on-
ly to force disputing countries to accept Russia‟s offers159, but also to increase the flow 
of gas that can be supplied to Europe, making other projects like Nabucco economically 
unfeasible, due to their saturating of the market with Russian gas. 
The 2006 Ukraine-Russia dispute triggered an increased concern about energy 
security. On February 9, 2006 European Commission President Barroso declared that 
now more cooperation among EU states was needed to reduce dependence on Russian 
energy and that alternative sources of energy were needed. This was supported, the next 
day by the Polish Prime Minister‟s statement about the need of creating a “Euro-
Atlantic Energy Security Pact”. Given the lack of concrete reply from the EU as a 
community, Barroso emphasized again the need to build a common policy to improve 
EU energy security in 2009, stating that: "this crisis has confirmed what we have said 
when we were proposing this diversification strategy to our member states. It is com-
pletely unwise for one country to rely only on one supplier" (Speck 2009). 
                                               
159 See also Bindi 2010, 137. 
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The diversification can be achieved by supporting and Nabucco, which the Eu-
ropean Commission stated to be ready to support with a 250 million Euros
160
 and the 
construction of the Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines (Speck 2009). 
A more intense statement was that from the Presidency of the European Union 
of January 4, 2009, according to which: 
“The European Union calls for an urgent solution to the commercial dispute on 
gas supplies from the Russian Federation to Ukraine, and for an immediate resumption 
of full deliveries of gas to the EU member states. Energy relations between the EU and 
its neighbors should be based on reliability and predictability. Existing commitments to 
supply and transit have to be honored under all circumstances. The European Union re-
grets the fact that assurances of the reliability of energy supply have not been met and 
will continue to monitor the situation closely.” (EU2009.cz 2009) 
 
4.2 Russia and Belarus 
 
In addition, the relationship between Russia and Belarus exhibited the same 
trend, in which Russia tried to raise the price of the gas that was previously supplied at a 
very cheap rate, despite the fact that the amount of gas transported via Belarus is sub-
stantially less than that via Ukraine (less than 20%, compared to around 80%). The eco-
nomic and political relationship between Belarus and Russia have always been much 
more pacific
161
, when compared to Russia-Ukraine; that is to the extent that the two 
countries have discussed the possibility to merge together and form one state (Stern 
2005, 97; Lucas 2008, 134). This suggests that purely economic reasons may have been 
behind the gas cuts (Oliker et al 2009, 98). The two-decade-long agreements reached in 
                                               
160 This sums, the author says, covers just 3% of the total cost of the pipeline (Speck 2009). 
161 See also Bindi 2010, 140. According to the author, the Belarusian President, Alexander Lukashenka 
has turned his country into an autocratic regime, ruled by him, which has little to share with the democrat-
ic regime adopted by Europe, which has even shown unable to prevent and resolve crises like the 2008 
war in Georgia and fragmented in its decision (Bindi, 141-142). See also Oliker et al (2009, 98). 
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1993 and 1995 required Russia to provide a large quantity of gas in exchange for trans-
fering the assets of Beltransgaz, the gas transmission company, after 99 years. The rela-
tionship between the two countries started degenerating after 1998, when gas debts 
started reaching very high levels and the two parties failed to agree on the price of the 
gas deliveries (Oliker et al). In 2002, an agreement was reached in which Belarus would 
pay for gas supplies at a price that was reserved for Russian territories, therefore much 
lower than those accorded to higher zones. But since little was being done to commence 
the joint venture between Beltransgaz and Gazprom and the debt kept increasing, the 
first threats of halting gas supplies were made. At the time Belarus claimed that the val-
ue of Beltransgaz and the value of refurbishments needed was much higher than the be-
lieved Russian counterparts. Thus a much higher financial contribution was requested to 
access half of the assets of the joint venture between the two companies and an addi-
tional large fee needed to fix the transportation system (Stern 2005, 98).  
In 2003, the crisis degenerated to the point that Gazprom stopped its supplies to 
Belarus as soon as the contract binding them to do so expired. Lacking any agreement 
on price, debt and terms to conclude the joint venture, gas supplies were stopped on 
January 1, 2004. Even though Belarus was being supplied by private companies on 
short term contracts, Belarus and Russia did not reach an agreement in January of that 
year and on February 18, 2004 Gazprom cut off all gas supplies for 30 hours, including 
those that were meant to be delivered to the European market. Evidence of gas diver-
sions were hard to find, although Gazprom claimed that some did occur and it is logical 
that such an event occurred given the drastic circumstances
162
. Belarus was thus forced 
to sign short term contracts with other independent firms to be supplied the necessary 
                                               
162 See Stern 2005. 
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gas. Over five months after the interruption of gas supplies to Belarus in 2004, the two 
countries reached an agreement, in which a higher price was set to be paid to Gazprom. 
This price was still well below the price of the gas sold to European countries. Moreo-
ver, Gazprom obtained a lower tariff for the transportation of the gas through the Bela-
rusian pipeline system while Belarus agreed to receive a 175 million dollars loan which 
would help pay its gas debt to Gazprom (NewEurope.eu. 2006). 
The consequences of the cut were significant, especially for the Kaliningrad re-
gion and Poland, the former being forced to switch to oil fuel and to hot water and the 
latter suffering a 35% diminution on February 18, and 50% on February 19. Meanwhile, 
Latvia was able to compensate using its own gas reserves which were sufficient enough 
to help neighboring Lithuania as well (NewEurope.eu. 2006, 100). In late March 2006 
Gazprom requested a raise in price, which was later quantified to become equal to the 
price of the gas delivered to other European countries. Belarus was confident to still 
hold bargaining leverage in terms of being an important route towards the European 
market, and until other pipelines were constructed that bypassed it, it would have been 
still in a position to avoid entering the Russian sphere of influence (Ria Novosti 2006; 
Kupchinsky 2006).  
Should the gas be cut off, Belarus could have shifted the burden of such a move 
back to Russia, by redirecting, as Ukraine did, the gas that was supposed to be reaching 
the European markets, at the expense, evidently, of an increased European concern over 
their energy security. At stake in the dispute was not just the price of the gas being con-
sumed by the transporting countries, but also the control over the pipeline system, 
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which Russia had shown a strong interest in
163
. In fact, there are two major systems in 
Belarus, one that is the property of Belarus and the other, the Yamal-Europe pipeline is 
the property of Gazprom, which is required to pay the costs of traversing the Belarusian 
territory. Belarus already had a significant debt to Russia that stemmed from gas delive-
ries in the 1990s and a sudden gas price increase was likely to aggravate the financial 
situation of the country. Therefore this aggravation renders the country vulnerable to 
Russian pressures to allow access to control the Belarusian pipeline system (Kup-
chinsky 2006).  
As a probable reaction of the European markets to the 2004 crisis, the Directive 
of the Council of the European Union 2004/67/EC of April 26, 2004, which advocates 
common EU policies by establishing responsibilities on each EU country, joint opera-




The situation for Belarus worsened in 2007, when the gas price was increased to 
$100 even though the country was allowed to pay the accumulated debt by July 2007. 
However, failing to do so, Belarus was threatened to have its gas supplies reduced by 
45% on August 1, 2007, even after having to forfeit 50% of the shares in Beltranshaz 
for 2.5 billion dollars along with a prospecting gas price increase in the years to come 
that would have made gas prices for Belarus equal to those applied to European coun-
tries (Maksymiuk 2007). 
                                               
163 Russia is alleged to have cut off gas supply when in 2002 Belarus decided not to allow Russia to gain 
partial control over the Beltranshaz, a company owned by the Belarusian state that runs the local pipeline 
system (Kupchinsky 2006). 
164 See below for a more detailed description. 
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The European Commission reacted by making public its concern regarding the 
development of the crisis, stating on August 1 that: 
"We take these developments very seriously and we believe [that] both sides 
[will be able] to resolve the dispute without any delay and to create conditions for the 
timely resumption of the deliveries" (Maksymiuk 2006).  
Moreover, the following day the European Commission activated the EU's Net-
work of Energy Security Correspondents (NESCO)
165
, a forum created in order to antic-
ipate and prevent disruptions on energy supplies to the EU. 
 
4.3 Russia and Moldova 
 
Moldova is a small country which was once occupied by Romania and became 
part of the Soviet Union after WWII. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moldova 
(now pro-West) declared its independence. The portion of Moldovan territories which 
covers the land beyond the river Dniest attempted in turn to reach independence under 
the name Trasnistria (pro-Russia), but it is nowadays still not recognized by the interna-
tional community. Moldova enjoys the support of the Romanian government not only in 
its struggle to gain control of Transnistria (currently occupied by Russian troops), but 
also in its dealing with the Russian increase of gas prices, which Romania declared in 
2006 to be willing to counter by supplying the small country with a cheaper alternative 
(World of Information 2006). 
                                               
165 See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/629&format=HTML&aged=0&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en . See below for more information. 
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Despite its small gas consumption, Moldova is located in a key position regard-
ing the transportation of gas to Europe: over 22 billion cubic meters of Russian gas need 
to traverse its territories (Stern 2005, 101). Similarly to the Ukrainian and Belarusian 
cases, the major issue is the debt contracted for the consumption of Russian gas. In 
1998, however, tensions decreased because of the creation of MoldovaGaz, a joint ven-
ture owned by Gazprom (50%), the Moldovan government (35.3%) and other small par-
ties who are responsible for the distribution of Russian gas in the territory (Stern 2005).  
The situation quickly worsened as soon as it was clear that the financial situation 
of Moldova deteriorated due to the inability to pay for the high prices charged by Gaz-
prom, despite previous agreements stating that the price to be charged was inferior. 
Moldova compensated for higher prices with higher transit fees; however, due to the 
large debt, Gazprom repeatedly threatened and implemented complete gas cut offs to 
Moldova in order to extract more payments or to be guaranteed that the payments were 
going to be made. The situation did not change until 2004 when Gazprom renewed its 
threats of halting gas supplies. This failed to be implemented due to the recognized 
Moldovan role as a transit country (Stern 2005, 102). On January 1, 2006 Moldova was 
faced with no gas supplies due to its refusal to accept a 100+% increase in price, an in-
crease from the $80 the year before. The following day, Ukraine started supplying Mol-
dova with an amount of gas that equaled 50% of its daily requirements, but, Ukraine be-
ing the only (emergency) supplier of energy for Moldova, the latter was left in a weaker 
bargaining position (Socor 2006). Sixteen days after the gas disruption, Russia resumed 
the gas supply, having settled with Moldova to pay $110 (BBC News 2006). Socor 
claims that raising the gas price was clearly a Russian attempt at modifying Moldova‟s 
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policy on the resolution of the conflict in Trasnistria and their pro-Western orientation 
(BBC News 2006). 
The Moldovan crisis attracted the EU‟s attention, and on January 9, 2006 it pub-
licly declared to "urgently recommence negotiations and reach an equitable compro-
mise" (Socor 2006). 
Moldova, due to its positioning and connections, was also hardly affected by the 




The estimation of the PP-NARCH model returns interesting results, which have 
a high degree of conformity with the characteristics of the case studies I have just de-
scribed. In fact, not only the 2009 Ukraine-Russia emerges as having had a significant 
effect on the surrounding economies, but also the 2004 and 2006 Belarusian crisis par-
ticularly stand out as relevant explanatory variables of the negative impact on GDP in-
curred by several countries during and after the gas disputes. 
In support of the goodness of fit of the model, there is a significant and negative 
relationship between real GDP growth and gas prices. Under investigation are in fact all 
countries that are net energy importers, thus vulnerable to increases in gas prices. The 
expected relationship is supported by the model, which shows a strong and negative re-
lationship between the two variables. As an additional test of the validity of the model, 
the direction of the relationship between the exchange rate and the Euro and the Dollar 
estimated by the model is in the correct direction. As common sense would suggest, I 
should find a negative relationship between the exchange rate between Euro and Dollar, 
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since the higher the value of the Euro compared to that of the Dollar, the more expen-
sive European exports and the less competitive in general the European area becomes 
relative to the US exports of product and services. The model confirms the negative re-
lationship between the exchange rate Euro-Dollar, further reinforcing the appropriate-
ness of the model.  
The parameters for oil price, and the exchange rate between Euro and British 
pound are not significantly different from zero; even though I left these two variables 
out of PCA with the precise intent to use them as a test of validity of the model (thus 
expecting a significant and negative relationship with GDP growth) 
The parameter estimation of the crises reveals that there is a significant and neg-
ative impact of the Belarus 2004 (2Q), Belarus 2006 (2Q), Ukraine 2006 and 2009 (1Q 
and 2Q), but no significant relationship is found for the two remaining crises, the one 
that occurred between Moldova and Russia in 2006, and the one between Russia and 
Belarus in 2007.  
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Table 4.1 
Regression results of the PP-NARCH model (GDP model) 
Variables Estimated parameter p-value 
Gas price -0.05051 0.187 
Oil price 0.000884 0.889 
Exchange Euro-Pound -0.73023 0.39 
Exchange rate Euro-US Dollar -2.1385 0.12 
Factor 1 -0.02656 0.21 
Factor 2 0.007612 0.556 
Factor 3 -0.02982 0.217 
Belarus 2004 -1.49683** <0.001 
Belarus 2006 -0.41896* 0.021 
Moldova 2006 0.23299 0.169 
Belarus 2007  -0.00304 0.981 
Ukraine 2006 and 2009 -0.40146 0.057 
Constant 4.251081 0.118 
ARMA disturbances 
AR(1) -0.14113 0.252 
MA(1) -0.61447 0.000 
NARCH 
NARCH 1.585872 0.026 
NARCH_K -0.1531 0.242 
Constant 0.060769 0.029 
Similar results (sometimes weaker, some other times stronger) are offered by 
some of the alternative specifications reported above. More specifically, the vast majori-
ty of these unreported models emphasize the strong significance of the variable measur-
ing especially the dispute between Russia and Belarus in 2004, as found also in the best 
model indentified. Similar observations can be made for the crisis between the same 
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countries in 2006, and, to a less extent also for the two Ukrainian crises in 2006 and 
2009. 
Several alternative models supported the finding of my best model that the Bela-
rusian crisis in 2006 and the Moldovan dispute did not significantly affect other econo-
mies (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 
Hypotheses supported by alternative model specifications 
Model Significant and Negative effect (Crises) 
1. PP-NARCH, ma(1) ar(1) Belarus 2004, Belarus 2006, Ukraine 2006 and 2009 
2. PP-NARCH, ma(2) ar(2) Belarus 2006 
3. PP-NARCH Belarus 2006 
4. PP-ARCH (1), ma(1) ar(1) Belarus 2004, Belarus 2006, Ukraine 2006 and 2009 
5. PP-GARCH (1,1)166 NA 
6. PP-GARCH (1,1), ma(1) ar(1) 167 NA 
7. PP-ARCH (1) Belarus 2004, Belarus 2006 
8. PP-GARCH (2,1)168 NA 
9. PP-GARCH (1,2) Belarus 2004, Belarus 2006 
10. FE (within) regression with AR(1)  Belarus 2004 
11. Fixed-effects (within) regression None
169 
12 PP-NAGARCH(1,0) Belarus 2004, Belarus 2006, Ukraine 2006 and 2009
170 
13 PP-NAGARCH(1,1) NA 
 
                                               
166 Error returned by STATA: “flat log pseudo likelihood encountered, cannot find uphill direction”. 
167 Error returned: “flat or discontinuous region encountered, numerical derivatives are approximate”, 
which returns no parameters estimation. 
168 See previous note. 
169 No parameters are significant and negative in this model. 
170 Unlike the best model identified, this configuration finds a positive and significant relationship for the 
Moldovan crisis. The 2007 Belarusian crisis is not found significant. 
  
162 Changing Games and Evolving Contexts: Political Bargaining in European Energy Disputes 
As noted in Table 4.2, several models support the hypothesis that the gas dispute 
between Belarus and Russia in 2004 and 2006 significantly affected real GDP growth of 
the countries under investigation. Weaker evidence of the significance of the Ukrainian 
crises is found in other model specifications, while failure to reject the null hypothesis is 
demonstrated for the 2006 Moldovan crisis and the Belarusian crisis in 2007. 
In sum, the models considered above show that a good portion of the cases stu-
died in the present work had a negative effect on the surrounding environment consti-
tuted by European countries and other institutions. This negative externality is a strong 
incentive for the environment to react and become an active player in the negotiation 
process. A clear example is the 2006 Belarusian crisis, which according to Nichol, 
Woehrel and Bernard (2006) and Yhiah (2008) quickly reached an end due to a intense 
reaction of European customers. 
The results described above are also supported by the stock market model, with 
some differences. In fact, in this model the direction of the relationship is at times con-
fused: for some variables measuring the impact of the crises, I find some positive signs, 
indicating that the disputes brought a growth in the stock markets. Similarly, for some 
variables measuring the impact of the reaction functions, I find a negative sign, indicat-
ing that the stock markets somehow reacted to these statements or creation of new inst i-
tutions in a negative manner. Looking at the model selected as the best, the 2007 Bela-
rusian dispute, and the 2009 Ukraine dispute are found to have had a strong and nega-
tive effect on the stock market indices. 
As mentioned above, this second model also reveals that some important politi-
cal acts like official statements from the EU can significantly affect important economic 
measures like the stock market. These statements, made by important institutions, have 
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indeed affected the transactions made in the stock markets of the EU countries studied 
here, countering the negative effect of these crises.  
More specifically, the stock market model shows that a significant trend oc-
curred in all the cases except for the statement made by the European Commission Pres-
ident Barroso on February 9, 2006 regarding the need for more cooperation among EU 
to reduce dependence on Russian energy and that alternative sources of energy were 
needed. I hypothesized that the directions of these relationships was positive, but as can 
be seen in Table 4.3, only half of the reaction functions (two out of four) that are found 
to be significant in the direction hypothesized. Similar conclusions are drawn for the ef-
fect of the disputes on the markets. This is probably the result of not using control va-
riables and the fact that much weaker evidence of an effect of the disputes and the reac-
tions characterized the Moldovan case and the 2006 Ukrainian cases. 
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Table 4.3 
Regression results of the stock market model 
 Independent Variables Estimated parameter p-value 
Belarus 2004 (3 days) .0032154 .065 
Moldova 2006 (40 days) .0024231 0.001 
Belarus 2006 (6 days) .0017289 0.304 
Belarus 2007 (6 days) -.0171193 <0.001 
Ukraine 2006 (9 days) .0032749 0.004 
Ukraine 2009 (66 days) -.0062195 0.004 
Reaction functions   
Belarus 2004 (5 days)171 -.0067432 <0.001 
Moldova 2006 (8 days) -.0031388 0.003 
Belarus 2006 NA172 NA173 
Belarus 2007 (8 days) .0140548 <0.001 
Ukraine 2006 (1 days) -.0027755 0.358 
Ukraine 2009 (3 days) .0180918 0.004 
A summary of hypothesis testing is provided in Table 4.4, which follows the hy-
potheses at the end of chapter 2. Hypotheses that support my claim that disputes and 
reactions had an effect on GDP and stock markets are highlighted in bold characters. 
                                               
171 Several other duration models for the 2004 Belarusian dispute were studied, with similar conclusions. 
172 In this case, since Gazprom threatened to increase price only, without doing much else, no intervention 
of external actor was recorded (see above). 
173 See previous footnote. 
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Table 4.4 
Hypotheses summary 
Hypothesis Testing result 
H1a: significant and negative relationship between the GDP growth and the start of the 
2006 Ukraine dispute 
Negative; significant at 94.3% confidence level 
H1b: significant and negative relationship between the GDP growth and the start of the 
2009 dispute  
Negative; significant at 94.3% confidence level 
H2a: significant and positive relationship between stock market trend and the start of the dis-
pute between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 
Not significant 
H2b: significant and positive relationship between stock market trend and the start of the 
dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2009 
Significant and positive 
H3a: significant and positive relationship between stock market trend and the reaction function 
in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 
Not significant 
H3b: significant and positive relationship between stock market trend and the reaction 
function (Russia and Ukraine in 2009) 
Significant and positive 
H4a: significant and negative relationship between the GDP growth and the start of the 
2004 Belarusian dispute. 
Significant and negative 
H4b: significant and negative relationship between the GDP growth and the start of the 
2006 Belarusian dispute 
Significant and negative 
H4c: significant and negative relationship between the GDP growth and the start of the 2007 
Belarusian dispute  
Not significant 
H5a: significant and negative relationship between the stock market trend and the reaction func-
tion (Russia and Belarus in 2004) 
Not significant 
H5b: significant and negative relationship between the stock market trend and the start of the 
dispute between Russia and Belarus in 2006 
Not significant 
H5c: significant and negative relationship between the stock market trend and the start of 
the dispute (Russia and Belarus in 2007) 
Negative and significant 
H6a: significant and positive relationship between the stock market trend and the reaction 
function (Russia and Belarus in 2004) 
Negative and significant 
H6b: significant and positive relationship between the stock market trend and the reaction func-
tion (Russia and Belarus in 2006) 
Not significant 
H6c: significant and positive relationship between the stock market trend and the reaction 
function (Russia and Belarus in 2007) 
Positive and significant 
H7: significant and negative relationship between the GDP growth and the start of the 2006 
Moldovan dispute  
Not significant 
H8: significant and negative relationship between stock market trend and the start of the 
2006 Moldovan dispute  
Positive and significant 
H9: significant and positive relationship between the stock market trend and the reaction 
function in the dispute between Russia and Moldova in 2006 
Negative and significant 
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5 Theoretical Issues and Game Theoretic Approaches 
 
The results presented above emphasize that the environment in which the two 
actors were bargaining has changed since the collapse of the negotiations and the begin-
ning of the dispute. Whether the direction of the relationships found are in the direc-
tionn hypothesized or not, is of little importance. In fact, the models point out that an 
important political bargaining model like game theory should account for an evolving 
environment in order to offer a more realistic representation of the facts. The sections 
that follow offer the reader an understanding of whether, and if so, to what degree, cur-
rent game theory can model a dynamic environment. 
5.1 Alternative game theoretical models for a changing environment 
 
Expected utility models have evolved in recent years to the point where several 
modifications to basic games have been made and new formalizations have been de-
vised so as to make the new models more robust (Schoemaker 1982) or to adjust game 
theory to a new set of assumptions on the environment of play, in which the concept of 
utility maximization has been revised and replaced by different driving forces of 
change, as in evolutionary game theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Young 1998; Di-
xit, Skeath, Reiley 2009; Frey 2010). Also, in which utility the type of probability trans-
formations or the measure of the outcomes are calculated or measured in a different way 
(Schoemaker 1982). Other recent games have been devised so as to take into account 
communication among the players in order to monitor its effect on the final outcome of 
the interaction between the players (Cho and Kreps 1987). 
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It is important to note, however, that evolutionary game theory is able to take in-
to account the preferences of actors that were not previously accounted for in earlier 
games. Danielson (1998) describes evolutionary game theory as the result of game 
theorists‟ two main concerns: the large amount of possible equilibriums that one can 
reach, especially with repeated games, among which only one has to be selected, and 
the reliability of the unbounded rationality assumption. Evolutionary game theory as-
sumes that players do not behave in a strictly rational way; they rather follow „rules of 
thumb‟ (Danielson 1998, 110) which players update given their past performance in 
previous games and in the population. In evolutionary games, first-generation popula-
tions with i players can select a set of relevant, possible strategies Li. For every player i 
(with his strategy set i  in Li), there are also (i-1) animals, which are assumed to im-
mediately play their game according to their strategy set i . From this population, other 
generations can be created where every i-animal plays the part of player i along with a j-
animal (where j indicates the size of the population of the second generation) that is as-
sumed to react to the new player‟s strategies. Every j animal can in turn become a play-
er, creating a third-generation population, so on and so forth. Moreover, every animal in 
generation k will be able to replicate itself in generation k+1 according to his expected 
payoff. The contribution of evolutionary game theory is that of reconstructing the evolu-
tion of the former generation and understanding which strategies are able to dominate 
the system in the future, which is generation after generation (Myerson 1991, 117-118; 
Dixit, Skeath, Reiley 2009). 
For randomly matched populations, the equilibrium of a finitely repeated game 
converges to a situation where defection prevails (Binmore and Samuelson 1992). 
However, Myerson notes that, despite these results, cooperation can survive for long pe-
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riods. Different results are achieved when players participate in infinitely repeated 
games; in fact, the learning patterns that characterize these games lead to a cooperative 
equilibrium (Nachbar 1992).  
Although evolutionary games can be very useful in studying the preferences of 
actors that were not previously accounted for in the original game and their evolution, 
they are unable to model a changing environment in that it focuses on preferences of ac-
tors that do not belong to the current game anymore, but which may have survived the 
test of time thanks to successful strategies. The focus is on strategies and their degree of 
successfulness in the system; nothing is here done to model the gradual importance of 
the preferences of actors that were initially disinterested in the evolution of the dispute, 
but which were then struck by the negative externalities of the disputes. 
Putnam (1988) discusses the relationship between domestic and international 
politics using the 1978 Bonn summit conference as a case study. Putnam maintains that, 
although a collection of solutions to the first oil shock was accepted by all states that 
were present at the meeting, these states would have not accepted this common resolve 
were international pressures absent. Moreover, according to Putnam, it is due to a small 
domestic group that the agreement was able to be reached at the international level. In 
the German case, it was due to officials in the Chancellor‟s Office and the Economics 
Ministry, the Social Democratic party and trade unions. In the Japanese case, it was due 
to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Economic Planning Agency and some addi-
tional political actors. In the American case, it was a group of key economic officials 
that supported the package that all accepted and agreed upon.  
Putnam views the politics of many international negotiations as a two-level 
game: governments try to please pressuring domestic groups and individuals strive to 
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minimize possible negative repercussions at the international level. It is important to 
understand that which can please domestic groups can actually harm international nego-
tiations and vice versa. Putnam identifies a precise process in which the bargaining first 
takes place; once a decision is made at this level (Level 1), an agreement (ratification) is 
reached at the domestic level (Level 2).  
Putnam‟s two level-games should aid the reader in comprehending the nature of 
the subject being investigated in this work. He claims that if one wants to understand 
how bargaining crises end one needs to account for the growing pressure deriving from 
external actors. Putnam‟s arguments could seemingly be adapted by replacing the do-
mestic arena with the local confrontation between Russia and one of its neighboring 
countries. The international arena can be placed within a broader context, which in-
cludes European countries that have an interest in an early resolution of the crisis. How-
ever, these games fail to take into account the growing diplomatic pressures, assuming, 
as Putnam does, a static set of preferences that characterize the international arena. The 
core of these arguments is that even if one considers the Russia-Ukraine or Russia-
Belarus dispute a two-level game, where one does account for the influence of other ac-
tors, this is done in a non-dynamic way
174
. In fact, these actors have little to no interest 
in preventing the two countries from escalating their disagreements, for example, to the 
levels seen in 2009. However, as soon as these crises start damaging the other actors‟ 
economies, then these actors have a concrete and valid reason to exert pressure on the 
other two so that they can reach an agreement in the shortest time possible. The longer 
the crisis lasts and the greater their effect on the broader environment, the greater the 
diplomatic pressures stemming from this environment.  
                                               
174 Dynamicity refers here to the evolution of the context and not to the repetition of a game. 
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One may argue that all that is needed is to employ a two-level game that 
represents the bargaining situation which leads to the end of the dispute. In this situa-
tion, not only the preferences of the two „domestic‟ actors matter but also where other 
countries belonging to the proximate environment play a role. On the one hand, this re-
presentation would symbolize a significant step towards understanding the end of the 
dispute. However, I argue that this static representation does not fully portray the impor-
tance of the cumulated pressures that the international political sphere exerted on the 
disputing countries. The last interaction of the international players with Russia and 
Ukraine/Belarus surely adds to general understanding. However, the sequence of the 
comments, meetings, diplomatic actions made since the start of the dispute can offer a 
more complete picture than just studying the last moments of the crisis. For this reason, 
one argues that a more dynamic analysis of the active role of the international arena 
needs to be added to the current literature of political bargaining.  
Similar comments can be made with regards to nested games (Tsebelis 1990; 
Scholz 1991). In fact, even by increasing the number of games the disputing actors are 
simultaneously playing does not change the situation. One is not properly studying the 
accumulated effect of the diplomatic pressures exerted over time on the two main play-
ers by the surrounding environment. 
Infinitely repeated games (Myerson 1994; Shubik 1991) and multi-agent games 
(Littman, Kearns, Singh 2001) offer interesting insights in terms of revealing the out-
come of the interaction of players. However, the learning process which seems to be 
guiding players to an equilibrium characterized by cooperation, suffers from the same 
weakness described above. The players of political crises I discuss in this work are per-
taining to participants who play little or no role at the beginning of the crisis, but be-
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come relevant players as time passes and as they perceive that the crisis needs to end in 
order to avoid further negative consequences. Infinitely repeated games with two or 
more players study the interaction of those whose preferences are known and/or whose 
actions teach the other players what the optimal strategy is. But they cannot properly 
model a situation in which new actors gradually join the game and the game structure 
evolves in response. 
Supergames consist of a series of 2x2 matrixes. Each payoff contains not only 
the value relative to that choice, but it may contain also statements that lead to the con-
tinuation of the game by replaying it, or that lead to another game included in the super-
game. Thus, supergames are like classical games, which, however, may force the player 
to take into the fact that under some circumstances, the game may not end there, and 
some features of the game can change as a consequence (Snyder and Diesing 1977, 61-
63).  
Metagames focus on strategies rather than options or moves as in other models. 
It assumes sequential play, that is one player chooses a strategy after the first player has 
chosen his own. The combination of sequential moves and strategies as unit of analysis 
produces an important fact, that the second player usually has more strategic options 
than the first one. In fact, being the second player entails a larger set of strategies, which 
are conditional on what the first player has chosen. Conditional strategies are in fact not 
available to the first player, who cannot have any information about the strategic choic-
es of the other player (63-64). Although supergames and metagames come close to de-
scribing evolving behaviors, they fail to achieve the level of complexity that I argue is 
necessary to account for the preferences of additional actors and, more importantly, the 
gradual relevance of these actors in shaping the game being played. In fact, supergames, 
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as described in Snyder and Diesing (1977), are games that are used to model the cumu-
lative effects of the interaction among a fixed number of players. 
Fuzzy game theory has been recently developed in order to better cope with the 
uncertainty of objectives, constraints, moves and outcomes (Aristidou and Sarangi 
2006, 645; Kandel and Zhang 1998). This theory assumes that in reality it is often not 
possible to attribute, with precision, the degree of membership to a set. In other words, 
the “fuzziness” of membership introduced in this revised form of game theory is no 
longer expressed as a binary value, 1 or 0, but it can take any value between these two 
numbers. The value of fuzzy game theory is that of being able to exploit to its full ex-
tent even minor information about the possible payoffs, strategies and objectives. In 
fact, in real world situations one cannot always be completely sure that the objective of 
another player is the one imagined. However, being able to account for example, a 95% 
chance that a player wants to achieve what was estimated by another player in terms of 
goals or moves, removes the inability of classic game theory of dealing with dual (or 
multiple) membership. This provides the main game theoretic constructs with additional 
information which can help refine our understanding of real world phenomena. In fact, 
with fuzzy game theory, one can study more complex and less abstract interactions 
among players, who, like their actual counterparts, do not or cannot know exactly the 
strategies, goals and objectives of the game being played. Fuzzy game theory certainly 
represents a possible construct that a game theorist may use to deal with external actors 
that gradually intervene in a political crisis. The current state of the literature, however, 
demonstrates that the number of players is precisely defined and the fuzziness pertains 
to other aspects of the games like the structure of the payoffs, strategies, objectives, 
moves, but not the increasing importance of one or more players in a game. 
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In conclusion, similar remarks can be made for neutrosophic game theory (Bhat-
tacharya, Smarandache, Khoshnevisan 2006), a generalization of fuzzy game theory 
which has been applied by the authors of the paper to the study of the conflict between 
Israel and Palestine. Neutrosophic (Bhattacharya, Smarandache, Khoshnevisan 2006, 
59)
175
 game theory adds to fuzzy game theory the consideration of the fact that the play-
ers of the game do not exactly know what the other player‟s goal is. This is so, given the 
two parties‟ lack of understanding what a „just‟ agreement means. Moreover, the theory 
also argues that not all sets of possible agreements result in favorability of one side or 
the other one in that there are some sets in the evaluative judgment space of both actors 
that appear to be favorable to neither actors. This is the case especially if the outcome is 
heavily affected by the preferences of a mediator actor. This particular branch of game 
theory progresses closer to considering the preferences of external actors; however, si-
milarly to fuzzy games, it fails to account for a changing environment and its evolving 
preferences. 
 
5.2 A critique of bargaining theory: a dynamic, evolving context 
 
Despite the large number of games that are possible to use
176
, the games de-
scribed above fail to adequately take into account the dynamic role of the external envi-
                                               
175 Neutrosophy studies the role of neutrality as a middle ground between different ideologies. 
176 It is worth at this point briefly describing a slightly different bargaining model, Stahl‟s (1972) and Ru-
binstein‟s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining game. In this game, there can be an infinite number of of-
fers that can be made by the parties involved, but there is a cost in time in keeping the bargaining going. 
For both players, then, there is an interest in concluding the bargaining process as soon as possible, in that 
the more time it takes for them to reach an agreement, the more the price to be divided will shrink. The 
  
175 Theoretical Issues and Game Theoretic ApproachesTheoretical Issues and Game Theoretic 
Approaches 
ronment in the success or the failure in which two or more parties reunite to reach an 
agreement. No importance is given to the changing nature of the environment, although 
more modern games can deal with relevant issues affecting the performance of the basic 
strategic game: among these are the fact that in reality bargainers apply the principle of 
“equal gains”177 or that of “greatest good”178, the option of transferring utility (or simply 
destroying it) or the use of threats (Myerson 1991, 384), incomplete information
179
, or 
multi-player games (417). 
In Shubik (1964) there is recognition of this problem, and the authors of the ar-
ticle maintain that “we repeat most emphatically that our theory is thoroughly static. A 
dynamic theory would unquestionably be more complete and therefore more preferable. 
But there is ample evidence from other branches of science that it is futile to try to build 
one as long as the static side is not thoroughly understood” (p.93). At the time, however, 
Smith‟s The Logic of Animal Conflict (1973) and especially Axelrod‟s The Evolution of 
Cooperation (1984), the first works discussing evolutionary game theory still had to be 
published and attract the attention of the academic community. 
Evolutionary games do account for an evolving environment but their goals are 
different from those that are being discussed here. In fact, in order to have a better un-
derstanding of why gas disputes were settled in a specific way, one is not interested in 
                                                                                                                                          
authors conclude that in these kinds of games, the outcome of the bargaining process converges to the 
Nash equilibrium with a discount factor close to 1 (Myerson 1991, 394). 
177 The principle of “equal gains” claims that bargainers make interpersonal comparisons of utility, that is 
they compare their utility in the bargaining process with the other players. If other players are seen as to 
be receiving more, then the former player is entitled to ask an higher pay-off in order to equal the gains of 
the two (or more) sides (Myerson 1991, 381). 
178 The principle of “greatest good” maintains that a player is entitled to ask for additional benefits be-
cause doing so will allow him to gain more than what the other player would lose (see above). 
179 See Chapter 8 and 10. 
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knowing what past strategies were employed by the current actors; one is rather inter-
ested in studying why a dyadic context (Russia and Ukraine or Russia and Belarus) is 
useful for studying the start of the dispute. This situation evolved into a multi-party sys-
tem where also the preferences of other actors played an important role. The formula-
tion of evolutionary game needs to be deeply revised in order to better explain the de-
veloping importance of the preferences of external actors that belong to the same „gen-
eration‟. This in turn, determines which player is going to continue in the game. At that 
point, the insights offered by infinitely repeated games can be applied in order to ex-
plain why Russia, Ukraine or Belarus settled a gas dispute in a specific manner. At the 
moment, however, game theory does not explicitly account for this issue. 
Snyder and Diesing (1977) offer the reader a detailed review of several formal 
models used in the literature to model international crises in the international theory. 
Despite all the differences, advantage and disadvantages of the models they present, the 
authors point out that all these models share a conception of both the international sys-
tem and the domestic system as “relatively static factors that constrain and shape the 
dynamic processes of interstate bargaining and internal decision making” (31). Snyder 
and Diesing define the international system as the external parameter and as “the num-
ber of major actors in the system and the distribution of power between them” (28) and 
maintain that they affect decision-making in a crisis by modifying the alignment options 
available to the disputing countries, and by introducing relevant interest conflicts (29). 
Domestic factors like public opinion, bureaucracy, political party ideology and the per-
sonalities of the major decision-makers have a clear effect on the final outcome of cris-
es, but they do not play a dynamic role in the crisis-resolution process, offering rather 
the context within which the crisis is dealt with, modifying perceptions and value of the 
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actors involved in the process. According to Snyder and Diesing, the number of actors 
play a comparable role to that of domestic factors, given their effect on the outcome of 
the bargaining process; however, they do not affect the preferences and strategies of the 
actors, but they exert their influence on the domestic factors, which in turn shapes the 
outcome of the decision-making process (31).  
To the authors, however, the elements that count the most are domestic elements 
like bureaucratic roles, strategic preferences of the major actors, power-distribution 
within the decision-unit and domestic perceptions of another state‟s internal situation. 
Adding additional variables is to the authors simply a source of unwanted and unneces-
sary complexity (32). Allison (1971) briefly talks about the effects of the changed envi-
ronment on the equilibrium between the two superpowers. According to Allison, the 
Soviets placed missiles in Cuba because they wanted to attract the American attention 
away from the European continent, leaving the Soviets free to make a move against 
Germany (45-46). Offering a chance to the US to attack a small and almost defenseless 
country like Cuba would have in fact caused internal instability in the US first, but, 
more importantly, it would have changed the world balance of power with several Latin 
American countries favorable to the Soviets, rather than the aggressive U.S. Moreover, 
an American attack on Cuba would have created opposition also within NATO itself, 
possibly crippling it, and it would have shown other world countries that the U.S. was a 
real threat to the Communist world. Allison dismisses the hypothesis that the Soviet 
deployed missiles in Cuba despite clear American warnings not to do so just to divert 
American attention away from the true target, Germany, because it is hard to believe 
that the Soviets really intended it. In fact, it would have been easier to provide Cuba 
with fewer missiles and let the world know that Cuba and the Soviet Union would have 
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not retaliated. Such a situation would have more easily prompted an American attack on 
the missiles, triggering political instability domestically and overseas, and shifting the 
balance of power more in favor of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, the fact that the Soviet 
Union withdrew the missiles before an American attack supports his belief that this hy-
pothesis should be disregarded when explaining the Cuban missile crisis.  
The point of discussing one of the hypotheses Allison offers the reader is not to 
discuss its validity; it is to showcase that, once again, a rational interpretation of an in-
ternational crisis like the Cold War could have gained in explanatory power by taking 
into account the effects of a changed environment on the resolution of the crisis. In fact, 
the internal and external situation of the U.S. would have been different in the period 
pre-attack on the missiles and in the following period, where the latter would have been 
characterized by more stringent domestic and international constraints on the options 
that the U.S. had. If an attack did really happen, then in order to have a better under-
standing of how the Cold War ended, one would have to take into account the degenera-
tion of the American situation and possibly attribute to it a suddenly reached agreement 
with the Soviets. 
Assuming that the Soviets did want the U.S. to attack, the international system 
structure and therefore also the domestic internal situation would have changed the po-
litical environment between the Soviet Union and the U.S. in the following years, pos-
sibly leading to a different outcome of the political bargaining. More pressure from the 
domestic setting, and more anti-Americanism from Latin America could have lead the 
U.S. to quickly reach an agreement with the Soviet Union that granted it, for example, 
full influence on some key world areas. In other words, the changed environment could 
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have, as Allison also implies, heavily affected the political bargaining environment to-
wards a more successful outcome for the Soviet Union. 
Reilly and Sigall (1976, 3) are aware of this issue and claim that “every person is 
affected by the politics of the society in which he lives” and that goes beyond what 
game theorists do, which is considering the environment as a constraint on choices and 
perception of the outcome of the bargain. Such a problem is also reported by Reilly and 
Sigall (1976, 13) and Gintis (2010) who claim that economic theory, based on the ra-
tional actor assumption, is inherently flawed because social context and norms are 
usually ignored or assumed to be constant in the game theoretic models developed. It 
has been demonstrated above that prospect theory is a reaction to some of the weak-
nesses of the utility-maximizing assumption. But other issues remain open which also 
may be due to the over-reliance of current economists on outdated literature (Gintis 
2010).  
According to Gintis, social norms have been a discussion topic for some game 
theorists, who concluded that social norms represent Nash equilibriums of social games 
(Lewis 1969; Bicchieri 2006). However, standard game theory lacks acknowledgement 
of social norms that are not just within a static context in which the interactions occur, 
but play an active role in defining the players‟ motivations (Gintis 2010, 35). In many 
cases, it is logical to assume that the social norms that promote coordination are a con-
stant in a specific case. 
However, as the empirical results have shown, gas disputes take place in dynam-
ic environments, characterized by large externalities which can affect the diplomatic re-
lationships among the players belonging to same environment. In such an environment, 
a researcher that ignores the effects of a dynamic environment in his model risks un-
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dermining the validity of the game-theory used to explain or to predict the outcome of 
the bargaining process. Gintis (2010) maintains that the preferences of the players do 
not exclusively stem from personal features of the players, as for the rational actor, but 
are rather the result of the players and their preferences within the environment of refer-
ence. However, scholars have been unable to take into account the influence of the ex-
ternal situation because of the complexity and the lack of literature suggesting the ele-
ments that affect the preferences and in what way. The effect of reputation in game 
theory has been studied by some academics (Kreps and Wilson 1982; Nisan, Rouhgar-
den, Tardos, Vazirani 2007), but they do not provide an adequate framework with 
which one can better understand the true preferences and values that guide agreements 




In fact, there are a lot of exceptions and irregularities that need to be explained 
which even the models accounting for reputation fail to fully describe. According to 
Gintis, the typical explanation that the literature provides for unexplained variance is 
that the players have a cognitive deficit or that there are still unclear values and factors 
that are difficult to investigate (Gintis 2010, 36). Examples of these principles and val-
                                               
180 Nye‟s (1990) „soft power‟ is useful in order to explain why states do perceive and consider the pres-
sures that result from damage to other states‟ economies. To Nye (1990), soft power is the ability to influ-
ence the world to help oneself without using force (or hard power) to influence the other party to act. 
Since now the world is shifting to multi-dimensional problems, a crisis between two states is very likely 
to affect others as well. In order for states to solve problems, it is now becoming more and more improper 
to employ military force but rather problems tend to be solved by cooperating with other states by con-
vincing them that their interests are similar (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). In today‟s political arena, soft 
power is a very important tool that allows a state to improve its relative position among its peers: thus, a 
state should try to maximize this tool in any occasion. Ignoring the pressures deriving from other states 
may seriously damage the soft power of the state that has been considered responsible for the com-
mencement of the crisis and increased gas and oil prices. 
  
181 Theoretical Issues and Game Theoretic ApproachesTheoretical Issues and Game Theoretic 
Approaches 
ues are found in the fact that many people are willing to sacrifice personal gain for the 
goal of approval in his/her community. The authors believes that game players shape 
their preferences and make decisions that are socially acceptable even if they are direct-
ly concerned with reputational issues. In other words, Gintis maintains that the literature 
covering the importance of building reputation for present and future situations, fails to 
realize that reputation is just one of the values that individuals account for when playing 
their games. Selfishness or reputation is too simple an approximation of the actual way 
players settle disputes. This is due to the belief that a certain course of action is more 
morally or socially acceptable and may override egoistic preferences. In order to illu-
strate his point, Gintis claims that there are occasions in which the actors move away 
from purely egoistic purposes; such as facing higher costs for the sake of punishing 
cheaters or free-riders, or that the awareness of positive values in the counterpart 
represent factors that are able to modify the parties‟ agreement (2010, 36). 
The problem of the influence of a dynamic context was already known to Smith 
(1982), who maintained that “an obvious weakness of the game-theoretic approach to 
evolution is that it places great emphasis on equilibrium states, whereas evolution is a 
process of continuous, or at least periodic, change” (8). Gas disputes, like evolution, 
must be understood within a dynamic context which is clear through the introduction of 
the actions of European leaders leading to the resolution of the 2009 gas dispute
181
. 
Smith attributes the existence of this weakness to the increased (mathematical) com-
plexity that dealing with continuous change entails. The literature on sequential decision 
making (Lindblom, 1959; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1962; Brecher, 1972; Steinbruner, 
1974; Anderson 1983; Axelrod, 1984; Sylvan and Ross 1998; Beasley et al. 2001) cor-
                                               
181 See below. 
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responds with this claim and demonstrates that a static process that underpins the deci-
sion-making process (goals identification, alternatives search, payoff estimation for 
each alternative, alternatives evaluation and alternatives selections given the goal), as 
found in the literature, does not correctly represent reality. Anderson (1983) finds that in 
the case of the Cuban missile crisis, the Executive Committee, even though it vaguely 
knew that its goal was to remove the missiles from Cuba, discovered the true nature of 
its goals while dealing with the crisis itself. For example, while debating the best course 
of action the US should commit to, Robert Kennedy realized that a surprise airstrike 
represented a betrayal of the values on which the US image was based upon. In fact, re-
sorting to an attack that resembled the one suffered by the US on December 7, 1941, 
would have placed the US on the same moral level of the Japanese who killed thousands 
of soldiers unprepared to even defend themselves. Therefore, preservation of US mo-
rality and traditions were at this point integrated in the US strategic plan, de facto mak-
ing the airstrike an unfeasible option (212). 
A similar observation can be made for the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. If the goals 
at the onset of the crisis were merely those of imposing or resisting the other player‟s 
will, with the recognized development of the crisis, as Robert Kennedy did, other fac-
tors, namely the growing pressures coming from external actors, needed to be taken into 
account in order to successfully resolve the crisis. In both situations, the changed envi-
ronment introduced an additional element of complexity. In the case of the Cuban mis-
sile crisis there was also the realization that the morality of the nation had to coincide 
with its security while in crises like the gas disputes there is a gradual emergence of 
other relevant actors in the game. 
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The lack of game theoretic models in literature that takes into account the envi-
ronment and its potential effect on the preferences of the actors is even more surprising 
if one considers Porter‟s (1985) popular Five Forces model. According to Porter, the 
success of a company in a competitive environment depends on five factors: the compe-
tition within the market the company is operating in, the bargaining power of suppliers 
(which can extract higher prices for the raw materials they provide), the bargaining 
power of the buyer (which determines how high the price of the sold goods is), the 
threat of substitute product or services, and the threat of new entrants (see below). 
Figure 5.1 
Porter’s Five Forces model. 
 
Source: Porter (1985) 
Such a model is able to capture in a more refined way the complexity that is be-
hind the competition among companies that produce the same product and therefore 
who compete in the same market. It can also be used to compare the performance of dif-
ferent actors across time. In fact, by defining the intensity of the five forces for every 
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moment, one can possess information on how the competitive situation evolves over 
time. Therefore, one can possibly determine a conclusion about the effect of the imple-
mentation of a new policy (change of price, or diversification of product). For example, 
if a company decided to lower its price, with the intention of selling more and consoli-
dating its position in the market, if everything stays the same, the company can reason-
ably attribute a shift in the competition in the market to the change of price. However, 
real world competition takes place in a changing environment and that is the main con-
tribution of Porter‟s model. This is so because position in the market depends also on 
how disastrous may be the entrance of new competitors in the market, how many people 
think that the product can be replaced with a similar one, or how strong suppliers or cus-
tomers are. 
One finds it interesting that even though the business strategy literature does in-
deed deal with the environment as a source of change, the game theory literature lacks 
any direct consideration of it. Such an issue may be the result of the belief that there is 
not a well-established knowledge of the influence of specific external factors since 
game theory can be applied to wide range of situation and crises whose main determi-
nants may or may not be known. Lacking a precise context in which game theory is to 
be applied, game theorists have not specified which variables must be taken into ac-
count, for context varies often, so that it would not make sense to prescribe the study of 
some specific environmental variables. However, probably as a result of this issue, 
game theory has remained incapable of dealing  with a changing environment. A result 
of this is the overly large attribution of the outcome of the bargaining process to the pre-
ferences of the individuals, unaffected by external factors like social norms (Gintis 
2010), or the broader context. 
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Porter‟s model above can be modified to better describe the game theoretic situa-
tion that is being studied here and that is the simplified version of a gas price dispute be-
tween Russia and Ukraine (see below). 
Figure 5.2 
A modified Porter’s Five Forces model. 
 
Personal adaptation of Porter’s model 
In the revised version of Porter‟s model, the concept of „existing competition‟ is 
replaced with the conflict of interest that arises between Russia and Ukraine. In this 
conflict Russia aims at obtaining a higher gas price and control of pipeline system 
transporting gas to Europe and Ukraine, striving to keep the gas price as low as possible 
and to keep control over the pipeline system as a bargaining instrument and as a source 
of income. Given the new situation, one is still discussing the bargaining power of the 
supplier, which in this case is solely Russia, which is enhanced by strategies like threat-
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ening Ukraine with preventing the gas from being supplied. In the new model the threat 
of new entrants is a contamination of the market by new players that upsets the price 
and power relations in the market. They may be represented by systems like Nabucco 
which is an alternative pipeline system that reduces the dependency of Europe on Rus-
sian, and Ukrainian, gas. The existence of alternative paths for Central Asian gas to 
reach Europe modifies the original preferences of both actors in different ways. Russia 
will lose markets to which it can sell its own gas while Ukraine will lose, at least tempo-
rarily, the revenues stemming from the transport of Russian gas. If new pipelines are 
constructed, or even if the threat of doing so is communicated by European countries, 
the preferences of the two players must change towards reaching an agreement sooner. 
In other words, the entrance of non Russian-Ukrainian gas increases the costs of contin-
uing the dispute. An agreement must be reached to avoid Europe diversifying its energy 
supply. 
„Substitutes‟ have been replaced in the new model by the European shift, or 
threat of shifts, to other energy sources like wind energy, geothermal energy, hydroelec-
tricity and so on. If during the dispute Europe sends credible signals that its reliance on 
Russian energy is to decline because other energy sources become more reliable and 
cheaper, then the two player‟s preferences are subject to modification. In fact, as seen 
above, both Ukraine and Russia, the players of the simplified game, are now placed in a 
situation where their preferences must consider that a prolonged dispute would deteri-
orate their economic relationship with the European market. In addition, a minor depen-
dence on Russian energy would result in lost opportunities for Russia to use its econom-
ic power to push its political agenda (Lucas 2008). In other words, now the dispute the 
parties have to consider is the fact that if the dispute lasts too long, the European coun-
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tries will be substantially more likely to suffer from the discontinuous flow of gas. 
Moreover, they will prefer to invest more resources into developing alternative energy 
sources that would render them less vulnerable to the disputes deriving from the Russia 
producers and the ex-Soviet republics. It is not in the Russian or their transporting part-
ners‟ interests to help diversification occur in that it would make the large investments 
in pipelines less profitable since less gas would be demanded and transported to Europe. 
It would slowly reduce the total demand in the main market for Russian gas. Both Rus-
sia and Ukraine do not want this to become a realization. Their preferences are now sub-
ject to an additional pressure that is similar to whether Europe decided to access Central 
Asian gas, or other areas, without using the Russian/Ukrainian infrastructure. 
Once again, the Russian strategic advantage deriving from using or threatening 
to keep the gas supply closed, is a powerful strategic tool to force Ukraine to comply 
with its requests. This tool is of growing power because Ukraine cannot divert the gas 
for an extended period of time to Europe because of its own survival. The resolution of 
the dispute would be at that point not only a matter of survival, since having the gas 
flowing to Europe represents an important source of income, but also a matter of na-
tional security for Ukraine. This is so because given the lack of efficiency of the pipe-
line system, it is likely that the gas internally produced would not suffice to heat houses 
and permit citizens to continue their normal life. Even though this element represents a 
strategy, it deserves to be included in the model because it conceptually replaces the 
„bargaining power of the supplier‟. The supplier in the new model is the same actor that 
is involved in the dispute. Even though this item should be considered as a detail of the 
main class „clash of preferences of the disputing countries‟, it was included in the model 
as a separate class in order for its separate connotation and relevance in determining the 
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outcome of the bargaining process, and also to stress the increasing relevance that is 
possessed by Russia. 
The diplomatic pressure stemming from the entire European Community has be-
come the key element in the new model. Russia, in fact, supplies a very consistent por-
tion of the entire demand of gas, and sudden cuts in the supply impose damages on the 
European economies and populations that rely on it for survival and production of 
goods. Concerns for a long crisis are likely to attract the attention of the European lead-
ers, at least those that are directly affected by the crisis. Their involvement in the resolu-
tion of the dispute will be motivated by their desire to re-establish a continuous flow of 
gas to their countries in order to provide energy to the civilian and industrial infrastruc-
ture. Also their involvement is motivated by concerns over the potential shock that the 
crisis has caused in the gas market and in general, in the world economy. As other ma-
jor crises have shown, wars and conflicts that have occurred in energy producer regions 
have been followed by an increase of the price of the main energy sources (see Figure 
5.3). 
Figure 5.3 




189 Theoretical Issues and Game Theoretic ApproachesTheoretical Issues and Game Theoretic 
Approaches 
In correspondence to both the invasion of Kuwait and Iraq, respectively in Au-
gust 1990 and March 2003, one notes an increase in the oil price. This was much more 
accentuated because of the large destruction that occurred to the Kuwaiti oil industry 
and the consumers‟ preoccupation relative to Saddam‟s rise to a hegemonic power in 
the Middle East. The high oil prices that characterized the end of 2008 have been shown 
in the academic literature to have harsh consequences on the economies of those coun-
tries that heavily depend on foreign energy (Hamilton 1983, Mork. 1989, Leduc and Sill 
2004). However delayed the effects of high oil prices may be on the economy, or how 
much of it can be attributed to a restrictive monetary policy (Leduc and Sill 2004), it is 
crucial that states are fully aware of the damaging effect of the oil prices on the econo-
mies of those countries that rely on foreign production for their own economic and po-
litical survival. As shown above, Europe heavily depends on foreign oil, as also in the 
Russia Ukraine crisis, and they will not permit threats from these countries regarding 
their security during the disputes.  
Thus, the emergence of a price disagreement directly affects the preferences of 
the disputing countries in that a timely resolution is in Europe‟s interest because that 
will entail a steadier energy supply and more confidence in the supply of gas from the 
Russian territories. One cannot assume that the outcome of the dispute solely depends 
on the preferences of the actors because the other countries and the international com-
munity will react to the resolution and will enact diplomatic pressures so that a conclu-
sion is quickly found. In other words, the understanding of how the dispute was settled 
must be placed in a dynamic context initially characterized by a low degree of diplomat-
ic pressure which then grows as the disputes struggles to be resolved. 
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It is important to note that the revision of Porter‟s model, popular among busi-
ness strategists, reveals that a thorough comprehension of bargaining crises cannot be 
fully understood just by considering the preferences of the actors involved. In fact, their 
preferences, that game theory generally assumes to be static (Rumelt, Schendel Teece 
1994), may be susceptible to pressures from the environment which are changing due to 
the rise of the dispute itself. In other words, if one looks at the broader context, thus in-
cluding the changing influence of the surrounding environment, one can go beyond the 
static situation that game theory adopts to describe bargaining among the disputing 
countries and analyze it from a more dynamical standpoint. 
Rumelt, Schendel, Teece (1994, 451) recognize that the literature covering the 
competitive advantage of companies suffers from the same problem which is placing the 
understanding of why some companies finds themselves in a broader and more dynamic 
context. In response, they offer a model that places the competition of the firm in what 
they call its proximate environment (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1994, 451). Accord-
ing to the authors, the competitive advantage of a firm stems from the local environment 
in which the firm is operating because it is not just its preferences, its strategies, or its 
unique way of combining resources that defines whether it is going to dominate or sole-
ly operate the market. It is specifically its proximate environment that defines the input, 
the information, opportunities and hurdles that help or hinder its accumulation of re-
sources and prestige (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1994). The authors derive their 
theory from their observation that some countries represent a more suitable location to 
establish and develop new businesses, while others, due to a stringent economic policy 
or other social and financial constraints make it more difficult for similar business de-
velopment. For example, in Europe many West-European countries have been outsourc-
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ing their main facilities to Eastern Europe where labor is cheaper and is often supported 
by the local government with the intent of promoting the economy and occupations. The 
authors claim that the environment inevitably changes and by doing so, it provide firms 
with a large variety of opportunities which the firms can take advantage of, or that they 
can ignore and pursue their own strategy. Similarly, these firms can influence the envi-
ronment as well, responding to these opportunities, innovating, using the resources 
available, and removing the hurdles present in the territory. 
The authors also assume that it is the proximate environment that significantly 
influences the success of a firm. In this environment, success depends on more than 
firm strategy, structure, and the level of competition in the market it is operating in. It 
also depends on other elements like the availability of skilled (or cheaper) workforce, a 
higher demand that supports the growth of the firm, and other industries, which, with 
their products, supplies, and more refined technologies offer the firm a competitive ad-
vantage over the other firms that reside elsewhere. See Figure 5.4 below. 
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Figure 5.4 
The proximate environment of a firm 
 
Source: Rumelt, Schendel, Teece (1994, 453) 
The insights of this model should make the reader ponder the importance of the 
environment in determining the success of a competing organization. One can easily 
transplant the ideas of the authors to a better understanding of why the two disputing 
countries analyzed so far, reach a specific agreement. As argued above, Porter‟s „Five 
forces model‟ can be modified replacing the competition between firms with the dispute 
among countries. Even though the issue is competition on the one hand, and bargaining 
on the other hand, one can still take the ideas from the author and adapt them to the con-
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text of the dispute between the gas-supplier Russia and the gas-transporter Ukraine. The 
importance of the environment is as important for a competing firm as well as for a dis-
puting country. In both cases there are opportunities and hurdles that can affect the final 
outcome which is the success of the firm in its market or the success of the country in 
the ongoing dispute. 
Figure 5.5 
The proximate environment of a gas importer 
 
 
In the adapted model of Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1994), reworked to effi-
ciently represent the situation of the two disputing countries, factor conditions have 
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been replaced by other factors that affect the competition between the two countries. 
The central economic precondition is the Ukrainian system for the Russian gas to reach 
the European customers. As also seen in the modified Five Forces model, the exclusivi-
ty of the Ukrainian system is what allows the country to maintain a bargaining advan-
tage even though Russia has been trying to reduce it by building Blue Stream, an addi-
tional gas line to Turkey in 1997 which is expected to be fully functional in 2010. An 
alteration of the centrality of the Ukrainian-Russian pipeline system would significantly 
change the nature of the dispute. The two actors would be put in a situation to collude in 
order to avoid losing the primacy of their resources which in the case of Ukraine, it is 
the property of the pipeline system, and in the Russian case, it is the abundance of natu-
ral resources and their importance for the European economy. Similarly, global demand 
is also an important factor that influences bargaining in the example. If the demand in-
creases and no other suppliers exist that can promptly provide gas where needed, the 
position of both Ukraine and Russia improves. Therefore, both parties are more likely to 
look for a favorable deal in the dispute. This means that the “pie will grow” in size and 
the disputers will support further negotiations until the best agreement has been reached. 
Conversely, if the demand decreases, it is in the best interest of both parties to close a 
deal as soon as possible and this is done before the economic downturn worsens or be-
fore other suppliers or pipelines complete the construction of competing transportation 
systems/energy alternatives. 
Keohane and Nye (1977) indicated in the late seventies that our globe is an in-
terconnected world, which they define as “global village”, due to telecommunications 
and jet travel. This provides an environment in which social and economic transactions 
are creating a “world without borders”. According to the authors, one is engaged in a 
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common enterprise and there is not a single nation or group of nations which can gain 
by pushing beyond the limits that sustain world economic growth. In this “global vil-
lage” no state or organization benefits from basing progress on demonstrations of 
strength because the destruction of the rival incurs damages of one‟s economic, social 
and political ties with that country and the other surrounding countries. Similarly, and 
even more clearly in the case of the gas dispute that entail the disruption the gas supply, 
a dispute over gas transportation and its price has severe consequences on the surround-
ing countries and the community in general. Drawing from the Rumelt, Schendel, Teece 
(1994) model of competitive advantage and the idea that it is the proximate context that 
more significantly affects the situation, one cannot assume that the bargain will not af-
fect the relationship with the members of the proximate community related to the dis-
pute. Especially if the crisis lasts several days and entails a significant disruption of the 
gas supply to European countries, one must consider the relevance of the other countries 
in shaping the outcome of the dispute among Russia and Ukraine. If initially the crisis is 
driven by the preferences of the two countries, the duration of the dispute will entail 
damages to the community‟s economy and a severing of ties between Ukraine and Rus-
sia within their proximate environment.  
With all of these aspects, which interact with each other in the original model, 
one can delineate the bi-directional relationships associated with them. An example is 
the global demand and the uniqueness of the transportation systems; if demand is strong 
and expected to grow, the gas-producing country has an incentive to be the promoter of 
new additional pipelines in order to avoid other competitors entering the same market 
which reduces the market share of the existing countries. If the monopolist is not oppor-
tunistic enough to seize the occasion to render the construction of rival pipelines eco-
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nomically illogical, other companies and countries may find a favorable situation to 
build a competing pipeline. This in turn will endanger both Russia‟s gas and Ukraine‟s 
pipeline system.  
Similarly, an expansion of the demand also changes the relationship among the 
community members served by the Russian gas and the Ukrainian infrastructure. The 
pressure to gain privileged access to these resources may force countries to compete 
amongst each other and form private agreements directly with the supplier. This in turn 
may have further effects like the construction of additional pipelines to help the transit 
of gas directly to the destination with the additional consequence of increasing depen-
dence on Russian gas. Alternatively, the increased demand or future signs of such a 
trend may foster cooperation among European countries to reunite and find a way to 
access another sources of gas and/or diversify their energy imports. A mixture of both 
strategies has characterized the present situation in that some countries, like Italy, have 
preferred closing a private deal directly with Gazprom rather than joining a community 
project like Nabucco (BBC News 2009). However, should the demand for gas rise as 
the economy recovers as expected, new developments in the relationship among the Eu-
ropean countries and the gas suppliers resulting in more cooperation or more enthu-
siasm to close exclusive deals directly with Russia may occur. 
The analysis of the business strategic literature has revealed a major limitation of 
current game theoretic approaches as partly hinted to by Gintis (2010) with his claim 
that external factors like social norms are responsible for shaping the actors‟ prefe-
rences. However, I have argued that even though game theory tends to not consider oth-
er elements that influence the preferences of the actors involved in a dispute, much 
more is excluded. This is the case especially if the dispute occurs over an extended pe-
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riod of time. One argues that the proximate environment is another source of variation 
in the actors‟ preferences because other members of the community in which the two 
disputing countries belong to may exert pressure to affirm a deal in a timely manner. 
This is so since they are directly connected to the crisis due to the instability caused by 
it and the disruption of the gas supply which was originally meant to be employed as a 
tool of persuasion, but which can be turned into a means of extending the effects of the 
prolonged crisis to the wider community of reference. The modified models proposed 
here claim from only a theoretical standpoint that the environment does affect the prefe-
rences of the disputing actors. Gintis (2010) focused his critique of game theory on the 
relevance of the social norms to the general discussion. 
I have started from this idea to develop a much larger argument: the proximate 
environment, that is the environment the dispute can be placed in, is also responsible for 
the decisions and the agreements reached by the parties, and there is empirical evidence 
that this environment has a real (economic) interest in doing so. For Gintis (2010) that 
was the presence of social norms while I argue that the diplomatic network surrounding 
the dispute can heavily influence the decisions taken by the actors. They have the op-
portunity to settle not only according to their own preferences but also taking into ac-
count the pressures stemming from neighboring countries that may have a personal in-
terest in the conclusion of the dispute in an expeditious way. The evidence that shows 
that the dispute is associated with damages in other states‟ economies by directly da-
maging those economies can be seen as relevant proof that the mere start of a dispute 
may trigger a mechanism. This mechanism modifies the preferences of the actors, due 
to the diplomatic interventions of actors that are not directly involved in the dispute 
(therefore usually not included in a normal bargaining model). However, in order to do 
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so, there is a need to find evidence that gas disputes are capable of triggering unfavora-
ble situations for other states. And that actors from the proximate environment become 
involved at this point.  
This then gives outside parties a reason to intervene in the crisis and play an ac-
tive role in modifying the preferences of the actors by imposing deadlines and urging a 
resolve to the dispute within pre-determined times. This was especially the case in the 
2009 gas dispute when a mission to Russia and to Ukraine was organized to support the 
claims that were made from both sides. This was done when the President of the Euro-
pean Commission spoke in person to both the Russian and the Ukrainian Prime Minis-
ters, urging them to restore the supply of gas as soon as possible since their reputations 
as reliable suppliers were in question. A telephone conversation involving the same par-
ties occurred three days later, when the President of the European Commission was 
granted assurances from the disputants that if a commission was to be deployed, then 
the crisis would soon reach an end (Pirani, Stern, Yafimava 2009, 46). On January 7th, 
2009 the German Chancellor spoke with the Prime Ministers and was able to reach 
agreement by which a commission of experts would be sent to both countries in order to 
investigate the actual causes behind the halt of gas to Europe. On January 11th, the 
Monitoring Agreement was accepted by all parties and European experts were deployed 
to designated key points of the Russian-Ukrainian pipeline system (Pirani, Stern, Yafi-
mava, 47). 
 
5.3 Changing games in an evolving environment 
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The 2009 crisis represents an extreme case in which the gravity of the situation, 
determined by the interruption of gas flow to Europe, triggered an immediate and clear 
response from the highest European political spheres. A similar statement cannot be 
made with reference to the 2006 gas dispute in which “the European Commission offi-
cials were severely criticized for only returning from holiday in time to welcome the 
end of the crisis” (Pirani, Stern, Yafimava 2009, 46). Despite the lack of intervention at 
the supra-national level, consumers reacted to the crisis due to the reduction of gas 
supply, even though the crisis merely lasted three days.  
Nonetheless, both crises stress an important fact, which is that the outcome of 
political bargaining that occurred between Russia and Ukraine, and Russia and Belarus 
or Moldova was affected in different degrees by the preferences of actors that had an in-
terest in an early resolution of the dispute. In both cases, gas supplies were reduced or 
cut causing significant damages to the economies and the standards of living of citizens 
of the countries that were more severely affected by the gas disruptions. Thus, these 
countries were strongly motivated to impose their preferences on the disputing actors 
since the consequences of their doing so were evident to all. However, even though 
crises are not followed by gas disruptions, they may be responsible for more subtle da-
maging events. These events are a decline in consumption, given the higher perception 
that the economy will be more unstable and/or like a rise in gas (and oil) price, which 
the economic literature shows to be the cause of a decline in the real GDP of energy im-
porting countries (Hamilton 1983; Abeysinghe 2001; Leduc and Sill 2004; Ramos and 
Veiga 2010).  
The evidence found that shows that gas crises do influence stock market indexes, 
energy prices, and GDP supports my claim that when studying and modeling gas dis-
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putes one should consider the pressure deriving from external actors that do not pertain 
to the commencing causes or clash of preferences of the start of a dispute. In other 
words, what political bargaining theory fails to account for is a changing environment in 
which the crisis takes place. More specifically, one argues that the context in which the 
crisis debuts changes immediately. This occurs as soon as the crisis reaches the point at 
which its very existence affects the internal situation of other actors. In fact, one pond-
ers two different questions; if one would like to understand how a crisis started, then it 
is logical to analyze what the preferences of the clashing parties are. However, if one 
would like to understand why a crisis ends with a specific agreement (that favors one 
side rather than the other one), then I argue that it is imperative to broaden the reference 
context and extend it to comprise of all the other actors that may have been affected, 
along with the pressures they may have exerted on the preferences of the disputing ac-
tors. 
As seen above, fuzzy games come close to portray a more realistic political bar-
gaining situation. However, in these games the number of players is precisely defined 
and the fuzziness pertains only to other aspects of the games like the structure of the 
payoffs, strategies, objectives, moves, but not the increasing importance of one or more 
additional players in a game. However, one can informally recognize that the fuzziness 
of these games is „more‟complete by acknowledging the fact that there are actors whose 
preferences gradually emerge and become active in a game, especially in an environ-
ment which has been damaged by the start of the crisis or in an environment that bene-
fitted from an active diplomatic intervention (statement from President of the EU for 
example).  
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In such a game, represented in Figure 5.6, not only the structure of the game 
changes; from a two-dimensional table its formal representation gradually evolves into a 
multi-dimensional table, where there are as many dimensions as the total number of 
players. In what I will call Fully-Fuzzy games the preferences orderings for actions 
change, aggregating across all “game-dimensions”, where the choice/alternatives arise. 
Figure 5.6 
A Fully-Fuzzy game with three players 
 
 
Fully-Fuzzy games possess the ability to consider an environment that gradually 
evolves to the point of introducing a new player mid-play that in the case of the present 
work could be identified as Europe, whether with this concept one refers to any combi-
nation of European countries and/or European institution which is directly or indirectly 
involved by the gas dispute in the negotiation process. Figure 5.6 emphasizes the gra-
dual transition (emphasized in the Figure by a dashed line) by which these new actors 
enter the game. As already said, it is this gradual change, which one can assume to be 
related to the cumulative damage suffered by these external actors, the central part of 
my argument and which I claim cannot be directly dealt with by current state-of-the-art 
of game theoretic models. 
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It is important to state here that in this work I am limiting my analysis to the in-
formal definition of Fully-Fuzzy games, leaving to future research the definition of the 
actual calculation of the pay-offs and equilibriums. 
As a final remark, it is important to note that the third party (EU) does not neces-
sarily have to be allied with either of the two former players, Russia and Ukraine. The 
preferences of this third entity may have some affinity with the preferences of the other 
actors, but, being a separate entity, they do not necessarily need to be so. 
 
5.4 Connecting the dots: discussion of results 
 
The models presented in this work shows that especially the crises between Rus-
sia and Belarus in 2007 and Ukraine in 2009 had heavy repercussions on external play-
ers, whether investigating is their real GDP growth or their stock markets. Part of the 
reason surely has to do with the fact that, despite good economic and political relation-
ships between Belarus and Russia (if compared to that Russia-Ukraine), Gazprom 
stopped supplies to Belarus as soon as the contract binding them expired in January 1, 
2004, and in the February of the same year and was repeatedly threatened similar events 
in later years as well. In 2004, Belarus survived the winter by signing temporary con-
tracts with some private gas companies.  
Belarus did not reach any agreement with Russia until February 18, 2004, when 
Gazprom cut off all gas supplies for 30 hours, including those that were meant to be de-
livered to the European market. Over five months after the interruption of gas supplies 
to Belarus in 2004, the two countries reached an agreement, in which a higher price was 
set and to be paid to Gazprom, while Gazprom obtained a lower tariff for the transporta-
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tion of the gas through the Belarusian pipeline system in exchange of a loan to Belarus 
which was supposed to help it pay its gas debt back to Gazprom (NewEurope.eu. 2006). 
The consequences of the February cut were significant especially for the Kali-
ningrad region and Poland, the former being forced to switch to fuel oil and to hot wa-
ter, the latter suffering a 35% supply decline on February 18, and a 50% gas diminution 
on February 19, while Latvia was able to compensate using its own gas reserves, which 
were even sufficient to help the neighboring Lithuania as well (NewEurope.eu. 2006, 
100).  
An agreement was found only at the end of year 2005, when Russia was in-
tended to supply gas for a very low price, namely around $47 per thousand cubic meter.  
In exchange Belarus would commit to (Kupchinsky 2006. 100):  
 follow the schedule planned for the completion of the Yamal-Europe 
pipeline which transports gas to Germany; 
 resolve the issues related to the leases of the lands on which the gas 
compressors were to be built; 
 resume the talks about the joint venture Beltrangaz-Gazprom.  
As noted above, the 2004 crisis hardly struck Poland, which receives half its 
supplies via the Belarus pipeline. According to Krushelnycky (2004), the crisis generat-
ed widespread fear in the country of being left without gas in the middle of the winter 
season. The crisis triggered the reaction of the Polish leaders, who requested an “urgent 
review of their country's energy policies”, given their high dependence on Russian 
energy which transits across countries that can be easily destabilized by crises like the 
one occurred in 2004.  
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The 2004 gas dispute, as shown above, triggered for the first time doubts on the 
reliability of Gazprom as energy supplier. In 30 years of successful economic and dip-
lomatic relations, this was the first time that Europe cast doubts upon Gazprom‟s ability 
to control its gas exports to Europe (Bruce 2005) without having to resort to total stop-
page of gas supplies on an important transit country like Belarus. These concerns were 
strongly supported by Germany, who proposed, along with Russia, the construction of 
the North-European Gas pipeline, known also as Nord Stream. This pipeline, over half 
of which is Gazprom‟s property, is designed with the precise intent to bypass the land-
based pipelines that cross the Belarusian and Ukrainian territories, thus reducing Rus-
sian dependence on the stability of these two countries for securing a steady flow of gas 
to Europe. It was in January 2004 that the Russian government made its first official 
move in support of the construction of this pipeline, which officially started at the end 
of 2005 (Cohen 2006). Germany has a personal interest in the success of this project, in 
that it will host the main gas hub for the entire Western section of the European Union 
and to some countries of Eastern Europe as well. The Nord Stream project will not only 
secure a more reliable supply of gas to Western Europe, but it will also bring a general 
reduction of the gas price, since no transit fees would be at that point be due to the tran-
sit countries. Transit fees, however, are also the motivation of the opposition of coun-
tries like Poland, Czech Republic, Slowakia, and Hungary, which provide an important 
source of revenues for their economies (Cohen 2006). 
Thus, if on the one hand the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline promotes 
more reliable supplies of gas from Russia, the dependence on Russian energy will be 
strengthened, making Europe directly vulnerable to the Russian political agenda, and 
decreasing the European ability to switch to alternative sources of energy. 
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However, the damaging effects of the 2004 dispute on the European Community 
as a whole were probably the reason behind the publication of the Directive of the 
Council of the European Union 2004/67/EC of April 26, 2004, according to which a 
minimum of common policy was to be adopted in order to guarantee a certain level of 
security of gas supplies
182
. Natural gas was, with this directive, recognized as a vital 
element for economic success of the European Union, and imposed on the Community 
the requirements of:  
 precisely identifying the responsibilities of different market player to secure 
a pre-defined standard of gas supplies; 
 creating gas reserves that are able to counter eventual supply disruptions. 
A Gas Coordination Group
183
 created for this specific task will monitor the contracts re-
gulating the supplies to European member States, the efficiency of the gas reserves of 
the Member States, and the degree of interconnection of gas reserves between Member 
States. The 2004/67 Directive introduces a 3-step approach to be followed in case of gas 
disruption: according to this approach, the industry attempts to resolve it first; if not 
agreement is reached, then the national governments have to intervene. However, if 
even these measures are not sufficient to resolve the situation, the Community as a 
whole will mediate and assist the disputing actors. 
While this Directive is probably the strongest European reaction to the growing 
threat of dependence on Russian gas at the time, not much in its language and in its re-
quirements show that the European Union, as a whole, should be forced to create and 
                                               
182 See http://www.energy.eu/directives/l_12720040429en00920096.pdf and also 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1917&format=HTML&aged=0&languag
e=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
183 This group was formally activated in 2006. See note above. 
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enforce rules that guarantee the security of supply not just of every single country, but  
the entire region as well. This suggests that, even though the 2004 crisis did affect sev-
eral European economies, a recognition of the centrality of Member states‟ freedom to 
decide the best approach to guarantee their own gas supply still dominate over the over-
all concern of growing dependence on foreign energy. Such an issue may be the expla-
nation for why the publication of the 2004/67 Directive did not reach significance in the 
stock market described above. 
The significance of the 2006 dispute not just in the model selected, but also in its 
variants is likely to reflect the increased relevance of gas security in Europe. In this oc-
casion, the effects of this crisis were probably behind the statements made by Andris 
Piebalgs, EU energy commissioner, in support of a reaching “as soon as possible a satis-
factory agreement that does not put in question gas transits to the EU” (BBC News 
2006a) and were also the motivation behind the renewed Polish interest in reducing its 
dependence on Russian energy, and in making it clear that the disputes between Belarus 
and Russia had clearly demonstrated how unreliable Russian gas supplies are, implicitly 
calling for a diversification of supplies. 
The 2006 crisis is likely to have further motivated Germany and Russia to con-
struct the Nord Stream pipeline, a project which was opposed for the reasons described 
above by Poland, which preferred to put additional pressure on the EU as to find a 
common answer to the Russian moves of consolidating its political and economic influ-
ence over the transit countries. 
Michael Glos, who was at the time, the chairman of the European Union Energy 
Ministers‟ Council, reflecting an experience with the potential negative effects that 
these kind of disputes can have on the European economies, expressed concern over the 
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evolution of the 2006 crisis.This dispute quickly degenerated in January 1, 2007, when 
Transneft, a Russian company, cut oil supplies on the Druzhba pipeline as a result of the 
Belarusian siphoning off of oil as a repayment of the unpaid transit fees through its ter-
ritories (Bloomberg.com 2007). Shortly after, on January 25, 2007, EU Energy Com-
missioner Andris Piebalgs emphasized the unacceptance of increasing dependence on 
imports and the importance of building up alternative sources of energy by
184
: 
 confirmation of the goal of reducing energy consumption by 20% by 2020; 
 an overall renewable energy target for 2020 of 20%; 
 a "minimum target" for biofuels in 2020 of 10% of the petrol and diesel 
market. 
Although these political reactions may be more easily attributed to the 2006 gas dis-
putes between Ukraine and Russia and Russia and Moldova, it is likely that these are 
the results of the perceived damage that these crises had on the EU GDP just few 
months before. The statistical model I described above found not only the dispute in 
2004 (Belarus), to be significant to explain the general downturn in the GDP of the 9 
countries analyzed; both the 2006 Belarusian and Ukrainian crises contributed to raising 
a general concern about the European dependence on Russian natural gas. Although the 
2006 dispute did not produce significant damages to the GDPs of the 9 countries chosen 
among the most influential in the Council of European Union, the effects of the crises in 
2004 and in 2006 probably carried over the following years and were reinforced by the 
growing certainty among EU leaders of the political significance of the Russian use of 
the “gas weapon” (Saunders 2008).  
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On the evening of August 1, 2007 the European Commission activated the EU's 
Network of Energy Security Correspondents (NESCO)
185
, a forum instituted on May 
10, 2007 and constituted by representatives of the European Commission, the Council 
Secretariat and EU Member States with the purpose of anticipating and preventing dis-
ruptions on energy supplies to the EU. On this date, NESCO was to officially follow 
from a close distance the Russia-Belarus crisis and report its potential effect on the EU 
energy security, de facto advertising the deepness of the EU concern of the potential ef-
fects of the 2007 crisis. The stock markets reacted positively to this event, probably re-
flecting that traders perceived the deep concern and interest of the EU in an early reso-
lution of the dispute. 
Saunders (2008) reports that a 2007 survey of the Transatlantic Trends found that 
59% of Europeans had recently changed their opinion regarding the reliability of Russia 
as an energy supplier; these results, that on the one hand should be reflected by a statis-
tical significance of the Belarusian dispute in 2007, do not necessarily need to be so, 
given the large negative effects that the Belarusian crises in 2004 and 2006, and the 
Ukrainian crisis in 2006 had on the economies of the 9 countries studied
186
.  
Not surprisingly, the Moldovan dispute did not have any significant effect according 
to the models presented in this work. The minor attention devoted to this dispute, I be-
lieve, might be a reflection that also given its position, the dispute between Russia and 
Moldova did not cause any relevant effect, or that its effects were so small that the 




186 Pirani, Stern and Yafimava (2009) also confirm the strong negative effect of the 2006 Ukrainian dis-
pute with Russia. 
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models used in this work could not capture. The model, however, may have attributed 
the variance that should be attributed to the Moldovan crisis to the other crises that oc-
curred at the same time. The Moldovan crisis, in fact, started (using the gas disruption 
as the indicator of negotiation failure) in January 1, 2006 at the same time the Ukrainian 
crisis did, followed few months later by the Belarusian crisis. It is likely, then, that the 
model struggles attributing variance to the variable that identifies the Moldovan crisis, 
given that other two crises were playing a role at the same time. However, as said 
above, it is also possible that the models correctly identify the fact that this crisis did not 
last long enough and was not followed by disruptions of supplies directed to the Euro-
pean to damage the economies of the 9 countries studied here. Nonetheless, the crisis 
did attract some attention from the European Commission, which on January 17, 2006 
welcomed the temporary agreement found by the two parties. The Commission, howev-
er, also sent an energy expert to Moldova in January 18, in order to assess the security 
of supply for Moldova and the EU (Lobjakas 2006). Thus, political pressure was ex-
erted on the negotiations too late, but the reason behind this act should not be attributed 
to the insignificant effects of the Moldovan crisis, but rather to the effects of the Belaru-
sian crisis in 2004, which, as discussed above, had attracted the political attention of the 
European Commission and brought the 2004/67/EC Directive of April 26, 2004. This 
Directive was the probable factor that led the Commission to send the expert to evaluate 
the situation in situ. 
In conclusion, the model finds a negative and significant effect of the dispute be-
tween Ukraine and Russia in 2009. Such a result could have been expected, given the 
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large gas disruption that affected several European countries
187
 (World Gas Intelligence 
2009).  
As shown in Table 4.3 above, the statement from the Presidency of the European 
Union of January 4, 2009, was negatively seen by EU traders, signifying that traders did 
not perceive a strong EU commitment that could have been enough to end energy dis-
ruptions. Moreover, the European Commission, as a result of the 2009 dispute, reacted 
also with the establishment of the “early warning mechanism”, an agreement drafted by 
the European Commission EU-Russia Summit on 21-22 May, 2009
188
 and accepted by 
President Medvedev to prevent and more efficiently manage supply disruptions
189
, 
whether they are of technical, legal or commercial nature. This agreement, reinforced by 
IP/09/1718, advocates the early notification of any foreseen gas, oil, electricity disrup-
tions which can be followed by consultations and the drafting of common plans to pre-
vent the reduction or the cut-off of gas to occur. 
In the occasion of the signing of this agreement in 2009 (which was being discussed 
already on the EU-Russia Summit in 2007), Commissioner Piebalgs commented that  
An energy crisis like the one the EU suffered in January is harmful for supply, transit and consuming 
countries alike. We need to do everything necessary to make sure that such a situation never happens 
again. I'm confident that the implementation of this Mechanism will be a powerful tool to prevent, in any 




                                               
187 See above. 
188 According to Grant and Barysch (2003), the EU-Russia Energy Dialogues do not to produce signifi-
cant results for issues like pipelines, gas supply contracts, electricity, sector restructuring and nuclear fuel 
supplies due to the general tendency of EU countries of dealing with these issues privately and directly 
with Russia. 
189 The June 2010 gas dispute between Belarus and Russia has shown that this system needs additional 
efforts to expeditiously prevent damaging effects on Europe. 
190 See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1718&language=en . 
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In July of the same year, the Commission proposed a Regulation designed to better 
cope with potential crises by
191
: 
 giving more independence to the market operators with regards to man-
aging supplies during any disruption; 
 promoting market transparency and ensure a deeper knowledge of the 
balance between demand and supply of gas; 
 promoting more collaboration between the disputing Member States and 
the EU. 
Energy security was once again the major topic in November 2009 with the launch 
of the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership, designed to at-
tract investments in Eastern Europe that maximize efficiency in this area. The project 
will start in Ukraine, which, according to Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for 
External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, has  
“a fantastic potential to save energy, and energy efficiency represents Ukraine‟s single best opportu-
nity to improve its energy security by reducing its import dependency. Modest investments can bring big 
results. I hope that we can demonstrate in Ukraine that energy efficiency is good for the economy, good 
for the consumer, and good for the planet – so that the projects we undertake here can be copied else-
where”192. 
 
This project is just another example of the programmes sponsored by the European 
Commission to reduce general consumption of energy resources, while, at the same 
time, reducing dependency and costs. Along this line is the sponsorization of the expan-
                                               





212 Changing Games and Evolving Contexts: Political Bargaining in European Energy Disputes 
sion of a geothermal energy plant in Iceland
193
, the creation of “Marguerite”, the 2020 
European Fund for Energy, Climate Change and Infrastructure
194
, and an increased at-
tention to other renewable energy sources
195
. 
Unlike the dispute that occurred in 2006, the 2009 negotiation process lasted for 
over 20 days, with a partial gas reduction as soon as they reached a dead end and a total 
stop just six days later. The 2006 crisis lasted just 3 days, also thanks to the European 
customers‟ intervention, which was quickly followed, according to Nichol, Woehrel and 
Bernard (2006) and Yhiah (2008), by a series of agreements that settled the economic 
and political relationship between the two countries for a relatively long time especially 
if compared to the Belarusian case. 
The relevance of the external factors was evident not only in the significance of the 
statements, and institutions studied in the stock market model, but also by Russia de-
cided that it was in its interest to bypass Ukraine with the construction of the Nord 
Stream. Although several other diplomatic issues were connected to the building of this 
expensive infrastructure, Ukraine perceived that the realization of the new pipeline, that 
was supposed to bypass up to 50% of the Ukrainian pipeline system, was a serious 
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threat to its centrality and gas delivery to Europe
196
. It was also for this reason that a 
wave of agreements followed immediately after European customers reacted to the 2006 
dispute, reflected also by the broaden scope and increased amount of projects of IN-
OGATE programme
197
, a EU initiative to foster collaboration with the littoral states of 
the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea and surrounding countries to enhance energy securi-
ty, and attract financial resources on important projects dedicated to the achievement of 
the above mentioned goal. 
Similar conclusions, however, could be drawn for the 2009 crisis; in fact, the two 
parties were aware that a negotiation phase as long as that of the Belarusian crisis in 
2004 would have led the EU to seriously invest time and resources in alternative 
sources of energy, given the statements already made in 2004 about reducing energy 
consumption, lowering dependence on oil and gas and committing to the construction of 
the Nabucco pipeline, the White Stream (a pipeline which connects Georgia and Roma-
nia through the Black Sea) and the Interconnector between Turkey and Greece and Italy 
(ITGY). These pipelines, as discussed above, are in direct competition with the North 
Stream, the pipeline owned in majority by Russia which is planning to use it to bypass 
transit countries and lower the gas price itself by avoiding paying transit fees. Nabucco 
and similar projects, however, represents a threat also to Ukraine, which benefits from 
its being a transit country. This common interest in avoiding the loss of their privileged 
access to the European market, a loss which can be seen as an externality of a prolonged 
bargaining, is, I argue, another example that the preferences of external actors need to 
                                               
196 Its centrality represented its main bargaining advantage in the negotiations with Russia (Saunders 
2008). 
197 See http://www.inogate.org/ . 
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be accounted for to understand the development of important political crises like the 





The 2009 and the 2010 gas dispute have shown the international community that 
energy is to become a prime issue for European security. In recent years, these conflicts 
have reached an intensity which was only matched by those of the seventies. In addition 
to European security, the expansion of Russian political influence in Europe has become 
a major concern for the highest European leaders, who suspect that Russia may use the 
energy weapon to advance its political agenda also in Eastern and Western Europe.  
Understanding the development and conclusion of these political bargaining 
events can occur through the use of political bargaining models, and it is discussing the 
potential of these models where I believe that this work is making its biggest contribu-
tion. This work shows that one of the most popular political bargaining models, game 
theory, has thus far been limited by its inability of dealing with a changing environment. 
Evolutionary games, infinitively repeated games, multi-agent games, two-level games, 
nested games, fuzzy games, neutrosophic games, supergames, metagames, despite their 
value and their emphasisis on specific issues do not account for an environment in 
which multiple actors gradually become active parts of the game, as shown to be a real 
occurrance and supported by empirical evidence in political bargaining crises like those 
between Russia and its former satellites. Figure 5.6 emphasizes that an evolving envi-
ronment can significantly affect not only the structure of a game (no more just a Chick-
en game), but it modifies the calculation relative to the aggregation of the preferences, 
which, in the specific case presented in Figure 5.6, would occur across all thre dimen-
sions. 
In conclusion, I believe that a secondary contribution of this work is to bring to 
light the existence of statistical techniques like ARCH models and Principal Component 
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Analysis. These techniques, mostly used in economics or health sciences, would cer-
tainly help political scientists produce better research, more robust and of higher quali-
ty, to the benefit of the whole scientific community. 
It is important to point out that the present work is simply an attempt to stress 
the limits of modern game theory. As the reader has noticed, there is no attempt to for-
malize the gradual interaction of multiple players. This work is rather designed to ack-
noledge this game theoretical limitation and leaves the design of the formal utility cal-
culus to future research, mainly due to the mathematical complexity of the task. I chose 
the call the game “Fully-Fuzzy” knowing that the computation complexity of this game 
would probably be at a higher level than Fuzzy games. Nonetheless, it is probable that 
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